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Abstract 
 
The present research provides an outline of the history of human rights in Soviet 
legal doctrine in order to show the impact of main trends in its historical development on 
contemporary legal thinking in Russia. The research is pursued using primary sources that 
focus on the concepts and evolution of the ideas held by Soviet lawyers, namely - the 
conception of “proletarian” law of  D.Kursky, the “socialistic” concept  of human rights of 
S. Kechekyan, E. Lukasheva and  V. Chikvadze who studied the phenomenon of the claim 
on the formation of a new type of special Soviet law and other. The study aims to fill the 
gap in international legal scholarship, contributing by the research on Soviet academics 
whose scientific tradition is only found in Russian-language texts. This present work is 
conducted using a historiographical method, which is aimed at uncovering the continuities 
between the past and the present and is based on the premise that history is an inevitable 
element in order to grasp the essence of modern Russian legal thinking. 
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Introduction 
 
“Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small 
places, close to home — so close and so small that they cannot 
be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the 
individual person: the neighborhood he lives in; the school or 
college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. 
Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks 
equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without 
discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they 
have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action 
to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for 
progress in the larger world.” 
Eleanor 
Roosevelt1 
 
 
My life experiences and the environment in which I grew up stimulated my desire 
to pursue human rights and my curiosity for history of law in post-communist countries. 
Due to my father’s job in the military, my family was required to move around quite a bit. I 
myself was born in Berlin and have spent the majority of my life in Moscow, but my 
experiences and travels have taught me a respect for different cultures and ways of living. 
                                                          
1 Chair of the committee created by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to draft the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at the presentation of IN YOUR HANDS: A Guide for 
Community Action for the Tenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United 
Nations, New York, 27 March 1958 cited from “Human rights indicators: a guide to measurement and 
implementation”, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2012, p.9 
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My family left Germany on the day that the Berlin wall fell. It was only when I was older 
that I was able to understand the real significance of this event, and grasp the importance 
of the changes which happened after the collapse of the USSR.  These events, as well as 
the political transitions of Russia in the 1990’s allowed me to take notice of the significant 
impact that different state transitions which could happen overnight, much like what 
happened in Moscow, can have for the people living within the state.  
The present research is focused on the development of human rights in Soviet legal 
doctrine in order to demonstrate the correlation between past trends and contemporary 
human rights practices in Russia. There is scarce material in international scholarship on 
the development of Soviet legal history, and even less which is written from strictly 
positivist position; rather it is usually presented showing a strong bond between ideology 
and politics without clear separation. H.Kelsen made a critical positivist analysis of the 
Soviet legal doctrine in The Communist Theory of Law, where he provides a critique of 
mainstream Soviet legal scholars, namely A.Vyshinksy, E.Pashukanis, P.Stuchka, 
M.Reisner, M.Strogovich, S.Golunsky. The translation of texts from the same Soviet 
lawyers is provided by J. Hazard in Soviet legal philosophy, which was a part of post-World 
War II US scholarship on the Soviet Union characterized by W. E. Butler as a ‘know thine 
enemy’ syndrome: “to comprehend how he lives, to facilitate means of understanding and 
communication so as to avoid miscalculation, to identify and clarify opposed positions and 
values”.2 
In Gentle Civilizer of Nations M.Koskenniemi highlights one of the wide spread 
problems in historiographical legal study – that attention is normally only paid to “what the 
great masters of the discipline thought and did”.3 But it is also paramount to study the 
work of other, less famous scholars of USSR who had an impact on the development of 
the legal doctrine in order to grasp the complete picture of legal formation in the Soviet 
Union. The greatest difficulty for international scholarship is the heritage left by less 
                                                          
2 BUTLER W. E., ‘International Law and the Comparative Method’, in W. E. Butler (ed.), International 
Law in Comparative Perspective (Alpen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980) 25–40 at 31, cited from 
MALKSOO L. “Russian approaches to International law”, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.7 
3 KOSKENNIEMI M., “Gentle civilizer of nations: The Rise and Fall of international law 1870-1960”, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001 
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famous Soviet lawyers that have not been translated from Russian and thus their impact is 
largely unknown. Many notice that dozens of socialist experts are known only as names4. 
Using the advantage of being a native Russian speaker, my research is done using primary 
sources that focuses on the concepts and evolution in the ideas held by Soviet lawyers, 
whose scientific tradition is only found in Russian-language texts.  
The soviet socialistic legal system was based on the doctrine of Marx and Engels 
which is not a pure legal study. Instead, there were only two possible sources available 
which could form the basis of an established legal system: Soviet political government and 
scientific socialist scholars. Neither body acted independently of the other and faced great 
difficulty interpreting classical Marxian texts and creating a basis for legal study. Even 
though both bodies sought to “adapt itself submissively to every change of Soviet 
government” 5  legal doctrine equally played a significant role in the formation of state 
institutions and practice. 
The time frame of my research on Soviet legal doctrine is from the initial formation 
of the Soviet judicial system, dating from the October Revolution of 1917, till the collapse 
of USSR in in 1991. The early period before 1922-1923 is characterized by extreme 
“judicial fluidity” and the use of old legislation of the Russian Empire in the absence of 
relevant Bolshevik laws. The year 1922 marked the end of transition from Imperial Russian 
legislation to that of the Soviet Republic, since the new reality required a new approach and 
interpretation of Marxist thought from legal scholars so as to adapt to the necessities of the 
new state and build the foundations of Soviet legal doctrine. Research during the early 
period of Soviet legal formation is presented by analyzing the work of Soviet lawyers who 
created the very foundations of Soviet legal scholarship – D.Kursky, N.Krylenko, 
M.Kozlovsky, I.Razumovsky, each of whom gave different, contrasting hypotheses 
concerning the dialectical nature of law and Marxian doctrine. The result is clearly 
demonstrated by careful study of J. Stalin's policy. Evgeny Pashukanis’ naïve optimism 
about accomplishing all of Marx’s predictions was criticized and all of his scientific views 
                                                          
4 See for example, LUDWIKOWSKI R. “Socialist legal theory in post-Pashukanis era”, Boston College 
International Law Review: Volume 8 Issue 2, 1987, p.323 
5 KELSEN H. “The communist theory of law”, Frederick A.Praeger Publishing House, New York, 
1955 
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regarding the law and predictions on withering it away, he was claimed “traitor and 
wrecker” and repressed. Conversely, the Soviet General Procurator A.J. Vyshinsky, who 
became also the director of Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, took a 
new line in the development of Soviet legal doctrine: that the state established law with the 
sole function of being an expression of state will through sanctions and coercion. A. 
Vyshinsky played the role of “explorer” of Stalin’s will in pursuance of this course in the 
legal scholarship. It is interesting to note that during this period alternative legal theories 
still existed which I will cover in my research. For example, a psychological theory of law 
by L. Petrajitsky (and his progenies A. Lunacharsky and D. Dembsky) influenced the 
development of Soviet scholarship heavily. This theory was criticized by V.Sergeevich and 
it was further adopted by M. Reiser, who altered it on “Marxian foundations” (see for 
example, M.Reisner “Теория Л.И.Петражицкого, марксизм и социальная идеология” 
[Theory of L.I. Petrajutsky, Marxism and social ideology]). The theory of “octroyed rights” 
is another alternative theory which was formulated by A. Malitsky, who saw the rights of 
individuals as a privilege granted them by the state. Under this premise, the existence of 
obligations which an individual is eligible for together with the rights and freedom they 
receive are laid out. This theory was roundly criticized by both L. Kaganovich, who 
opposed it by using the provisions of Marx and Lenin, and by D. Kursky, who insisted on 
a dictatorship of the proletariat. It is worth paying attention to another phenomenon 
during the 1950-1960s – legal debates about redefining of law. The initial definition which 
was formulated by A.J.Vyshinsky was claimed “narrow normative” and alternative 
definitions were formulated by V. Nersesyants, S.Kechekyan, A.Vasiliev, V.Mamutov and 
L.Yavich. During Brezhnev’s period, prominent scholars from the State Academy of 
Sciences Institute of State and Law persisted in the fight for “socialistic” human rights 
seeing them as a new type of law, notably E. Lukasheva, V. Chikvadze and A. Stalgevich. 
An alternative approach called civilism was offered by V. Nersesyantz, which under-lined 
the uniqueness of Russian civilization and its subsequent relationship with the law.  Also, 
research on Soviet international law from the position of eventual contribution to the 
international law of a global community offers an interesting conclusion. As Bowring 
 12  
 
claims, “the Soviet theory and practice of international law, if it is the subject of any 
consideration at all, is usually dismissed as a purely historical example of an extreme species 
of positivism, and of contemporary interest. Most often it is ignored. For example, in his 
essay “What should international lawyers learn from Karl Marx?”6 Martti Koskenniemi does not 
mention Soviet international law at all.”7 Bill Bowing takes a different position and seeks to 
argue that Soviet international law, notwithstanding of all its contradictions, has created 
some of the most important notions and principles of contemporary international law 
which are of continuing relevance. Namely, the right to self-determination of public 
international law.8 Right to self-determination was an important issue for Marxian doctrine, 
since it prescribed the gradual advance of socialism in the world and right to self-
determination in international law of was that legal category which could promote the 
process of communist revolutions further. 
The first part of the present research is dedicated to the history of the development 
of the Soviet legal doctrine of human rights. Hans Kelsen in his Communist theory of law and 
state highlights two main stages of development in Soviet legal doctrine and periodizes the 
relationship between socialism and law: the first period “when law and socialism were still 
treated as compatible” and the second period after 1936-1937 “after the idea of 
incompatibility had been openly abandoned”.9 
Another system of periodization is mentioned by Professor Hazard in Soviet legal 
Philosophy10, and it distinguishes the development of Soviet legal theory into the three parts 
– “the Early period 1918-1928, the Middle Period 1929-1937 (the climax of Marxian 
theory) and the period of the retreat to the bourgeois positions and establishment of the 
                                                          
6  KOSKENNIEMI M. “What international lawyers should learn from Karl Marx?”, ” from 
“International law on the left”, S.Marks (ed.), Cambridge University press, 2008, p.30 
7 BOWRING B. “Positivism versus self-determination: the contradictions of Soviet international law” 
from “International law on the left”, S.Marks (ed.), Cambridge University press, 2008, p. 133 
8 Ibidem, p.134 
9 KELSEN H. “The communist theory of law”, Frederick A.Praeger Publishing House, New York, 
1955, p.89 
10 HAZARD J., “Soviet legal philosophy”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951 
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New Base from 1938”. Soviet lawyer Krasavchikov O.A.11 provided periodization which 
complements and explains these main stages: the first period of formation refers to 1917-
1922, just after the revolution of 1917, when the young Soviet state tried to adapt 
theoretical Marxist doctrine to develop the legal system. The period of primary 
development took place in 1923-1936 which could mainly be characterized as “double 
oriented”, referring to the two main objectives of the Soviet legal system at the time: 1) the 
struggle against bourgeois harmful influence on the Western system of law and the old 
heritage; 2) the development of the Soviet (socialistic) conception of law. The period 
between 1936 and 1956 was a time of stabilization, when the main provisions of a 
Marxism-Leninism conception expressed in Soviet laws and regulations were exercised by 
the functioning of the Soviet regime. The period after 1956 Krasavchikov called a “period 
of further development of Soviet doctrine”, meaning that the legal thinking had already 
created the main tendencies and patterns and its development was following strict frames 
established in the earlier periods. Periodization illustrates the main tendencies in the 
development of Soviet civil law and could be applied to the whole formation of the Soviet 
doctrine and formation of all spheres of law because it reflects the main stages of the 
development of Soviet legal thought. 12  For the objectives of the present research the 
development of the Soviet legal doctrine is presented in chronological order compatible 
with the systems of periodization mentioned above, but not strictly following them. This is 
due to the belief that the best way to uncover the main argument of the present research is 
to provide insight into the Soviet legal doctrine by not only following the development of 
the doctrine, but by also gaining an understanding of how it can raise the self-awareness of 
Russian lawyers today. 
My argument is based on the premise that “things do not mean (the material world 
does not convey meaning); rather, people construct the meaning of things, using the sign 
                                                          
11  KRASAVCHIKOV O.A. «Советская наука гражданского права (понятие, предмет, состав и 
система)» [Soviet science of civil law (definition, object, content and system)], Publishing house of 
Sverdlovsk Law Institute, Sverdlovsk, 1961, p.46 
12 IOFFE O.S. “Избранные труды по гражданскому праву: из истории цивилистической мысли. 
Гражданское правоотношение. Критика теории «хозяйственного права»” [Selected works on civil 
law: from the history of civil thought. Civil legal relationship. Critics on the theory of “economic law”], 
Publishing house “Statut”, Moscow, 2009 
Electronic source in Russian language: http://civil.consultant.ru/elib/books/3/, accessed on 28.08.2015 
 14  
 
system (predominantly, but not exclusively linguistic)”13. These concepts could therefore be 
understood differently since there are always people involved who construct their meaning. 
It is also noticed that certain concepts are used differently by Russian scholars. Estonian 
scholar Lauri Mälksoo in his recent monograph Russian Approaches to International Law, asks: 
“…perhaps in the West not enough attention had been paid to what officially “Russia” had 
meant by “international law” and what ideas and attitudes lay behind this discourse in 
Russia” 14 . He highlights in his study the drastic differences in the understanding of 
international law by Russian and Western scholars.  The claim that all rights are universal 
was also strongly contested by M. Koskenniemi15. While it is easy to agree that “rights are a 
product of Western culture and history and their principal propagandists have been 
Western organizations, activists and academics”16 and see Russian human rights as a part of 
the Western tradition, still “the domestic discursive contest of human rights is inevitable.”17 
Russian scholars themselves claim a specific notion and “Russian idea” of human rights, 
which cannot be simply discarded. Moreover, as Koskenniemi claims, there is not a 
method which “allows the lawyer to set aside her “politics”, her subjective fears and 
passions”. Also, in order to grasp the reality of functioning human rights in Russia we need 
to see the “conditioned intent of the speaker – with reference to the historical, economic 
and social reality within which the speaker is situated.”18  
A key illustration of the perceptive differences between the West and Russia can be 
seen in the way each viewed legislation in the Soviet Union. John Quigley19 wrote earnestly 
from the West that the rule of law in USSR was progressive and guaranteed more rights to 
                                                          
13  MILLIKEN J., “The study of discourse in International Relations: A critique of research and 
methods”, 5 European Journal of International Relations (1999), 225-254, at 229 
14  MÄLKSOO L. “Russian approaches to International law”, Oxford University Press, 2015, 
Introduction 
15 See e.g., KOSKENNIEMI M. “Human rights, politics and love” from “The politics of International 
law”, Hart Publishing, USA, 2011, p.153 
16 Ibid, p.162 
17 PRECLIK P. “Culture re-introduced: contestation of human rights in contemporary Russia”, volume 
“Russia and European human rights law: the rise of civilizational argument” edited by Lauri Mälksoo, 
Brill Nijhoff publishing house, Leiden-Boston, 2014, p. 45 
18 JOUANNET E. “Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction” in KOSKENNIEMI M., from “The politics 
of International law”, Hart Publishing, USA, 2011 
19 QUINGLEY J. “Soviet legal innovation and the law of the Western world”, Cambridge university 
press, 2012 
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Soviet citizens than even those in Europe enjoyed. Nonetheless, the plaudits 
notwithstanding, it is true that liberal legislation was also aimed at people outside the Soviet 
Union and served the strategic purpose of bolstering the international image of it and the 
communist project at large, whereas in reality the rights that were promised and 
championed from abroad could not be exercised by Soviet citizens. Furthermore, the 
legislation was aimed at future generations to secure the conditions for the future 
continuation of communism.20 Generously proclaimed, the rights were seen as “targets” 
and expectations rather than real guarantees.21 In my research I get to the heart of the 
reasons for this - ideological, legal and how legal practice functioned – which meant the 
exercising of certain rights was not completely possible and the violations of other 
guarantees somehow could not be contested.22 In many cases internal legislation was itself 
contradicted by Constitutional provisions which failed to allow for the exercising of 
existing rights, and, in other cases internal instructions and closed departmental decrees 
(which were not published or made public) prescribed how some practices should be 
carried out, in both cases making it possible, instead of following the Constitution, that the 
success of Soviet politics was held hostage to its short and long-term aims. The Soviet 
population was able to grasp the drastic mismatch between the proclamations made by the 
                                                          
20 TOWE E. Thomas “Fundamental rights in the Soviet Union: a comparative approach”, University of 
Pennsylvania law review, Vol.115-125, 1967, p.77 
21 BELAVUSAU U. “The Emerging Concepts of Social Rights in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia”, Prague 
Yearbook of Comparative Law – 2010, pp. 137-157, 2011, p.156 
22  Such reasons vary for different categories of rights. For example, the freedom of manifestation 
guaranteed by article 50 of Soviet Constitution of 1936 didn’t exist, since any non-communist 
demonstration was qualified as “anti-Soviet” and prescribed imprisonment due to the art.70 of Criminal 
Code of USSR (“Anti-Soviet propaganda”). So, freedom of religion (guaranteed by the same art.50 of 
Constitution 1936 with further development of its provisions in  resolution of Congress of People’s 
Deputies of RSFSR from 1 January of 1929 (with amendments from 23.06.1975) “About religious 
associations”) wasn’t possible to exercise, since one of the method to influence on the religious groups 
was taking away children from religious families, since bringing up in religious traditions contradicted 
Soviet ideology which prescribed “communist education” to all young people which began at an early 
age. This principle which became the legal base for taking away children from religious families was 
embodied in article 52 of the Soviet Code on matrimony and family: “parents should bring up their 
children according to the moral code of the communist”.  
 16  
 
Soviet government and the reality they faced. In this case it could be said that it is 
insufficient to make a purely legal reading of the argument and use only textual approach to 
studying Soviet legal doctrine23.  
The second part of the current research examines a critical period after the collapse 
of the USSR with special attention paid to the construction of a new state order. This made 
it possible to see the origins of the legal concepts which were adopted during the 
construction of a new democratic state. By following the development of legal approaches 
in Russia in the first part of the research, we gain a holistic picture as to its particularities in 
the second. This in turn makes the understanding of the Russian concept of human right 
clearer for practitioners such as Lauri Mälksoo who anticipated this necessity relating to 
domestic and international law by stating that “it should not become a danger of creating a 
parallel world of abstract theorizing”.24 The main argument is based on the analysis of how 
Soviet legal doctrine historically has been construed in order to inspect the main trends of 
its development which influenced modern ideas of law and the perception of Western legal 
concepts on human rights in Russia. 
In my research I bring to the fore the following questions: are there any historical 
patterns on human rights from USSR to the present day and how do they influence 
modern Russia? What was the attitude to justice and law in the Soviet period and do the 
historical roots influence modern Russian legal thinking? The main argument is uncovered 
through history as a fundamental part of the analysis. 
In his seminal work Gentle Civilizer of Nations, M.Koskenniemi reinterpreted 
historiography and applied it to international law to provide an approach of where theory 
and the history of the discipline allow us to establish the links between the past and the 
                                                          
23 Description of two orthodox methods in study of history of thought is given by SKINNER Q. in 
“Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas”, “History and Theory”, Blackwell Publishing for 
Wesleyan University, Vol.8, No.1 (1969), pp.3-53. The first method prescribes necessity of studying the 
contest of “religious, political and economic factors” in order to grasp the meaning of any text, and the 
second one insists on autonomy of the text itself which could provide itself the understanding of its 
own meaning. The author of the present paper uses the first contextual method. 
24 MÄLKSOO L. “Russian approaches to International law”, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.25 
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present situation of human rights norms. By also using comparative analysis of concepts 
applied to human rights and how they are understood in the West and in modern Russia, I 
show the continuity between Soviet past and modern Russia in the way they are practiced.  
A historiographical approach, defined as a method which uses historical evidence in 
constructing and formulating scientific theories25, is common also for the Italian academic 
tradition in studies of history of legal thought (see for example, fundamental study of E. 
Rotelli and P. Schiera on comparative development of the state “Lo stato moderno” [The 
Modern State])26, and is used as the methodology for the present study. My affiliation to 
the University of Florence and Center of studies of history of modern legal thought 
[Centro studi per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno]27, and especially supervision of 
Prof.Cappellini, provided me with the captivation by the Italian historiographical 
scholarship with philosophical understanding of the research on history of legal ideas 
which deepened the analysis of the formation of Soviet legal doctrine. As Mannoni claims, 
the fundamental part of the analysis of historical research of legal thought is doctrine, but it 
is not sufficient for the complete analysis if it is complemented with research on how law 
itself was practiced:  
“And then, the history of legal doctrine is necessary, but it is not sufficient. 
Reconstruction of the doctrine is obligatory but insufficient to provide the whole picture of 
what really happening without the contribution of the community of diplomats, lawyers, 
statists, police and millions of other subjects, a part of academic community, such as 
pacifists, religious activists, humanitarian movements... history of legal thinking must be a 
                                                          
25 FUAT FIRAT A. (1987),"Historiography, Scientific Method, and Exceptional Historical Events", in 
NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 14, eds. Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, 
UT : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 435-438. 
26 ROTELLI E., SCHIERA P. on comparative development of the state “Lo stato moderno” [Modern 
State], Publishing house “Il Mulino”, Bologna, 1974, part 1 “Dal medioevo all’eta moderna’ [From 
Medieval to the modern epoch], chapter of Theodor Mayer “I fondamenti dello Stato modern Tedesco 
nell’alto Medioevo” [Fundamentals of modern German state in the late Medieval epoch], pp.21-490, 
CRIFO G. “Civis”, Editori Laterza publishing house, 2005, Bari, chapter 2 “Prospettiva storiografica” 
[Historiographical perspective] pp.9-21, HINTZE O. “Stato e societa” [State and society], Publishing 
house Zanichelli, Bologna, 1980, and others. 
27 Center of studies of history of modern legal thought [Centro studi per la storia del pensiero giuridico 
moderno] is a research center which is active for more than 40 years at the University of Florence.  It 
was founded with the initiative of Paolo Grossi in 1971 as a research center for a wide range of topics, 
first of all interdisciplinary. http://www.centropgm.unifi.it 
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stoppage and not a rushing movement; the debates must cause contribution to the 
understanding but not just an academic discussion of the practice. This means to 
reconstruct the life of the institutes, look at the contests, and make expertise in this subject 
from political history and international relations as well.”28  
But there is another danger in such an approach. Social legal studies could mix law 
with politics. This tendency is described by Paolo Grossi as one of the main dangers of 
legal research. In Ritorno al diritto he claims that a crisis of law happened due to the political 
influence on it: 
“In modernity, in general there is a strong bond, and it must be admitted the 
necessary one, between power and law, because power, knowing about the enormous force 
which is law, intends to control it completely. This bond penetrates to the origins of law as 
well, which reflects in its autonomy the choices of power, and its defects.”29  
Grossi divides the terms of norm and legality, highlighting the formal character of 
legality: “The terminological change couldn’t be repeated enough – that is from the legal 
norm to the legal order – this is not just a nominal problem, but it becomes a change of 
legal thinking. Legal norms could be expressed in a legality just with one condition: if a 
legal norm efficiently respects the values and interests of certain determined society, if 
there are eyes and ears of the state attentively directed to the people, ready to percept what 
comes from there.” 30  This division of terms is extremely important for the 
historiographical study of Russian legal thinking since legal norms in periods of Soviet 
ruling were deprived of the high principles of legality in favor of Marxian principles of 
doctrine. Especially in analyzing and uncovering the main argument of the present research 
– what Russians really mean under the legal notion of human rights. 
 
                                                          
28  MANNONI S. “Da Vienna a Monaco (1814-1938). Ordine europeo e diritto internazionale”, 
G.Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2014, p.6 
29 GROSSI P. “Ritorno al Diritto” [Back to the Law], Publishing house Editori Laterza, Bari, 2015, p.5 
30 Ibidem, p.35 
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Introduzione 
 
“Dove, nonostante tutto, iniziano i diritti umani universali? Nei 
posti piccoli, vicino casa — così vicini e cosi piccoli che non possono 
essere visti nella mappa del mondo. Allo stesso tempo sono il mondo 
individuale di una persona: nei posti dove vive; nella scuola o il liceo 
сhe lui frequenta; nella fattoria, fabbrica oppure nell’ufficio dove lui 
lavora. Sono i posti dove ogni uomo, donna e bambino, cerca la 
giustizia paritaria, una dignità paritaria senza discriminazione. Se 
questi diritti non hanno senso lì, non avranno senso da nessuna 
altra parte. Senza un movimento concertato dell’esercizio dei nostri 
diritti nei luoghi a noi più familiari, più vicini a casa nostra, non 
avremo il progresso nella sua accezione più ampia e crescente.”  
Eleanor Roosevelt31 
 
 
Le esperienze della mia vita e l’ambiente in cui sono cresciuta hanno stimolato il 
mio desiderio di perseguire i diritti umani e di appagare la mia curiosità circa la storia 
giuridica dei paesi europei del  post-comunismo. Visto il lavoro di mio padre come militare, 
                                                          
31 Il membro del comitato fondato dalla Commissione su diritti umani delle Nazione Unite per 
elaborazione della bozza Della Dichiarazione Universale dei diritti del’uomo. Dalla presentazione NEI 
TUOI MANI: la guida per la comune azione per il decesimo anniversario della Dichiarazione dei diritti 
dell’uomo, Nazione Unite, New York, 27 Marzo 1958 citato da “Human rights indicators: a guide to 
measurement and implementation”[Indicatori dei diritti umani: la guida per determinazione e 
implicazione], Nazione Unite, New York and Geneva, 2012, p.9. 
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la mia famiglia ha dovuto viaggiare molto. Io sono nata a Berlino, ma ho trascorso la 
maggior parte della mia vita a Mosca. Le mie esperienze mi hanno insegnato a rispettare 
diverse culture e modi di vivere. La mia famiglia ha lasciato la Germania il giorno in cui il 
muro di Berlino è caduto. Solo quando sono diventata più grande ho potuto comprendere 
il vero significato di quell’evento e capire l’importanza dei cambiamenti storici e politici 
seguiti alla caduta dell’ Unione Sovietica. Quegli eventi, insieme alle transizione politiche 
avvenute in Russia nell’ultimo decennio del Novecento, mi hanno fatto riflettere e 
ragionare sull’influenza della storia politica e nazionale di un paese nella vita concreta delle 
persone. Tutto potrebbe accadere in una notte qualunque, ma molto di più fu quel che 
avvenne a Mosca in quegli anni, un turbine di mutamenti che ha avuto un forte impatto 
sulla vita di ogni persona.  
La presente ricerca è dedicata allo studio della storia dello sviluppo dei diritti umani 
nella dottrina giuridica dell’Unione Sovietica ed ha lo scopo di dimostrare la correlazione 
tra gli orientamenti passati e le pratiche contemporanee vigenti in Russia.  
La storia della dottrina giuridica dell’Unione Sovietica manca di contributi di marca 
internazionale, ed ancor meno sono gli apporti che si hanno dai giuristi positivisti, poiché 
solitamente difettano di una chiara divisione tra aspetto politico e ideologico. Un’analisi 
positivista, critica della dottrina giuridica dell’Unione Sovietica, è presentata da Hans 
Kelsen nella Sua Communist Theory of Law, dove viene stesa una critica ai principali giuristi 
sovietici: A.J. Vyshinksy, E.B. Pashukanis, P.I. Stuchka, M.A. Reisner, M.S. Strogovich, 
S.A. Golunsky. 
Anche le traduzioni dei testi degli stessi giuristi sovietici effettuate da John Hazard 
nel Soviet legal philosophy, farà parte della ricerca della dottrina americana sul diritto 
dell’Unione Sovietica dopo la Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Significativo di questo, poi, 
riassumibile nel dogma di William E. Butler - ‘Conosci il tuo nemico”: “per capire come lui 
 21  
 
vive, per migliorare le tue capacità di comprensione e comunicazione, cosi per evitare gli 
errori, per identificare e chiarire le posizioni contrarie e i valori”.32 
Nel Gentle Civilizer of Nations, M. Koskenniemi descrive uno dei problemi più 
comuni nello studio storiografico, ossia il fatto che l’attenzione è sempre stata data 
solamente a “quello che i grandi maestri della disciplina pensavano oppure facevano”.33 
Viceversa, è di moltissima importanza studiare anche le idee degli studiosi meno noti 
dell’Unione Sovietica, che pure hanno avuto tanta influenza sullo sviluppo della dottrina 
giuridica, aiutandoci ad avere un quadro completo della formazione giuridica dell’Unione 
Sovietica. La più grande difficoltà per lo studio internazionale dell’eredità giuridica dell’ 
Unione Sovietica è legata al fatto che le loro opere non sono state tradotte dalla lingua 
russa, e pertanto il loro lavoro resta per la maggior parte sconosciuto. Per questo, la ricerca 
che si presenta, ha la possibilità di colmare un’importante lacuna. 
La mia ricerca è basata su fonti primarie che descrivono i concetti e l’evoluzione 
delle idee dei giuristi sovietici, una tradizione tecnica e scientifica di cui può essere trovata 
testimonianza solamente nei testi in russo. 
Il sistema giuridico socialista si è basato sulla dottrina di Marx e Engels della quale 
non si è fatto un puro studio giuridico, ma una concreta attuazione del funzionamento della 
società (il materialismo storico). Sono esistite nel tempo due possibili fonti di formazione 
circa la base del sistema giuridico russo: il governo politico sovietico e il lavoro degli 
studiosi socialisti. La dottrina era come ha notato Hans Kelsen “concorde in tutta umiltà ad 
ogni cambiamento del governo sovietico” 34 , però nonostante questo aveva un ruolo 
significativo nella formazione delle istituzioni politiche e pratiche. Nessuna delle due fonti 
ha funzionato indipendente, perché entrambe hanno trovato difficoltà nell’interpretazione 
                                                          
32BUTLER W. E., ‘International Law and the Comparative Method’, in W. E. Butler (ed.), International 
Law in Comparative Perspective (Alpen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980) 25–40 at 31, citato da MÄLKSOO 
L. “Russian approaches to International law”, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.7 
33 KOSKENNIEMI M. “Gentle civilizer of nations: The Rise and Fall of international law 1870-1960”, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001 
34 KELSEN H. “The communist theory of law”[La teoria comunista del diritto], Frederick A.Praeger 
Publishing House, New York, 1955 
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dei testi classici di Marx, e non sono riuscite a costruire solide basi per affrontare uno 
studio giuridico.  
Il dies a quo della mia ricerca inizia dai fondamenti della formazione della dottrina 
giuridica dell’Unione Sovietica, dalla data della Rivoluzione di Ottobre 1917 fino alla caduta 
dell’Unione Sovietica nel 1991. Il periodo prima del biennio 1922-1923 è caratterizzato da 
una “fluidità giuridica” e dall’uso della vecchia legislazione dell’Impero Russo, in assenza di 
leggi rilevanti dei Bolscevichi. L’anno 1922 ha significato la fine del periodo di transizione 
dalla legislazione Russa Imperiale a quello dell’Unione Sovietica Repubblicana, perché la 
nuova realtà richiedeva nuovi approcci e interpretazioni del pensiero di Marx per adottarlo 
alle necessità del neonato governo e creare le fondamenta di una nuova dottrina giuridica 
sovietica.  
La ricerca intorno al primo periodo di formazione della dottrina giuridica è 
presentata attraverso l’analisi del lavoro dei giuristi sovietici che hanno creato i fondamenti 
dello Studio Giuridico Sovietico: D.Kursky, N. Krylenko, M. Kozlovsky, I.Razumovsky; 
ognuno di loro ha sviluppato teorie giuridiche diverse e alle volte contrastanti riguardo la 
dottrina Marxista e la tematica giuridica. Il risultato può essere chiaramente dimostrato 
dallo studio meticoloso della politica di Stalin. 
“L’otttimismo naif” di Evgeny Pashukanis riguardo l’attuazione di tutte le 
previsioni di Marx è stato criticato severamente insieme ai suoi concetti scientifici riguardo 
al diritto e le profezie sul diritto morente; non a caso egli era chiamato “traditore della 
patria” e veniva per questo emarginato. Al contrario, il procuratore generale A.J. Vyshinsky, 
diventato il direttore dell’Accademia Sovietica delle Scienze Istituto di Stato e Diritto, ha 
segnato la linea nuova dello sviluppo della dottrina giuridica sovietica: lo stato ha bisogno 
del diritto con uno solo obiettivo, cioè per renderlo espressione della volontà dello Stato 
tramite le sanzioni e la costrizione. A.J. Vyshinsky ha avuto, perciò, un ruolo di “rivelatore 
della volontà di Stalin” nel corso della formazione dello studio del diritto. Sarà molto 
interessante, così, scoprire che esistevano molteplici teorie giuridiche alternative in quel 
periodo. Per esempio, la teoria psicologica del diritto di L. Petrajitsky (e i suoi allievi A. 
Lunacharsky e D. Dembsky) ha molto influenzato lo sviluppo dello studio sovietico del 
diritto. Questa teoria è stata criticata moltissimo da V.Sergeevich e successivamente M. 
Reiser ha inserito questa teoria nella “fondazione Marxiana” (guarda per esempio, 
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M.Reisner “Теория Л.И.Петражицкого, марксизм и социальная идеология” [La teoria 
di L.I. Petrajutsky, Marxism ideologia sociale]). La teoria dei diritti octroyé è un’ altra teoria 
alternativa formulata dallo studioso sovietico A. Malitsky, che ha visto i diritti delle persone 
come un privilegio donato a loro dallo Stato. Da questo punto di vista lui ha spiegato che 
insieme ai diritti e alle libertà che lo stato garantisce, fornisce anche obblighi. Questo 
concetto è stato criticato da L. Kaganovich, che ha  deciso di contrastare la teoria delle 
previsioni di Marx e Lenin, una teoria criticata anche da D.Kursky, che ha insistito  sulla 
necessità sia della dittatura che del proletariato. Molto interessante da analizzare è anche un 
altro fenomeno degli gli anni 1950-1960: i dibattiti giuridici sull’ elaborazione della 
definizione del diritto.  
La definizione del diritto era stata formulata da A. Vyshinsky ed era stata chiamata 
“normativismo conciso”, le definizione alternative erano formulate da V. Nersesyants, 
S.Kechekyan, A.Vasiliev, V.Mamutov e L.Yavich. Durante il periodo di Brezhnev, i 
studiosi dall’ Accademia delle Scienze e dell’ Istituto dello stato e diritto,  E. Lukasheva, V. 
Chikvadze and A. Stalgevich hanno portato avanti una teoria dei diritti socialistici. Un 
approccio alternativo chiamato “civilismo” è stato invece sostenuto da V. Nersesyantz che 
ha sottolineato il carattere unico della civilizzazione russa e la relazione speciale attraverso il 
diritto per questo motivo.  
La ricerca sul diritto internazionale sovietico riguardo il contributo dell’Unione 
Sovietico sul diritto internazionale della comunità globale porta a delle conclusioni 
interessanti. Come Bowring scrive “La teoria Sovietica del diritto e la pratica del diritto 
internazionale, se trattate in una ricerca, vengono spesso viste come l’esempio puro storico 
del positivismo estremo, senza nessun interesse giuridico contemporaneo. Molto spesso 
questa tema è semplicemente ignorata. Per esempio, nel saggio“What should international 
lawyers learn from Karl Marx?” 35Martti Koskenniemi non nomina il diritto internazionale 
Sovietico.” 36  Bill Bowing prende una posizione diversa e dimostra che il diritto 
internazionale dell’ Unione Sovietica, nonostante tutte le sue contraddizioni, ha creato 
                                                          
35 KOSKENNIEMI M. “What international lawyers should learn from Karl Marx?” in “International 
law on the left”, S.Marks (ed.), Cambridge University press, 2008, p.30 
36 BOWRING B. “Positivism versus self-determination: the contradictions of Soviet international law” 
in “International law on the left”, S.Marks (ed.), Cambridge University press, 2008, p. 133 
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diverse nozioni e principi sul diritto internazionale contemporaneo che tuttora appaiono 
rilevanti. Il più importante di questi era il diritto di autodeterminazione nell’ambito del 
diritto internazionale pubblico. 37 Il diritto di autodeterminazione era una nozione 
significativa per la dottrina Marxista, perché ha prescritto lo sviluppo graduale del 
socialismo nel mondo e ha introdotto il diritto di autodeterminazione nel diritto 
internazionale come categoria giuridica per aiutare i paesi coinvolti nel processo delle 
rivoluzioni comuniste.  
Durante il periodo di Brezhnev, famosi giuristi dell’Accademia Statale delle Scienze 
dell’Istituto dello Stato e Diritto insistevano nella sfida di concettualizzare i diritti umani 
socialisti; si tratta di E. Lukasheva, V. Chikvadze e V. Kudrjavtsev. Un approccio 
alternativo, chiamato civilismo, è stato offerto da V. Nersesyantz, che ha sottolineato 
l’unicità della civilizzazione russa e la sua peculiare relazione attraverso il diritto. In altri 
termini ciò significa che i diritti umani in Russia hanno avuto una propria origine e un 
proprio sviluppo, basati su un variegato approccio culturale. 
La prima parte della presente ricerca è dedicata alla storia dello sviluppo dei diritti 
umani in Unione Sovietica. Hans Kelsen nel Communist theory of law and state ha sottolineato 
due periodi di sviluppo della dottrina Sovietica del diritto, prendendo come criterio di 
questo periodizzazione la relazione tra socialismo e diritto: “quando il diritto e socialismo 
erano percepiti come compatibili” e un altro secondo periodo – dopo il 1936-1937 - 
quando l’idea di compatibilità era pubblicamente abbandonata”.38 
Un altro sistema di periodizzazione veniva elaborato dal Professor Hazard nel Soviet 
legal Philosophy39  che ha distinto la teoria Sovietica del diritto in tre parti – “il periodo 
precoce 1918-1928, il mezzo periodo1929-1937 (climax della teoria Marxiana) e il periodo 
di eliminazione delle posizioni della borghesia e fondazione della Nuova Base dal 1938”. 
                                                          
37Ibidem, p.134 
38 KELSEN H. “The communist theory of law”, Frederick A.Praeger Publishing House, New York, 
1955, p.89 
39 HAZARD J., “Soviet legal philosophy”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951 
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Un giurista Sovietico, Krasavchikov O.A., 40  il sistema menzionato sopra e suddivide i 
periodi più importanti in questo modo: il primo periodo si riferisce al 1917-1922, subito 
dopo la rivoluzione del 1917, quando il giovane Stato Sovietico ha cercato di adottare la 
dottrina Marxista per un nuovo sistema giuridico. Il periodo successivo, che va dal 1923 al 
1936 è caratterizzato da  un “doppio orientato”, nel senso che la formazione giuridica 
dell’Unione Sovietica era influenzata da un duplice orientamento: uno era riferito alla 
battaglia contro l’influenza della borghesia e al suo sistema giuridico Occidentale, mentre 
l’altro si riferisce all’elaborazione del concetto Sovietico (socialistico) del diritto Il periodo 
che va dal 1936 al 1956 è stato il periodo di maggiore stabilizzazione delle disposizioni 
Marxiste-Leniniste, perché le posizioni teoriche sono state concretamente applicate al 
regime sovietico. Invece, il periodo successivo al 1956, è stato chiamato da Krasavchikov 
“il periodo di sviluppo della dottrina sovietica”, nel senso  che mentre nei periodi 
precedenti era stata creata l’ossatura del pensiero giuridico, ora  questo ha continuato a 
svilupparsi nell’assetto pratico. Tale sistema di periodizzazione ci aiuta a vedere la tendenza 
e i periodi di maggiore sviluppo nella formazione della dottrina Sovietica.41 Per gli scopi 
della presente ricerca, la parte storica della tesi è presentata cronologicamente  e 
compatibilmente ai sistemi di periodizzazione descritti sopra, però non coincide 
strettamente con nessuno di essi. Il modo migliore per illustrare l’argomento principale 
della ricerca è non solo spiegare lo sviluppo della dottrina Sovietica del diritto, ma far luce 
sull’influenza della dottrina sovietica sul pensiero giuridico moderno russo. 
Il mio lavoro concorda con l’affermazione secondo cui “le cose da sole non 
producono significato (il mondo materiale non stabilisce il suo senso), piuttosto sono le 
persone che costruiscono il senso delle cose usando diversi sistemi di segni (più spesso, ma 
                                                          
40  KRASAVCHIKOV O.A. «Советская наука гражданского права (понятие, предмет, состав и 
система)» [Soviet science of civil law (definition, object, content and system)], Publishing house of 
Sverdlovsk Law Institute, Sverdlovsk, 1961, p.46 
41IOFFEO.S. “Избранные труды по гражданскому праву: из истории цивилистической мысли. 
Гражданское правоотношение. Критика теории «хозяйственного права»” [Selected works on civil 
law: from the history of civil thought. Legal civil relationship. Critics on the theory of “economic law”], 
Publishing house “Statut”, Moscow, 2009 
Electronic source in Russian language: http://civil.consultant.ru/elib/books/3/, accessed on 28.08.2015 
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non solamente, linguistici)”. 42  Questi concetti possono essere interpretati diversamente 
perché  sono sempre le persone a dare il significato alle cose. E’ stato già notato che vari 
concetti sono stati studiati diversamente dagli studiosi russi. Il Professore Estone Lauri 
Mälksoo nella sua monografia recente Russian Approaches to International Law, chiede: 
“…probabilmente in Occidente non è stata data sufficiente attenzione a ciò che in Russia 
ufficialmente è  stato proclamato usando il termine “diritto internazionale” e quali idee ed 
approcci stiano, realmente, dietro a questo discorso in Russia?”43. Lui sottolinea nella sua 
ricerca le differenze enormi tra la comprensione del diritto internazionale da parte degli 
studiosi russi ed occidentali. 
Il principio secondo cui i diritti siano universali è stato fortemente contestato da M. 
Koskenniemi44. I diritti umani, come li vediamo adesso, sono “il prodotto della cultura 
Occidentale e i loro propagandisti principali sono organizzazioni Occidentali, attivisti e 
accademici Occidentali”45, così  possiamo vedere la Russia come parte di questa tradizione 
europea, ma allo stesso tempo “un contestuale discorso domestico intorno ai diritti umani è 
inevitabile.”46 Gli studiosi russi parlano della specifica concezione russa e di una “l’idea 
russa” dei diritti umani, che non può essere più ignorata. Più che altro, come Koskenniemi 
insiste, non esiste un metodo che “permette al giurista di mettere da parte la sua “politica”, 
i suoi timori soggettivi e le sue passioni”. Per questo, per capire la realtà funzionante dei 
diritti umani in Russia, dobbiamo vedere quale sia “l’intenzione contestuale di colui che 
afferma o nega tali diritti, con particolare riguardo alla sua realtà storica, economica e 
sociale.”47 
                                                          
42  MILLIKEN J., “The study of discourse in International Relations: A critique of research and 
methods” [Lo studio del discorso in relazioni internaizonali: la critica nella ricerca e metodo], 5 
European Journal of International Relations (1999), 225-254, at 229. 
43MÄLKSOO L. “Russian approaches to International law”[Approcci russi al diritto internazionale], 
Oxford University Press, 2015, Introduction 
44 KOSKENNIEMI M. “Human rights, politics and love”[Diritti umani, politica e amore] from “The 
politics of International law”, Hart Publishing, USA, 2011, p.153 
45 Ibidem, p.162 
46  PRECLIK P. “Culture re-introduced: contestation of human rights in contemporary Russia”[Re-
introduzione della cultura: contestazione dei diritti umani nella Russia moderna], volume “Russia and 
European human rights law: the rise of civilizational argument” ed. Lauri Mälksoo, Brill Nijhoff 
publishing house, Leiden-Boston, 2014, p. 45 
47JOUANNET E. “Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction”[Koskenniemi: introduzione critica] in 
KOSKENNIEMI M.,“The politics of International law”, Hart Publishing, USA, 2011 
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Un’illustrazione chiarissima della prospettiva della diversità tra l’Occidente e la 
Russia può essere osservata secondo il punto di vista della legislazione nell’ Unione 
Sovietica. John Quigley48 ha scritto dal punto di vista dello studioso occidentale riguardo  
alla legislazione dell’Unione Sovietica. Ha parlato di una legislazione progressista, atteso che 
le norme costituzionali russe hanno garantito tanti diritti che, per esempio, i proletari 
europei non avevano. Tuttavia è da riferire che la legislazione, apparentemente libera, in 
realtà era scritta per le persone non appartenenti all’Unione Sovietica e aveva lo scopo 
strategico di formare un’opinione pubblica internazionale favorevole al comunismo. In 
realtà l’intenzione era di non garantire pienamente l’applicazione di questi diritti ai cittadini 
sovietici. Inoltre è giusto dire che tale legislazione era stata scritta per le generazioni future, 
per permettere le condizioni di sviluppo del comunismo.49Generosamente proclamati, i 
diritti erano visti come un orientamento oppure come un obiettivo futuro e non come delle 
reali garanzie.50 Nella mia ricerca seguirò il centro dei motivi di questo fenomeno– motivi 
ideologici, legali e pratici – per dare risposta alla domanda: come è stato possibile, anche dal 
punto di vista giuridico, che i diritti violati non potessero essere realizzati e che la loro 
violazione non potesse essere contestata.51In  molti casi la legislazione interna era contraria 
alla Costituzione e non permetteva di realizzare molti diritti ufficialmente garantiti; in altri 
casi, esistevano “le ordinanze chiuse” (le quale non erano pubblicate e accessibili al 
                                                          
48 QUINGLEY J. “Soviet legal innovation and the law of the Western world” [Innovazione giudirica 
sovietica e legislazione del’Occidente], Cambridge university press, 2012 
49  TOWE E. Thomas “Fundamental rights in the Soviet Union: a comparative approach” [Diritti 
fondamentali nell’Unione Sovietica: aproccio compratistico], University of Pennsylvania law review, 
Vol.115-125, 1967, p.77 
50BELAVUSAU U. “The Emerging Concepts of Social Rights in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia”[Sviluppo  
dei concetti dei diritti sociali in Belarussia, Ukraina e Russia], Prague Yearbook of Comparative Law –
2010, pp. 137-157, 2011, on p.156 
51  Questi motivi variano per diverse categorie di diritti. Per esempio, la liberta di manifestazione 
garantita dall’art 50 della Costituzione Sovietica del 1936 non esisteva perche’ qualsiasi dimostrazione 
non comunista era interpretata come anti-sovietica e come reato, per il quale era prescritta la pena in 
prigione ex art.70 del codice penale dell’USSR (“Anti-Soviet propaganda”). Anche, la liberta di religione 
(garantita della stessa articolo art.50 della Costituzione del 1936 con ampio sviluppo delle disposizioni in  
risoluzione di Congresso degli Deputati Nazionali di RSFSR dal 1 Gennaio 1929 (con cambiamenti dal 
23.06.1975) “Sulle associazioni religiose”) non era possibile realizzare perche ci fosse un metodo che 
permetteva di influenzare i gruppi religiosi – il governo ha portato via i bambini dalle famiglie che 
praticavano la religione. L’Ideologia sovietica prevedeva educazione comunista per tutti minori. Questo 
principio era formulato nell’articolo 52 del Codice Sovietico della Famiglia e d era diventato la base 
legale per portare I bambini via nella casa statale di famiglia: “i genitori devono educare i suoi bambini con il 
codice morale del comunista”.  
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pubblico) le quali circolavano nei dipartimenti e nelle altre istituzioni di governo dettando il 
concreto modo di eseguire le diverse pratiche. Molto spesso queste ordinanze chiuse erano 
il motivo per cui la pratica si mostrava diversa da quella stabilita dalla legge. La popolazione 
dell’Unione Sovietica era capace di vedere la differenza tra la realtà e le proclamazioni del 
governo Sovietico. In questo caso, chiaramente, si può vedere che è insufficiente fare una 
pura lettura giuridica dell’argomento e che non si può  usare solo un approccio testuale 
nello studio della dottrina sovietica. 52 
La seconda parte della presente ricerca analizza il periodo critico seguito alla caduta 
dell’Unione Sovietica, con un’attenzione speciale al processo di costruzione del nuovo 
ordinamento. In ciò è  possibile vedere le origine dei concetti giuridici che sono stati 
adottati durante la costruzione del nuovo stato democratico. Seguendo lo sviluppo degli 
approcci legali in Russia nella prima parte della ricerca, potremo vedere un quadro ampio 
delle sue peculiarità (nella seconda parte). Questo a sua volta determinerà una 
comprensione pratica più chiara dei concetti di diritti umani così come ha evidenziato Lauri 
Mälksoo, che riferendosi al diritto nazionale ed a quello internazionale, ha affermato che 
“questo non dovrebbe creare la pericolosità di produrre il mondo parallelo delle teorie 
astratte”53. 
Nella mia ricerca mi pongo le seguenti domande: come le tradizioni storiche sui 
diritti umani dell’Unione Sovietica hanno influenzato la situazione nella Russia moderna? 
Quale era l’atteggiamento verso la giustizia e il diritto nel periodo Sovietico? Le radici 
storiche hanno influenzato il modo di pensare del diritto moderno? L’argomento principale 
viene presentato tramite storia come la parte fondamentale dell’analisi. 
                                                          
52Tale descrizione dei due approcci ortodossi dello studio della storia del pensiero e’ stato fatto da 
SKINNER Q. in “Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas” [Significato e comprensione nella 
storia del pensiero], “History and Theory”, Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University, Vol.8, No.1 
(1969), pp.3-53. Il primo approccio descrive la necessita di studiare il contesto della religione, della 
politica e della economia per capire il senso di qualsiasi testo, l’altro approccio invece dice che il testo da 
solo può provvedere al suo significato. L’autore del presente lavoro segue il primo approccio del metodo 
contestuale.  
53MÄLKSOO L. “Russian approaches to International law”[Approcci russi al diritto internazionale], 
Oxford University Press, 2015, p.25 
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Nel suo lavoro rivoluzionario Gentle Civilizer of Nations, M. Koskenniemi ha 
reinterpretato la storiografia e ha applicato questo metodo allo studio del diritto 
internazionale; ha attuato un approccio in cui la teoria e la storia della disciplina 
permettessero di costruire collegamenti tra il passato e il presente della storia dei diritti 
umani. Usando l’analisi comparatistica sui concetti applicati ai diritti umani, per come sono 
interpretati nel mondo occidentale e particolarmente in quello russo, la ricerca stabilisce 
una continuità tra Unione Sovietica e Russia moderna, continuità apprezzabile anche nel 
cammino della conquista dei diritti umani. 
L’approccio storiografico è un metodo che usa l’evidenza storica per costruire e 
formulare le teorie scientifiche 54 ; è una metodologia molto comune nella tradizione 
accademica italiana per lo studio della storia del pensiero giuridico (guarda per esempio, lo 
studio fondamentale di E. Rotelli e P. Schiera sullo sviluppo comparatistico dello stato, “Lo 
stato moderno”)55; questo approccio storiografico è usato come metodologia principale 
della presente ricerca. La mia affiliazione all’Università di Firenze e al Centro studi per la 
storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, e il tutorato presso il Prof. Cappellini, mi hanno 
portato ad approfondire la ricerca storica della dottrina Sovietica del diritto, tramite  lo 
studio storiografico della tradizione Italiana, fornendo alla ricerca una giusta base storico-
filosofica. Come Mannoni scrive, la dottrina è la parte fondamentale dell’analisi storica del 
pensiero giuridico, però non è sufficiente per un’ analisi completa e per una  ricerca su 
come il diritto è stato progressivamente costruito:  
“Eppure la storia delle Dottrine giuridiche per quanto necessaria, non è affatto 
sufficiente. La ricostruzione dottrinale è  tanto indispensabile quanto inadeguata a fornire 
da sola un quadro a tutto tondo di un’esperienza giuridica che annovera nella sua comunità 
                                                          
54 FUAT FIRAT A. (1987), "Historiography, Scientific Method, and Exceptional Historical 
Events"[Storiografia, metodo scientifico e eventi storici eccezionali], in NA - Advances in Consumer 
Research Volume 14, eds. Melanie Wallendorf and Paul Anderson, Provo, UT: Association for 
Consumer Research, Pages: 435-438. 
55  ROTELLI E. e SCHIERA P. “Lo stato moderno”, “Il Mulino”, Bologna, 1974, parte 1 “Dal 
medioevo all’eta moderna”, Theodor Mayer “I fondamenti dello Stato modern Tedesco nell’alto 
Medioevo”, pp.21-490, CRIFO G. “Civis”, Editori Laterza publishing house, 2005, Bari, capitolo 2 
“Prospettiva storiografica”, pp.9-21, HINTZE O. “Stato e societa”, Publishing house Zanichelli, 
Bologna, 1980, e altri. 
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epistemica diplomatici, giuridici, statisti, militari, e una miriade di altri soggetti oltre agli 
accademici professionali, come i pacifisti, gli attivisti religiosi, i movimenti umanitari... la 
storia delle dottrine giuridiche deve essere una posta e non una scorciatoia; un 
arricchimento e non un alibi per sottrarsi allo sforzo di andare oltre i dibattiti rarefatti degli 
accademici il cui impatto sulla prassi non è stato spesso all’altezza della intensità della loro 
passione intellettuale. Il che significa ricostruire la vita degli istituti e delle istituzioni, 
guardare ai contesti facendosi forte della grande varietà conquistata in questa materia dalla 
storia politica e delle relazioni internazionali.”56 
Però, c’è un pericolo in questo approccio: i studi legali e sociali possono confondere 
il diritto con la politica. Questa tendenza è descritta come un pericolo da Paolo Grossi che, 
nel Ritorno al diritto esprime la visione secondo cui la crisi del diritto è dovuta alla 
commistione tra diritto e politica:  
“Nella modernità’, insomma, si ha un vicolo strettissimo, addirittura necessario, fra 
potere politico e il diritto, perché il potere, consapevole della formidabile forza coesiva del 
cemento giuridico, intende controllarlo completamente. Questo vincolo non può non 
ripercuotersi anche nelle orditure stesse del diritto, che, leso nella sua autonomia e 
riflettendo ormai le scelte del potere, ne riflette anche le miserie.”57 
Grossi divide i termini legalità e norma, sottolineando il carattere formale della 
legalità: “Non si ripeterà mai abbastanza che il cambio terminologico – ossia da norma a 
ordinamento – non è un problema meramente nomenclatorio, ma si incarna in un cambio 
di mentalità giuridica. Il diritto può attuarsi concretamente in ordinamento soltanto a una 
condizione: che, nell’effettività, si facciano i conti con valori ed interessi circolanti in una 
determinata società, che si abbiano occhi e orecchi attenti verso il basso, pronti a un 
adeguamento in relazione a quanto in basso avviene.”58Questa distinzione di termini è di 
grande importanza per lo studio storiografico del pensiero giuridico russo, visto che le 
norme legali nei periodi di governo Sovietico erano deprivate dai principi fondamentali di 
                                                          
56 MANNONI S. “Da Vienna a Monaco (1814-1938). Ordine europeo e diritto internazionale”, 
G.Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2014, p.6 
57GROSSI P. “Ritorno al Diritto” [Back to the Law], Publishing house Editori Laterza, Bari, 2011, p.5 
58Ibidem, p.35 
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legalità in favore dei principi della dottrina Marxista. Soprattutto nell’analisi dell’argomento 
principale di questa ricerca, si arriverà a delineare, a scoprire cosa i russi in realtà 
intendessero per la nozione diritti umani.  
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Glossary (abbreviations):  
 
CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Коммунистическая партия 
Советского Союза) 
KGB – State Security Committee (Комитет государственной безопасности) 
RSFSR – The Russian Soviet Federative Socialistic Republics 
SSR – Soviet Socialistic Republic 
Perestroika – reforms and new ideology, aimed on restructuring of political and 
economic system of USSR. The complex of the reforms was developed upon the request 
of the General Secretary of CPSU V.Andropov, and carried out by M.Gorbachev during 
1986-1991.  
GULAG – The supreme agency of correctional labor camps, the government 
authority which administered the forced labor camps’ system from the 1930s until the 
1950s during the Stalin’s era. 
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Part 1 
Formalism of the Soviet legal doctrine of human rights 
(1922-1991) 
 
“We couldn’t be put out from our position by demagogical claims and 
sobbing that we can’t limit human’s freedom and human rights. No, we 
can, if this freedom is used to harm social welfare and interests of all 
people”59 
A.J. Vyshinsky, 9 December 1948  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The transitional period 1917-1923 and revolutionary justice 
1.1. Revolutionary conscience as foundation of the Soviet judiciary  
On the day of the October Revolution on 25 October 1917 rebels seized the 
Winter Palace in Saint-Petersburg and hoisted upon it their flags. Ordinance №1, issued on 
the same day and signed by Vladimir Lenin, formally legislated the status of a main state 
                                                          
59 VYSHINSKY A.J. “Из речи в дискуссии по голосовании о принятии Декларации о правах 
человека” [From the speech about discussion on voting for the adoption of the Declaration about 
rights of the person], p.367-378, from «Вопросы международного права и международной 
политики» [Issues of international law and international politics], collection of speeches, State 
publishing house of legal literature, 1951, p.371 
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body - the Soviet Commission of the Peoples’ Deputies, and delegated to it the power due 
to the insurrection of workers, peasants and soldiers. The Ordinance №1 followed the 
Decree on Peace and the Decree on Land, which mentioned the establishment of the 
revolutionary court. A further development of judicial power was enunciated by the Decree 
on Courts from 5 December 1917, issued by the new main state organ – the Soviet 
Commission of the Peoples’ Deputies. 
Since new state established its power on the immense territory, it faced all the 
realities that the former Russian Empire suffered – namely famine due to problems with 
the supply of provisions, danger of a new war against weakened after the revolution state, 
counter revolutionary movements inside the country, internal political fighting.  The 
measures of a new power were mostly reactive aimed at survival and holding on to power 
in the hard times ahead. Very soon idealistic expectations about establishing a ruling power 
of the working class according to Marxist doctrine, as opposed to the style of the old 
monarchy, resulted in inconsistency and the need for laws and legislative provisions. Such 
measures showed their inevitable necessity but the new Soviet power suffered from a lack 
of resources to formulate a new doctrine of law and form a state which could manage to 
operate in this new reality. There was a lack of any gradual or profound study of the 
problems that necessity of a new legislation created. 
On 4 May 1918 the first dispositions about the courts were made by Temporary 
Government. It was prescribed that together with the judges two People’s assessors should 
be elected for the same period – those two candidates were not obliged to have any 
educational qualification. As the first Soviet Procurator D.Kursky claimed in his speech in 
1918: 
“Proletariat and the poorest peasants, having combatted for the political power, 
should ruin all legal superstructure of bourgeois state, and courts as well. Now the decision 
making process should depend on workers and the poorest peasants elected as People’s 
assessors. Those People’s assessors should be constantly renewed, and by their present 
connect the court with Soviet citizens – workers and poorest peasants. Only that type of 
court could be called the People’s court in a true sense. Peoples assessors, directly 
connected with the masses of Soviet workers, in their decisions and ordinances will reveal 
those legal positions which correspond to the interests of the working class. In those cases 
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where the courts were only professional judges without People’s assessors (and those 
deviations happened in some districts), there is no place for the revolutionary creativeness, 
the court becomes inert and bourgeois offering ready formulas from the old Codes.”60  
Revolutionary “creativeness” in decision making was welcomed, for instance, p.18 
of the “Ordinance about temporary revolutionary courts in the Novgorodskaya region”61 
of 1917, prescribed that: “the person which is admitted to be guilty is prescribed to the 
punishment which the court decides. The Court shouldn’t limit itself with any existing 
legislative prescriptions, as a non-obligatory source it may use Criminal Code and Code on 
punishments [of Russian Empire]”. Such a formula very soon showed its ineffectiveness, 
non-professional judges without any educational qualifications were not able to face all the 
complexities of the post-revolutionary situation. In Moscow for example, from March to 
August 1917 in comparison to the same period in 1916, the composition of criminal acts 
increased in the following way: the quantity of murders increased to 1075.0% (from 8 to 
86), robberies to 1196.9% (from 27 to 323), thefts to 546.5% (from 3618 to 19773).62 
The decision was made during the first few years of Soviet rule to proclaim the old 
laws of the Russian Empire valid, with the proviso that they did not contravene with the 
decrees of Soviet power and revolutionary consciousness. This provision was set forth in 
the first acts of the new Soviet power. The Decree on Courts p.5 stated that:  
“Courts sustain the decisions in the name of Russian Republic, and are guided in its 
decisions by the laws of the previous deposed government only because they are not 
canceled yet, and if they do not contradict the revolutionary consciousness and the 
revolutionary sense of justice.  
                                                          
60 KURSKY D.V. “Избранные статьи и речи” [Selected articles and speeches], Publishing house of 
Ministry of Justice of USSR, Moscow, 1948, p.14-15  
61  “Положение о временных революционных судах Новгородской губернии” [The ordinance 
about temporary revolutionary courts of Novgorodskaya region], 30 December 1917, cited from Kursky 
D.V. “Избранные статьи и речи” [Selected articles and speeches], Publishing house of Ministry of 
Justice of USSR, Moscow, 1948, p.17    
62 Central State Archive of the October Revolution, F.393, Op.6.7.124, page 17, cited from Abramovsky 
A.A. “Становление института Советского суда на Урале в 1917-1918 годах (на примере 
Оренбургской губернии)” [Formation of the Soviet courts in the Urals in 1917-198 (the case of 
Orenbug region)], Journal “Vestnik of Chelyabinsk state Univesity”, Issue 1, volume 4, 2004, p.29 
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Note. All laws must be considered repealed which contradict decrees of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Soviet workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies and workers’ 
and peasants’ government; as well as provisions of the political program of the Russian 
Social-Democratic party and parties of socialist-revolutionaries.”63  
As such the competence to determine which laws of the previous regime 
contradicted the decrees of the Executive Central Soviet Committee fell to the judges of 
the revolutionary courts. 
An affirmation in a legal act such as “all laws must be considered repealed which 
contradict decrees of Central Executive Committee of the Soviet workers’, soldiers’ and 
peasants’ deputies..” in the above mentioned decree does not in itself abolish any law. That 
is such a provisional legal norm does not delineate which legislation is to be abolished. It 
merely designates the authority for decision-making about abolishing legal norms, and also 
determines criteria for such abolition64.  
The judge constituted the state organ that was authorized to determine which 
norms should be abolished, and the main criterion for the application of laws is the lack of 
contravention of revolutionary consciousness. While they were given very broad discretion 
with respect to judicial authority, the Soviet government nonetheless never aimed at 
institutionalizing the independence of judges, granting more power to the state organs 
administered the judicial authority. By this mechanism, judicial power always expressed 
itself as a direct arm of the state.65   
Three weeks after the proclamation of Soviet power and the October Revolution 
the Decree on Courts stabilized the provisions made by the Soviet legal doctrine – 
undercutting the division of state powers and linking state organs for the sake of the 
                                                          
63  “Decree on Courts the Soviet of the Peoples’ Deputies of RSFSR” from 24 November 1917, 
“Decrees of Soviet power”, Publishing house of the state political literature, Moscow, 1957 
64 COSSUTA Marco, “Fra giustizia ed arbitrio. Il principio di legalita nell’esperienza giuridica sovietica” 
[Between jutice and lawlessness. The principle of legality in the experience of Soviet justice], “Quaderni 
fiorentini XXXVI”, Publishing House Dott.A.Giuffre Editore, Milano, 2007, p.1091 
65 SCHLESINGER R. “La teoria del diritto nell’Unione Sovietica” [The theory of the law in the Soviet 
Union], Einaudi Publishing House, Torino, 1952, p.14 
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political interests of proletariat. 66  By the second Decree on Courts, dating from 30 
November 1917, which provided descriptions of how judges should apply laws, the judge’s 
revolutionary consciousness constructed as a source of law:  
“The People’s Courts apply the Decrees of the government of workers and 
peasants. In cases of lack of necessary norm of law or its incompleteness, judges must be 
led by their socialist legal consciousness”.67 
This was very convenient for the new power – any decision could be justified by the 
revolutionary consciousness of the judges and the conditions for the dependence of power 
became a political instrument of control. D.Kursky in his speech in 1918 stated that: 
“[…] revolutionary consciousness, which is the primary source for the decision 
making in the court, could provide the only one correct conclusion: that court is free and 
unlimited in choosing the punishment which depends on the crime and other 
circumstances, and it is not possible to tell beforehand if the transgressor will be sentenced 
for more than two years or not, it is possible just for some categories of crimes such as 
premeditated murder, robbery or gangsterism.”68 
At the same time being holders of unlimited power, based only on the revolutionary 
conciseness, the judges were not independent and didn’t possess any guarantees, which 
were claimed to be bourgeois and non-functional for Soviet society: 
“It is a crucial necessity to quicken the process of social transformations on the 
communist foundations dictated by the necessity of exceptional executive authority for its 
officials, but at the same time exceptional absolutism of their power requests possibility of 
termination of their status at any moment. […] So, the termination of the status of any 
official this is not only the norm of dictatorship of proletariat, this is an essential part of the 
notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[…] There is no ordinance or decree which will 
                                                          
66 COSSUTA Marco, “Fra giustizia ed arbitrio. Il principio di legalita nell’esperienza giuridica sovietica” 
[Between jutice and lawlessness. The principle of legality in the experience of Soviet justice], “Quaderni 
fiorentini XXXVI”, Publishing House Dott.A.Giuffre Editore, Milano, 2007, p.1093 
67 “Decree on Courts the Soviet of the Peoples’ Deputies of RSFSR №2” from 30 November 1917, 
“Decrees of Soviet power”, Publishing house of the state political literature, Moscow, 1957 
68 KURSKY D.V. “Избранные статьи и речи” [Selected articles and speeches], Publishing house of 
Ministry of Justice of USSR, Moscow, 1948, p.30 
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specify the motives for such termination of the status: for any reason and any official could 
be terminated by its authority this has its source logically from the structure of soviet 
power.”69   
For this reasons the initial formation of the Soviet judicial system, dating from the 
October revolution before 1922-1923 was characterized by extreme “judicial fluidity”, 
triggered by a lack of precise legal procedural norms. This led to creative law-making with a 
strong orientation towards the contingent political situation on the part of judges. Another 
feature of Soviet legal doctrine notable already from the same period of its very inception 
was a strong orientation toward the defense of the new political order. This made the 
creation of new Soviet legislation as a weapon against counter-revolutionary elements 
possible.70 
 
1.2.  Deprivation of rights in the Soviet Constitution of 1918 
 
New Soviet power tried to protect its status fighting against counter-revolutionary 
elements. One of the methods of such fighting became the revolutionary courts and 
another, the adoption of new law, aimed mainly to strengthen the positions of Bolsheviks. 
These measures showed their necessity since the number of counter-revolutionary crimes 
were rising: from the 7,000 decisions made by the People’s Courts in Moscow, 4,000 were 
in favor of indictment, and more than 50% of them were crimes concerning the 
transgression of the ruling order or Soviet decrees, so more than the half of the crimes 
were aimed at Soviet social order. So, we can see that criminal People’s Courts played a 
significant revolutionary role.71 
                                                          
69 Ibidem, p.38 
70 COSSUTA Marco, “Fra giustizia ed arbitrio. Il principio di legalita nell’esperienza giuridica sovietica” 
[Between jutice and lawlessness. The principle of legality in the experience of Soviet justice], “Quaderni 
fiorentini XXXVI”, Publishing House Dott.A.Giuffre Editore, Milano, 2007, p.1096 
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Article 9 of the first Soviet Constitution of 1918 proclaimed the dictatorship of the 
proletarian class:   
“The main objective of the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet 
Republic, designed for the present transitional period, is to establish the dictatorship of the 
urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful All-Russia 
Soviet Government, with a view to completely suppressing the bourgeoisie, abolishing 
exploitation of man by man, and establishing socialism, under which there will be neither 
division into classes nor state power.”72 
Law itself began to take the form of an instrument in the fight to defend the new 
political power of the Bolsheviks against all social classes with the exception of workers 
and peasants.  This was exercised by establishing such discriminatory laws that countered 
even potentially counter-revolutionary elements in a bond together with the creation of an 
ideology and political orientation. Article 7 of the new Constitution of 1918 proclaims the 
inevitable abolition of all anti-Soviet elements, or those which might be potentially counter-
revolutionary:  
“The Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets holds that now, in the hour of the 
people's resolute struggle against the exploiters, there should be no room for exploiters in 
any governmental agency. Power must belong fully and exclusively to the working people 
and their plenipotentiary representatives - the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' 
Deputies.” 73 
Following this ideological arrangement rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Soviet Constitution were legally proclaimed but not for all Soviet citizens, there were 
exceptions. Article 23 of the Constitution 1918 foresees that:  
“Guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the Russian Socialist 
Federative Soviet Republic deprives individuals and groups of rights, which they utilize to 
the detriment of the socialist revolution.” 
                                                          
72‘The Сriminal Code of RSFSRS adopted on 26 May 1922 by the IX session of Supreme Central 
Executive Committee, published in “Compilation of status of RSFSR №1” from 1922 
73 Constitution of RSFSR adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets 10 July 1918 
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These legal provisions were in accordance with Engels’ theory which considered 
the state as an expression of the fact that society is hopelessly enmeshed in class 
contradictions; “so that these opposed classes with antagonistic economic interests did not 
devour one another and society in hopeless struggle, for this a power became necessary, a 
power seemingly standing above society, a power which moderated the conflict, and held it 
within the limits of ‘order’. And this power arising from society but placing itself above it, 
and more and more alienating itself from it, is the state.”74 In this explanation there is one 
passage revealed later when Engels specifies the meaning of the state speaking of the fact 
that state power naturally evolves in the hands of the strongest class, “which, with the help 
of the state, becomes the politically dominant class”. 
Article 65 of the Constitution of 1918 listed those social classes, which were 
undesired by Soviet government and deprived by the legal guarantees:  
“The right to elect and to be elected is denied to the following persons, even 
if they belong to one of the categories listed above:  
Persons who employ hired labour for profit;  
Persons living on unearned income, such as interest on capital, profits from 
enterprises, receipts from property, etc.;  
Private traders and commercial middle-men;  
Monks and ministers of religion;  
Employees and agents of the former police, the special corps of gendarmerie 
and the secret political police department, as well as members of the former 
imperial family;  
Persons declared insane by legal proceeding, as well as persons in ward;  
Persons condemned for pecuniary and infamous crimes to terms established 
by law or by a court decision.” 
Included within this article of the 1918 Constitution is a definition of socially 
dangerous elements, rendering as it was stated above, highly subjective the application of 
the law on “judges socialistic consciousness”. Thus in a kind of defensive reaction, the state 
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began to use the law mainly in defense of the social relations proclaimed by the socialist 
state. 
This tendency continued in the adjudication of criminal law. The Criminal Code of 
1922, Article 6, provides the following definition of crime:   
“Crime is considered to be any dangerous act or act of omission that threatens the 
fundamentals of the Soviet state and legal order, established by the workers’ and peasants’ 
government for the transition period towards establishment of communism.”  
Notably, the above cited definition of crime does not engage whatsoever with the 
moral nature of criminality and is concerned exclusively with for the Soviet legal and state 
order.   
As well article 8 of the Criminal Code of 1922 includes a provision that:  
“Punishment and other measures of social impact are taken for the following 
purposes: a) general prevention of crimes committed by the transgressor, as well as by 
other unstable social elements; b) to adapt the transgressor to conditions of common social 
living by correctional labour; c) to disable the transgressor from committing further 
crimes.”  
This provision reveals yet again the principle of combatting social danger for the 
Soviet state order: in this instance both by the transgressor “as well as by other unstable 
social elements”. Thus punishment rests solely on the risk a given act for the state and its 
legal order, and is unrelated to any danger intrinsic to the criminal act itself. 
Article 24 of the Soviet Criminal Code mandated preliminary investigation of the 
personality of transgressor:  
“With regard to instituting penalties, the judge should evaluate the character of the 
transgressor as well as the crime committed.  
Toward this goal, the judge will ascertain the conditions under which the crime was 
committed, and consider the personality of the transgressor, his motives and lifestyle. 
Moreover, the degree to which the crime itself breaches the social order and fundamentals 
of social security should be determined.”  
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Article 27 of the Criminal Code of RSFSR evaluated punishment in accordance 
with counter-revolutionary criminal intent:  
“With regard to instituting penalties, the Criminal Code distinguishes two categories 
of crimes: a) those aimed against the power established by the workers and peasants’ new 
legal and social order, or crimes determined to be the most dangerous according to the 
present Criminal Code, whose minimum penalty cannot be diminished; and b) all other 
crimes, for which the present Code provides the highest penalty.” 
Hence, the severity of punishment was also continent on the personality of the 
transgressor and his potential risk to the Soviet state if he had further reasons for 
committing of crimes, or if he was relevant to the workers’ social class or the bourgeois 
one, which would have made him more dangerous. Background checks, in accordance with 
article 24 of the Criminal Code, afforded a judge the possibility of calibrating the level of 
punishment against an evaluation of the transgressor’s danger to the Soviet state. This 
feature is also highlighted by legal doctrine, but it is seen by them as an orientation toward 
the collective good as against the egoistic and individualistic approach of bourgeois law.75  
The year 1922 marked the end of transition period from Imperial Russian 
legislation to that of the Soviet Republic by the adoption of the new Soviet Penal Code of 
1922 and proclamation of the judicial reform of 1923, which led further individualization 
of the new Soviet legislation and adoption of other fundamental legal acts. Before 1922 in 
cases of absence of new legislation, the proclamation of the possibility to use that part of 
the pre-revolutionary legislation was inevitable, and legislation based on the socialistic legal 
consciousness of the judges and a non-subversion of the decrees of Soviet power very well 
followed the aim of strengthening of the new power in a weakened state after the 
revolution. 
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2. Stalin’s era of juridical formalism (1923-1953) 
2.1. Does a communist society need law? 
 
Consequent to the development of the Soviet state after the end of the transition 
period in 1922 Soviet legislation required restructuring. By that time the necessity of new 
legislation became obvious, and reality proved that elaboration of new Soviet legislation is 
inevitable. The Constitution of 192476 established new Soviet institutions of power: article 
37 of the Constitution established the Council of People's Commissars which exercised the 
general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. This 
state organ was represented in every Soviet republic (article 67 of the Constitution). Article 
37 also established the Supreme Court, and granted it competence to monitor 
revolutionary legislation throughout the Soviet Union. Article 46 established the role of the 
General Procurator, who was not only entitled to prosecute crimes in the Court, but also to 
provide his opinion on any question put forward by the Court. 
Alongside the institutionalization of governmental organ and bodies, it became 
apparent that interpretation and adaptation of the Marxian ideology for the new state was 
required. The soviet socialistic legal system was based on the doctrine of Marx and Engels 
which doesn’t represent a pure legal study. Instead, there were only two possible sources 
available which could form the basis of an established legal system: Soviet political 
government and scientific socialist scholars. So, for both, this was the greatest difficulty in 
interpreting classical Marxian texts which didn’t contain the direct prescriptions on how the 
state and legislation should be organized.  
Soviet legal scholars had a very complicated position vis-a-vis the law in general, 
since classical Marxian theory treated the law as a weapon in the struggle of socialism 
against capitalism, and held that the state, and indeed, the law itself, should eventually 
wither away. Moreover, key to Marxian theory was the division of society into two social 
classes: workers and capitalists (bourgeois), with antagonistic interests:  
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“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.[…] 
every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of 
oppressing and oppressed classes.”77 
Law itself was considered as an instrument of oppression of one social class by 
another, and state as a form established by the law exists for the same reason:  
“The state together with its law is the coercive machinery for the maintenance of 
exploitation of one class by the other, an instrument of the class exploiters which, through 
the state and its law becomes the politically dominated class. The state is the power 
established for the purpose of keeping the conflict between the dominant and the 
dominated class “within the bounds of order” (Fridrich Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, 
des Privateigetuns und des Staates”, Internationale Bibliotkek, Stuttgart, 1920, p.177 et seq) 
This “order” is the law, which – according to this view- although something different from 
the state, is in essential connection with the state. The state is “normally the state of the 
most powerful economically ruling class, which by its means becomes also the politically 
ruling class, and thus aquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed 
class.”78 
In 1917 V.I.Lenin’s work State and Revolution was published, which is considered the 
basic and first work on Soviet legal theory. In this seminal manuscript Lenin laid the 
foundation for the interpretation of key issues on Marxian doctrine which became the base 
for future scholars and an inevitable part of the study of historical materialism. Due to the 
significance of that contribution the whole concept took Lenin’s name - the communists of 
Soviet Union already followed the teaching of what they called Marxism-Leninism. The 
fundamental theoretical assertion in State and Revolution on law and state was developed by 
Lenin in order to execute the prime task - “to re-establish what Marx really thought on the 
subject of the state”. So, following the Marx’s theory, Lenin admits that:  
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“…the state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class 
antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonism objectively 
cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class 
antagonisms are irreconcilable.[…] According to Marx, the state is an organ of class rule, 
an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of “order”, which 
legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes.”79 
The state was constructed in Marxian theory as an instrument in the “oppression of 
one class over another”, so too was the law viewed. It was Lenin who developed the thesis 
that law would not wither away with the overthrowing the bourgeois state. In his State and 
Revolution Lenin argued that “the bourgeois state could be abolished only by revolution; the 
socialist state, in contrast, would wither away in a process of gradual transformation. The 
process of creating a collective, socialist mentality was not to be rapid, however, and this 
fact would necessarily slow down the process of withering away of the state.” 80 The state 
machinery of social control and law had to exist in the transition period. It was, however, 
the machinery of control over individuals, not over classes, which was to disappear 
gradually.  
According to Lenin, the process of withering away of state will create the situation 
when a substantial part of private law will be incorporated into public law. After the 
revolution, bourgeois law would begin gradually to wither away as long as economic 
progress was developing.81 This made possible future contributions on law and legislation 
from other scholars which due to the Lenin’s statement wasn’t considered any more 
“counter-revolutionary”. But still the definition of law wasn’t accepted wholly or without 
suspicion.  
Anyway, here the fundamental issue was resolved: the law in Soviet Union will exist 
due to the necessities of the state. Another notion after this, which created much 
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disappointment – what form of law will it be? The result of this dilemma could be grasped 
by careful study of Stalin's policy. 
 
2.2. Interpretations of Marxism-Leninism in the 1930s 
 
Evgeny Bronislavovich Pashukanis, a prominent representative of Soviet legal 
theory, whose juridical mentor was another Soviet legal scholar Piotr Stuchka, also like 
many other soviet lawyers interpreted Marxian theory, and due to his orthodox strict 
following to the Marxian doctrine without curving to the political will, Pashukanis is called 
“the only Soviet Marxist legal philosopher who has achieved significant scholarly 
recognition outside of the USSR”82. One of his major works The General Theory of Law and 
Marxism83 was first published in Moscow in 1924 and subsequently translated into French, 
German, Japanese, Serbo-Croat and English.  At the very beginning of the communist 
revolution Pashukanis was among many Bolsheviks who combatted the state due to the 
orthodox Marxism believing that the withering away of legal and political institutions will 
happen immediately after the victory of the revolution. Expectations were based on 
creation of a new revolutionary consciousness of justice which should be developed by 
revolutionary jurists and should replace the formal bourgeois legal heritage.  The belief that 
law itself is necessary for any society was labeled a feature of "legal fetishism" which Marx 
criticized strongly.84 Here we see a strong contradiction of Pashukanis writings with the 
position which Lenin claimed about the necessity of law during the transitional period of 
gradual transformation of the society to socialism. But formally, Pashukanis was right in 
claiming that after bourgeois law there isn’t any possible existence of any other kind of law 
(for instance socialistic law) since this statement repeated Marxian communist doctrine 
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perfectly. Predicting the future Marx admitted that law will remain in the first stage of 
communist society, but highlighted that it would be bourgeois law.   
Pashukanis was one of the Soviet legal scholars who had naïve optimism about  the 
realization of all Marx’s predictions about a future communist society. He was criticized 
and repressed for his scientific views in association of all law with bourgeois law and 
predictions on it withering away. In early 1937, Pashukanis was avowed as a "traitor and 
wrecker" and soon afterwards he was arrested and liquidated at Stalin's order. His mentor 
Piotr Stuchka had the same destiny: political critics of his scientific views and then 
repression. 
Soon afterwards, the Soviet General Procurator A.J.Vyshinsky, who also becomes a 
director of Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, held a new line in the 
development of Soviet legal doctrine: that state establishes law with the sole function of 
being an expression of state will through sanctions and coercion. A.J.Vyshinsky further 
developed this view, stating that:  
“The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power unlimited without any law, but 
creating its own law and using it – it punishes those who violate the stabilized political 
order. The dictatorship can’t stand the anarchy and disorder, in the contrary, it strictly 
follows the laws and principles established in the Fundamental Law of the proletarian State 
– in the Soviet Constitution”85   
That was a drastic turnaround from the legally nihilist character which defined the 
beginning of Soviet legal development before 1922 and resulted in legal idealism when the 
law became a weapon for managing the rebels of the counter-revolutionaries inside the 
country and the remaining defeated bourgeoisie, as well as external attacks from the 
capitalist world. 
Toward making law more applicable to the political interests and the expression of 
state power, P.Stuchka in “The revolutionary function of Soviet state and law” states that: 
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“we don’t need stable laws, almost, we need Constitution which should give us the 
possibility to change the laws in twenty-four hours.”86  
Due to the main political course in the development of legal doctrine introduced by 
Vyshinsky, Stalinist theorists broke with traditions; “they were less creative in juridical 
theories but more practical concerning political reality”87. Hans Kelsen acknowledged this 
phenomenon when he wrote that, “Soviet legal theory adapts itself submissively to every 
change of the Soviet government.”88 
Ludwikowski R. highlights that while Pashukanis' tried to interpret Marxism was 
connected in an assumption that the young Soviet state would follow the predictions of the 
fathers of scientific communism, the Stalinist theorists faced the necessity of adopting 
Marxism to the changing conditions of socialist life. He states that after the revolution 
nobody from the fathers of Soviet communist doctrine had any idea of how a new society 
should be legally organized and how the new state should function: “They learned that 
Lenin's generation of revolutionaries knew how to subvert, destroy, and change, but had 
little knowledge of how to build or create, or introduce more advanced institutions, better 
economic techniques, or improved agricultural methods. Lenin's generation of 
revolutionaries did not know how to adopt the Marxist concept of state and law to a new 
reality. For them, Marxism served as a sacred guide to be followed almost blindly”.89 The 
thesis that socialism created a new, higher form of the legal superstructure was emphasized 
by Vyshinsky and never challenged in the Soviet theory of law. In textbooks of socialist 
jurisprudence, authors still emphasized that "it is the socialist state and law which replaced 
the bourgeois state and law and which is going to wither away."90 
It is interesting to see the development of the some key issues of the theory of 
communism due to the political course of Soviet state. As Ludwikowki made a radical 
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conclusion of non-correlation of Soviet system to the scientific Marxian theory: “being a 
Marxist, Pashukanis did not fit into Stalin's system because this system was Marxism in 
name only.”91 
 
2.3. Special features of the Soviet legal scholarship 
 
The increasing institutionalization of state organs and the systematization of Soviet 
legislation rendered the division of state powers largely insignificant. Critically too, this 
institutionalization and systemization made the communist political party the axis around 
which all social and state organs functioned. Here we see another marked feature of the 
Soviet legal system: while it guaranteed rights and freedom for Soviet citizens, the 
communist political party ruled over all state institutions. So, article 126 of the Constitution 
of 193692:  
“In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop 
the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the 
U.S.S.R. are ensured the right to unite in public organizations--trade unions, cooperative 
associations, youth organizations,' sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and 
scientific societies; and the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks 
of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in 
their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all 
organizations of the working people, both public and state.”  
The role of the communist party, which failed to evaluate the role of laws formed 
the phenomena, was described by Thomas E.Towe:  
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“The Soviet Constitution guarantees, any of the same fundamental rights as are 
guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States, plus several others as well. Indeed, 
these rights are described in detail and appear on their face to be safe guarded more 
emphatically in the Soviet Constitution. However, the mere existence of constitutional 
provisions for fundamental rights does not necessarily guarantee that those rights will be 
protected. Western scholars often point to discrepancies between rhetorical phrases in the 
Soviet Constitution and actual practices in the area of fundamental rights.”93  
Initially, the struggle was to obtain political power against the bourgeoisie, the old 
ruling social class; after this was achieved came the complicated work of consolidating the 
new state apparatus. Managing the rebels of the counter-revolutionaries inside the country 
and the remaining defeated bourgeoisie, as well as external attacks from the capitalist 
world, formed the conditions in which the new legislative Soviet system was developed. To 
overcome those risks to Soviet power, the young, dominant class needed a new instrument, 
one that was very flexible and could be modified easily in the face of exigencies. Thus, legal 
norms that could be revised quickly on an ad hoc basis became an integral feature of the 
Soviet law. 94  The liquidity of law and its formal character does not imply the state 
establishing rules, but, rather, the expression of already existing social relationships 
between state and society, with modifications to the law-taking place whenever political 
needs arise.95 
Extremely “liquid” judicial norms matched organically well the conception of the 
law as an instrument of fight against all risks for new state, rather than establishing the 
rights and guarantees for individuals. Moreover, political “course” the individual protection 
wasn’t considered as a priority. As Soviet Professor Malitsky has stated: 
“The capitalist law  is based upon the abstract "natural rights" of an individual; it 
places the individual in the center of the world, surrounds him with a cult and therefore 
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establishes limits to the State […] However, the proletarian State sets the limits not to itself 
but to its  citizens.  A collective body called the State, rather  than  the  individual citizen, is 
at the center of the proletarian law.”96 
The emphasis of Soviet legal scholars was based on thesis of collectivity which 
established that only collectively by all citizens is possible to provide the interests for 
individuals.  
The definition of law introduced by A.J. Vyshinsky and finally formulated and 
adopted in the First Congress of Soviet lawyers:  
“Law is a system of rules of behavior, expressing the will of ruling class and 
formulated in legislative order, through the customs and rules of common living, 
sanctioned by the state power, and exercising of which are forced by the coercive power of 
the state for the purposes of protection, strengthening and development of the social 
relations which are favorable for the ruling class”.97  
As could clearly be seen, Vyshinsky’s attitude to law as a system of rules of 
behaviour (or “norms”) towards state, correlation of state and law, their functions and aims 
were absolutely different from the normativism as it was defined by Kelsen or normativism 
described by Duguit. Since Vyshisky called “norms” as any subjective and even arbitrary 
acts of power, we can talk about “potestarism” rather “normativism.”98 Nonetheless, this 
definition of law in Soviet literature was called “normative”, and later in 50-60s “narrow 
normative”. 
As Vyshinky himself admitted: “Our definition of law doesn’t have anything in 
common with normativism. Since normativism is based on absolutely the wrong 
perception of law as “social solidarity” (Duguit), as norm (Kelsen), which concludes the 
content of law, without connection to the social relations, which in reality determines the 
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content of law. The biggest mistake of normativity is that they giving definition to law as 
totality of norms are limited with this, trying to interpret the norms as something confined 
what could be understood only through itself.”99   
It is interesting to note that in this vision, the law is introduced through the will of 
the dominant class as an instrument of oppression in strong correlation with Lenin’s 
interpretation of Marxian doctrine. The definition denote a single main objective – “to 
follow, sanction and develop social relations and social system advantageous and beneficial 
for the dominant class”. In that sense Soviet lawyers bound the definition of law to legal 
norms and obligations – in contrast to the bourgeois conception of law, which subsumed a 
moral component and the supreme idea of justice as a supreme legislative principle.100 The 
Soviet definition mentions only the legally concretized will of the dominant class.  
This legal construction became possible by the segregation of social classes who 
could exercise the rights derived from most of the legal guarantees in Article 65 of the 
Constitution of 1918, cited above (1.2. Deprivation of rights in the Soviet Constitution of 
1918). Such restrictions were considered necessary to prevent counter-revolutionary 
movements. Only in Stalin’s Constitution of 1936 were such restrictions absent, as it was 
proclaimed that “the toiler’s class was eliminated” and only the new proletariat class existed 
in the Soviet state. Soviet legal scholars, as against Western ones, have seen no 
contradiction in institutionalizing certain rights, with some social categories unable to 
exercise them. 
As Hans Kelsen writes about this Vyshinky’s definition of law:  
“this definition however , applies only to the law of society divided into two classes, 
a dominant and a dominated class, and that means – according to the economic 
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interpretation of society – an exploiting and exploited class. But that was no longer the 
status of Soviet society.”101  
As Stalin announced on 25 November 1936 in his speech to the VIII Congress of 
Soviets of USSR:  
“Due to significant changes happened in the economy of the USSR [Stalin is 
referring to the period in which NEP ended and the five-year plan began], the structure of 
the classes of our society has changed […] All the oppressing classes have been liquidated. 
The workers’ class remained, the peasants’ class remained, the intellectuals remained. But it 
would be wrong to claim that those classes were not exposed to changes; that they remain 
the same as in the epoch of capitalism. […] The proletariat is the class that used to be 
oppressed by the capitalists. But nowadays here we have liquidated the capitalist class. […] 
There no longer exist a capitalist class that can oppress the proletariat. […] Is it possible, 
then to call our working class – “proletariat”? It is clear that it is not.[…] This means that 
the proletariat of the USSR has been transformed into completely new class – the working 
class of the USSR, which has destroyed the economic capitalist system, which has 
established the socialistic property as an instrument of production and which rules Soviet 
society in the communist way. […] What do they mean – all that changes? On the one 
hand, the boundary disappears between workers’ and peasants’ classes disappears, as well 
as between those classes and intellectuals, and also the old exclusivity of the classes 
disappears. This implies that the distance between these social groups continually 
diminishes. On the other hand, the social contradictions between those groups disappear. 
The disappearance of social contradictions also implies the elimination of political 
contradictions between them.”102 
As Hans Kelsen argues that the definition of law as a will of dominant class just 
became meaningless with this Stalin’s proclamation since the toilers class due was identified 
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with the whole society. It was not the only one, but one of the logical contradictions of 
Soviet legal doctrine.103  
 
2.4. Development of the Soviet legal education as a reflection of the 
state policy 
 
It is interesting to see the parallel in general attitude to the law of Soviet 
government with the development of legal education. Together with the general trend of 
first total refutation law which was replaced with gradual understanding that law is 
necessary for the functioning of the state and the beginning of the construction of system 
but on the Marxian doctrine towards legal idealism – the same path could be observed on 
the development of legal education. 
Just after the October revolution of 1917 there were no drastic changes to legal 
education in first few years. In a report from Moscow State University it is written: “Both 
1917 as well as 1918 passed for law faculty in atmosphere of pre-revolutionary mode […] 
Revolution didn’t influence somehow on the professorship staff or educational plans […] 
Major part of the university entrants were from non-proletariat social classes […]” 104 . 
Changes in legal higher education started in 1919, when by Decree of the Council of 
People’s Deputies of RSFSR «О некоторых изменениях в составе и устройстве 
государственных ученых и высших учебных заведений» [About several changes in 
system and structure of state scientific and highest institutions] issued on 1 October 1918 
was prescribed to all professors who had more 10 ten years length of working experience 
in a certain institution and more than 15 years of total working experience to pass the 
qualification exam, which main purpose was to check the “revolutionary consciousness” 
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(i.e. loyalty to new Bolshevik’s power) of the professorship. Major part of the professors 
did not pass it and were fired.105  Many legal faculties were closed in Universities and 
Institutes of higher education all over the country. 
Further changes in legal higher education were determined by the nihilist approach 
common to the whole legal system. By the Decree of Council of People’s Deputies in 
March of 1919 all legal faculties and institutions were abolished. On this basis, new 
faculties of social studies were established. Statues of Faculties of social sciences prescribed 
that: “All students, regardless of their specialization during first two years study the 
disciplines which will focus on general social education […], from the third year of 
education the faculty will be divided into three departments: economic, legal-political, 
historic…” 106 . On legal-political department were courses of history of law and state, 
evolution of political and legal thought, public law of Soviet Republic, social law, criminal 
sociology and politics, worker’s law, history of international relations and international 
law.107 
In August 1924 by the Decree of Council of People’s Deputies of RSFSR “About 
transformation of the system of institutions of higher education”,108 the faculties of social 
sciences were transformed in legal faculties of Soviet law. Restoration of legal faculties 
coincided with the tendency in formation of Soviet legal doctrine. After grasping the 
necessity of legislation in 1922 and later years happened the first Soviet codification (in 
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1922 were adopted Labour, Civil, Criminal Codes and Code on Lands, in 1923 were 
adopted Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code, in 1926 new Criminal Code 
and Family Code).   
Gradual activity on elimination of higher legal education brought its results. Even 
after restoration of legal faculties the number of student as well as people with higher legal 
education was insufficiently law. For the purposes of rapid legal training for prosecutors 
and judges Ministry of Justice opened legal courses of short duration, but this didn’t save 
the situation. Figures which provide J.Hazard: “In  the whole country in  1937 there  were 
only eight  juridical institutes at Moscow, Leningrad,  Saratov,  Kazan, Sverdlovsk,  
Karkhov, Minsk  and Tashkent, and three  law  faculties at Tiflis, Erivan  and  Baku. The 
total number of  students permitted to matriculate  in all  these  institutions providing a 
four-year course was set by law  at 1,490 in 1935.”109 
Due to the materials of population census in 1939 workers in legal sphere who had 
higher legal education were 2,4 thousands – which is 11,6% from the total number, 
secondary special legal education (who finished special legal courses) were only 3,6 
thousands – which is 48% from the total number of legal workers. From 1,000 judges and 
prosecutors only 117 had higher legal education. In 1939 only 10% of prosecutors and 
examining magistrate had higher legal education. 110  
On 16 July 1938 the All-Soviet Union was held on issues of science of Soviet law 
and state, where a serious critics on the activity of legal scientific institutions during 20s 
and 30s was made. A.J.Vyshinsky in his speech told the delegates that the distribution of 
theories of withering away of law and state and making equal of law as bourgeois law (with 
was the critics of Pashukanis described above since it was him who elaborated the theory 
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withering away of law and state as strict following to Marxian doctrine). Vyshinsky told, 
that:  
“all that delirium couldn’t not to strike significantly the activity of government legal 
bodies in general […] someone elaborated rotten theories about withering away of law, 
state and justice, that legal education isn’t needed, that we could manage not only without 
Roman law, but without Soviet law as well, which that someone wanted to bury. We 
dispersed our specialists: we lost old ones and didn’t grow up new ones.”111     
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3. Further development of the legal doctrine in the 1930s: formation of 
the new Soviet law 
3.1. The conception of “proletarian law” of D.Kursky 
 
However, even full of contradictions with Marxian theory, first Lenin’s statement 
about necessity of law, and then the whole political course, created a base for development 
of different conceptions of law which formed Soviet legal doctrine. As Nersesyants 
describes this variety of legal concepts, writing that all of them were under common 
Marxism-Leninism approach to law and this all their differences they had some features in 
common – justification of dictatorship and its dictatorial norms. Refusing bourgeois law, all 
concepts of law of that period refuse the sense of law as legality, adding to this notion anti-
legal dispositions of proletarian-communist dictatorship.112 
M.Kozlovsky, Bolshevik and People’s Commissar of Justice, after revolution of 
1917 wrote:  
“Transition period from capitalism to socialism, happening for the first time in the 
world after October revolution in Russia, creates in process of socialistic revolution special, 
unprecedented law, it is not law in its authentic meaning (the system of suppression of 
minority by majority), but proletarian law, which is still law, but in meaning as an 
instrument of suppression of opposition of minorities by the working class.”113 
Though this conception of “proletarian law” contradicted to the Marxian 
predictions about residual after the revolution bourgeois law during first stages of 
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socialism, Marxian theorists were likely to highlight the unity of proletarian class approach 
to law and state of Soviet legal theory and Marxian theory, rather than its contradictions.114  
Concepts of “proletarian law” were further developed by Dmitry Kursky, the first 
Soviet General Prosecutor. According to Kursky, proletarian law was system of norms 
which expressed interests and power of the whole proletarian class, which became possible 
in conditions of dictatorship of proletariat: 
“Dictatorship of proletariat could acknowledge the interests only of its class in 
general, the true representative of such dictatorship is the whole class – they are workers 
and poorest peasants, organized in the Communist Party; individual, moreover official 
representative is always performer, even if he has a lot of authority.”115 
 That is why, Kursky claimed, that law should reflect the interests of the whole class 
and there is no place for the rights of individuals. He insisted that in proletarian law 
couldn’t exist norms Habeas Corpus or any other legal prescriptions of individual rights. 
Conception of Kursky had a lot of from “revolutionary law” since abolishing Habeas Corpus 
norms he explained by the necessity of fighting against counter-revolutionary elements. 
And norms, protecting individual rights could limit proletariat in the fight for its 
interests.116 
Also, Kursky saw one of the main objectives of his conception in abolishing of all 
bourgeois norms: 
“Abolishing of all bourgeois legal norms is the only guarantee of justice for 
proletariat in cities and countryside and the poorest peasants, who made a great objective 
expressed in their dictatorship: total suppression of bourgeoisie, abolition of human 
exploitation and construction of socialism.”117   
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Kursky called his conception a “proletarian communist law” which could be seen as 
a revolutionary type of legal theory, which also largely reflected the further tendency in 
Soviet legal scholarship – the elaboration of the existence of special new type of Soviet law 
totally different from the bourgeois legal order. 
Any effort to reconcile Marxian thought with the legal project must confront the 
condition that Marxian theory proposes the establishment of a dictatorship of the 
proletariat, which is a power of ruling class unlimited with prescriptions and frames. With 
such a foundation, when Marxian theory in its deep essence prescribes withering away law 
and state and sees them only as a transitional necessity for a limited period of time, 
elaboration of somehow consistent and logical legal theories wasn’t possible. As many 
other heritage of Soviet lawyers, concept of proletarian law is an attempt to use some 
general notions for Soviet realities. The fact that legality and law in classical scientific 
meaning is something different from what Soviet scholars called “law”, they explained by 
appearance of new type of Soviet law and agreed with the difference in notions and 
definitions. 
As in could be seen in further development of Soviet legal scholarship, it lacked 
consistency since changes in political situation required changes in all spheres of law, and 
theoretical inclinations were supposed to follow that political changes. 
In that period of the development of Soviet law, a part of ideological and political 
influence, research and study of law was dedicated to the aim of overcoming it, which was 
in accordance with the prescriptions of Marxian doctrine. 
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3.2. The “socialistic” conception of human rights of S.Kechekyan, 
E.Lukasheva and V.Chikvadze 
 
Conception of “socialistic law” was a logical continuation of legal theories of non-
bourgeois, post-revolutionary, qualitatively new (proletarian, soviet) law. 118  On the 
congresses of CPSU already from the 1930s was proclaimed the necessity of elimination of 
remaining features of capitalism for total victory of socialism. With further years, the entry 
of USSR into the socialism was confirmed.   
S.F.Kechekyan describing the main special features of socialistic law, explained that 
since socialistic legal relations have as its foundation socialistic property for the means of 
production and socialistic system of economy, all principles of socialistic law first of all 
reflect the principle of socialism “from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his work”.119 
Socialistic concept of law put bigger attention to the human rights norms and 
guarantees in comparison as it was before. As Tumanov said, “one of the main features of 
socialistic law is that the role of law is increased.”120  
As every Soviet legal concept on re-interpretation of Marxian theory, and this time, 
the essence of human rights in socialistic society was seen from the dispositions of Marxian 
heritage. Lukashova E.A. and Chikvadze V.M. in their book “Socialistic concept of human 
rights” wrote: 
“Marxism-Leninism is deeply humane theory, based on the idea about individual as 
the highest value. K.Marx and F.Engels saw this connection between construction of 
communism with creation of the conditions for free development of every member of the 
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society. Marxism-Leninism doesn’t see a person a tool for the development of the state. 
[…] In socialistic society an individual is a purpose of the whole social development: this is 
the main objective of social progress, development of the state, law, and democracy.”121 
Kechekyan made an important provision for the socialistic conception of law that 
human rights exist only in terms of “collectivity”:  
“If seeing the legal relations in capitalistic society we can limit ourselves by the 
definitions of physical personalities and juridical entities, than making a characterization of 
legal relations in socialistic society we should uncover the concrete features of subjective 
law, existing in certain legal relations. 
It doesn’t mean that socialistic law doesn’t have human rights and rights of the 
citizens, which have individuals in their civil position. But in many cases property and non-
property rights of the individuals are determined by certain special features in the socialistic 
society. A lot of types of legal relations are determined by the membership in agricultural 
cooperatives, and many of them are determined by the official positions of individuals on 
state service or social organizations, the character of their work in the industrial sector etc. 
In socialistic law there is a very important role of collective legal subjects. This 
subjects act as holders of truly common interests, while at the same time under judicial 
entities of capitalistic countries is hidden private interests of certain capitalists, who try to 
present their private entrepreneurship in a collective form. 
Rights provided in socialistic legal relations and obligations of individuals in those 
relations, serve not only to the interests of the parties of those legal relations, but to the 
interests of the whole socialistic society. They couldn’t be expression of arbitrariness of 
certain individuals, they are not expression of their will separately divided from the whole 
society to which they belong. The will of the parties in the legal relations is the will of 
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individuals who are bonded by the relations of collaboration and mutual help, who are 
moving towards to the common aims together.”122 
Lukasheva and Chikvadze continue the thesis about collectivity and common social 
interests of socialistic law re-interpreting classics of Marxism-Leninism to give the 
foundation to the theory of socialistic rights of individuals: 
“Declaration of the rights of working class and exploited people123, which was 
adopted after the first socialistic revolution in the world, bond rights and obligations of 
individuals not with the abstract individuals, but with concrete social classes. Such attitude 
doesn’t mean underestimation of person, as bourgeois and capitalistic political ideology 
tries to present it, but just confirms thesis that freedom and rights of every working person 
could be expressed only through the social class to which he belongs. […] 
Following his humane approach, Lenin sees individual as a part of society. Since in 
all his expressions person express himself due to the influence of the society. Marxian 
literature was always highlighted the connection of individual and society. Since the abilities 
of the individual could be expressed only if there are favorable social conditions for it.”124 
A.K.Stalgevich describing the essence and special features of socialistic law, in his 
article “Some questions about theory of socialistic legal relations” provided complete list of 
characteristics of the socialistic legal relations which reflect the essence of socialistic legal 
concept. According to Stalgevich, socialistic legal relations: 
“1) are based on material conditions of socialistic society, conditioned by 
socialistic social order, socialistic system of economy and socialistic property 
for the means of production;  
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2) are maintained and developed by Soviet socialistic state under supervision 
of Communist Party;  
3) comply with the norms of socialistic law, which is expressed in laws and 
other legal acts, which provides the state will of working class […];  
4) contain the rights and common obligations of individuals stabilized and 
protected by Soviet state, those individuals are subjects of legal relations -  
Soviet citizens, Soviet state, Soviet state organizations, and Soviet social 
organizations of workers;  
 […] 7) serve as a way for exercising Soviet laws and other legal acts for 
strengthening of Soviet legal order, politics of communist party and Soviet 
state in the interests of people and great aim of achievement of 
communism”125 
The conception of socialistic law was prevailing in Soviet scholarship since it was 
universal framework for all other types of legal thought. Formulated in the 1930s, at the 
same time with the proclamations of CPSU about near achievement of socialism, the 
theory of socialist law was evaluated and transformed by many lawyers and stayed one of 
the mainstream wide-spread theories till the collapse of Soviet state.  
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4. The essence of human rights in the psychological theory of L.Petrazhitsky  
4.1. The psychological concept of law by L. Petrazhitsky 
 
The concept of law from the position of social classes view was developed by 
Soviet lawyer Mikhail Reisner. He began the elaboration of his legal concept before 
revolution of 1917 and further continued in the Soviet period. His legal concept was 
mainly based on the psychological theory of L.Petrazhitsky. 
Initially the psychological theory of law was developed by Leon Petrazhitsky before 
the revolution of 1917 and very much influenced the development of legal doctrine further 
in the Soviet period. But not only Reisner based his conception on achievements of 
Petrazhitsky, A.Lunacharsky, D.Dembsky and other Soviet scholars were also influenced 
by his outstanding theory of psychological understanding of law.  
In his main work Theory of law and state in correlation with the theory of morality, 
L.Petrazhitsky provided detailed analysis of the essence of law describing different legal 
concepts, namely “state concept of law” and “coercion legal concept”.  
About the first group concepts, he says that the most frequent, but at the same time 
improper, notion of law “as norms of coercion, which are declared and protected by the 
stated (or norms which are originated from the state)”126 He highlights that the weak part 
of that definition is that it correlates only with the state laws and not with the law in 
general, excluding for example international law and legal customs which are created by 
people and not by the state. He explains, that theories which adopt criteria of 
distinguishing of law from not-law by recognition of legal norms by the state, and not their 
creation by the state, are much better. He writes, that such theories “embrace at least even 
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those norms which are not created by the state, but are recognized by it (by the state) as 
legal norms, so those theories contain all official legal norms”.127   
Petrazhitsky claimed, that even this elaborated definition of law can’t be approved, 
since from declaring that law is only the norms recognized by the state, there appears the 
logical conclusion that existence of international law should be denied because certain 
states may decide not to recognize the norms of international law or recognize only part of 
them, so, according to this definition in this case, they will lose their legal character. 
Another disadvantage of this definition is that it includes definitio per idem  - that “certain 
category “x” should be defined through the reference to “x””. This means that defining law 
as norm recognized by the state includes the notion “state” in itself. And “state” means 
already existence of complicated system of legal norms, and scientific definition of state 
requires scientific definition of law. Following this definition we find ourselves in logic 
circulus without an exit.128 
Another logical contradiction of law as norms recognized by the state, according to 
Petrazhitsky, is that state may recognize not only legal norms, but other rules of behavior 
for example religion. Certain laws and codes contain some dispositions which don’t have a 
strict legal meaning; they express moral and other dispositions about behavior. So, 
according to Petrazhitsky the theory of state recognition of law doesn’t have a criteria of 
distinguishing the legal norms from other rules of behavior included in laws and other legal 
acts.129 Petrazhitsky stated that:  
“Incorporating into the definition of law the attitude to it from the state and 
orientating on this attitude, science goes down the wrong path […] connecting law to the 
state science deprives itself from rich and educational material – those legal acts which 
happened outside the state, without any connection to it and before it appeared, and makes 
its mental outlook narrow, we can say, makes it bureaucratic and formal.”130 
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Defining the second category of theories (coercion theories) which presumes law as 
system of obligatory norms which are maintained with state coercion, Petrazhitsky wrote 
that norms of law are connected to the feature of coercion, the power of coercion and law 
are seen as phenomenon which consists of two parts: norms and coercion.131 The essence 
of this connection of law and coercion is that any person who doesn’t follow the legal 
norms could be and more often must be subjected to coercive measures. In case a legal 
norm isn’t respected there is another legal norm (sanction), which prescribes the state 
bodies to apply (due their own initiative or due to the request of interested party) coercion. 
This coercion represents not only obligatory exercising the legal norm which is not 
respected but also punishment for the transgressor or other disadvantageous consequences 
for him.132 
Criticizing this category of legal concepts, Petrazhitsky wrote that these notions 
contained the same definition per idem since they all provided a definition of law through the 
definition of state and coercion. Another contradiction he saw in applying this definition to 
international law: the contradiction is that many norms of international law don’t have 
apparat of coercion. Also, many legal norms which prescribe the obligations of Monarch 
can’t be exercised since the inviolability of the personality of Monarch. He highlights 
mistakes of logical construction of coercive theories since it is widely recognized the legal 
character of international law as well as norms of about Monarch’s duties.133    
Through the critics of existing legal concepts Petrazhitsky makes a conclusion of 
mistaken statement of connection of law with the state. Form this presupposing he 
elaborates his own theory which he called psychological. He explains that: 
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“Specific nature of law, morality, esthetics, and their differences form each other 
and from other emotions is mainly situated not in the area of intellectual, but in the area of 
emotional, impulsive in the sense of its content.”134  
Petrazhitsky insists that law as well as rules on which functions society expresses 
itself from the human phycology, from different impulses and emotions which produces 
the psyche of individuals. He says, that “law as a phenomenon is those ethical impulses and 
emotions which have attributive character.”135  
Petrazhitsky also claims that legal science doesn’t have a correct definition of what 
the law is and in elaboration of the definition he sees a very important objective for legal 
science. And giving his notion of law Petrazhitsky highlights drastic differences between 
his view and traditional understanding of positive law:  
“Psychological definition law doesn’t have anything in common with what is usually 
lawyers determine as law […] Lawyers mistakenly percept as real law norms, dispositions 
and prohibitions […] Form completely another point of view – from refutation of what 
usually lawyers tend to think as real law – we tend to seek for phenomenon as special class 
of complicated emotionally-intellectual psychological processes, on which is based our 
definition of law as well as the whole study of psychological theory.”136  
From the point of view of his theory Petrazhitsky says that it doesn’t make sense to 
divide law on positive or intuitive, since intuitive law being primary law and base for all 
other legal structures doesn’t need to be recognized by the state, since it doesn’t determine 
its nature:  
“It is not important if as we seen before the division of law on positive and 
intuitive, if certain norms, obligations and rights are based on someone’s dispositions, 
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national customs or other normative facts, because we talk about which are alien to such 
attributions and are based solely on imperative emotions”.137 
From his psychological definition of law Petrazhitsky elaborates his theory of law 
and morality where he claims that law has regulative function which in fact influences the 
behavior of individuals, and morality being less demanding phenomenon acts as an 
orientation for the behavior.138 
An advantage of his theory is Petrazhitsky claims that it embraces a much bigger 
circle of social relations rather than positive law in its ordinary meaning, he also claims that 
his intuitive law explains the rules which construct deviation groups which are not 
connected to the state dispositions – and gives example of internal rules of criminals, 
pirates inside the criminal societies.139 
 
4.2. The critics of L.Petrzhitsky’s theory: D.Dembsky, V.Sergeevich and 
M.Reisner 
 
As soon as Petrazhitsky’s theory appeared it faced a lot of criticism from the 
scientific community. Before the revolution in 1910, V. Sergeevich, a historian and theorist 
of law, criticized Petrazhitsky’s statement about the method of understanding the law, since 
the basis for law was seen in psychological impulses of individual, Petrazhitsky claimed 
that: “[…] proper and unique method of observation should be recognized the method of 
self-observing and introspection” 140 . Since Petrazhitsky’s theory was based on the 
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of state and law in correlation with theory of morality], San-Petersburg ,1909, reprinted in 2000 by 
publishing house “Лань”[Lan], San-Petersburg, p.123 
140 SERGEEVICH V.I. «Мой ответ г.Петражицкому» [My answer to Petrazhitsky], Journal of Ministry 
of Justice, Senat’s publishing house, San-Petersburg, 1910, p. 4 
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subjective psychological attitude of individual vis-a-vis the law, it was logically expected 
that the choice of the method for this theory would be introspection. Sergeevich wrote: 
“Until now we thought, that positive law appears from the customs, laws and other 
outside sources of law, - what about natural or philosophic law, its sources – isn’t law or 
code of laws, it is something different, and various philosophical schools understand 
differently this sources of natural law. Our philosopher [L.Petrazhitsky] claims that the only 
source of any law and any obligations of individual is his own conciseness: any other law 
for him is imaginary; it is optical illusion and nothing more. If so, than, certainly, the only 
method of studying law is introspection. Here the author is absolutely logic: he doesn’t just 
claims that the only method is introspection, he couldn’t say anything else since it is 
absolutely logic. And if so, than the theory of Petrazhitsky doesn’t foresee anything about 
positive law, since the law and legislation doesn’t situate in our consciousness and 
according to the theory of the author it is not law, claiming positive law as law will be a 
contradiction to the author’s views.”141   
After the revolution the impact of Petrazhitsky’s theory, as far as criticism is 
concerned, didn’t waver. Soviet scholars criticized it or adapted it from the position of 
Marxian theory.  
After the revolution was adopted the Decree on Courts, which stated that in cases 
of lack of necessary norm of law or its incompleteness, judges must be led by their socialist 
legal consciousness. 142  Explaining the concept of socialist legal consciousness, 
A.Lunacharsky based his position on Petrazhitsky’s psychological theory. Lunacharsky 
stated that:  
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142  “Decree on Courts the Soviet of the Peoples’ Deputies of RSFSR” from 24 November 1917, 
“Decrees of Soviet power”, Publishing house of the state political literature, Moscow, 1957 
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“Every social class creates its own law when it applies its power, when it creates 
social world in the image and likeness of itself – what means according to its fundamental 
class interests and certain existing conditions.”143 
Dembsky D. was among the first scholars who made an attempt to explain the 
theory of Petrazhitsky from the Marxian position, as he himself wrote:  
“I intend to provide further program of construction or study about Law and 
Morality from the point of view of doctrine of Historical Materialism, we will take as 
beginning point Petrazhitsky’s study of Law and Morality for two reasons. First, is that this 
theory is the biggest contribution to the science of philosophy of law for a decade, and it 
couldn’t be ignored by any researcher. The second reason is that there is proof that 
Petrazhitsky’s basis is very different from ours and needs to be improved.”144  
In the first part of his writing “Philosophy of Law and Morality of prof.L.I.Petrazhitsky. 
Law and Morality from the view of historical materialism” Dembsky provides certain critiques 
about the definitions which Petrazhitsky gave for the notions of law, morality, ethics and 
some specifications about method, but more interesting is the second part “Law and morality 
from the point of view of historical materialism” where we can observe first attempts of 
elaboration of the theory of Petrazhitsky towards political communist ideology. Dembsky 
takes famous Marxian thesis as precondition for further elaboration of his views: 
“In social life people enter in different relations which don’t depend on their will – 
they are industrial relations, which are conditioned by the stage of development of their 
industrial forces. Systems of those industrial relations create the economic structure of the 
society, the real basis, on which the legal and political superstructure is constructed, and to 
which confirms certain forms of social consciousness. The way of production of economic 
goods conditions social, political and spiritual life. It is not the consciousness of people 
which determines their being, opposite; the social being determines their consciousness. 
                                                          
143 LUNARCHARSKY A. “Революция и суд” [Revolution and Court], Journal “Правда” [Truth], 
Publishing house “Печатный двор” [Pechatny dvor], San-Petersburg, 1917 
144  DEMBSKY D. “Философия права и нравственности проф.Л.И.Петражицкого. Право и 
нравственность с точки зрения исторического материализма” [Philosophy of Law and Morality of 
prof.L.I.Petrazhitsky. Law and Morality from the view of historical materialism], Publishing house 
B.Benguis, Harkov, 1910, p. 6 
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On the well known stage of development of economic industrial forces enter in 
contradiction with existing economic relations, or using legal terms property relations, 
within the limits of which they functioned before. From the form of development of 
economic forces this relations became its fetters. Here the social revolution happens. 
With the change of economic base, more or less quickly, modifies the whole 
superstructure of social, political, philosophical relations under it […]”145 
Dembsky insists that this Marxian formula of social living could be applied to the 
theory of Law and Morality in order to explain regularity and patterns in its development146: 
 “Bearer of the social power, with natural historic necessity, becomes always the 
class organizer, the class which plays organizational role in certain given industrial 
distributive system. Distributing the common sources of society, the ruling class (class-
organizer), dictates its own “morality” to other classes of the society, strengthening by this 
and developing favouring to it social relations. The essence of this “morality”, reflecting 
and expressing living (industrial-distributive) conditions of class-organizer, comes in 
further growing contradictions with “morality” of other social classes, which reflects 
significantly different living conditions of this classes, and by it determining the behavior of 
individuals of that social classes. In this processes the Law is born and consciousness for 
creation of social labour process.” 147  
Dembsky explains that not the whole morality of ruling class becomes law, but only 
part of it, that part which is necessary as a foundation for the system of production and 
distribution, which is presented by that social class. He writes also that coercion is a 
necessary feature of law, since the new ruling class formed inside the old society and 
growing and developing faces a lot of opposition.148 
If Dembsky tried to explain law and morality from the view of historical 
materialism and gave it a new communist vision, M.Reiser significantly modified 
                                                          
145 Ibidem, p.46-47 
146 Ibidem, p. 48 
147 Ibidem, p. 59 
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Petrazhitsky’s theory and saw his main achievement in giving to the theory “Marxian 
foundation”. Just after the October revolution he was among Bolsheviks who claimed that 
revolutionary legal consciousness of proletariat could become law necessary for proletariat 
as intuitive law of that social class149:  
“I refashioned Petrazhitsky’s doctrine concerning intuitive law in the sense that I 
put it upon a Marxist foundation, and thereby obtained not intuitive law in general (which 
could here and there furnish individual forms adapted to certain social conditions) but the 
most genuine class law which was worked out in the form of intuitive law (in the ranks of 
the oppressed and exploited mass) independently of any official framework whatsoever; 
and it is for the reason alone that we were able subsequently to utilize “revolutionary legal 
consciousness of the proletariat” as the foundation of the activity of our revolutionary 
justice, which at the beginning was without any positive norms whatsoever”.150   
Marxian statements about class law interpreted in a sense that every social class (not 
only ruling class but oppressed class as well) creates its real and existing intuitive law due to 
its psychology and social position of that class. Already under capitalism, according to 
Reisner, there is not only bourgeois law, but also proletarian and peasant’s law. So not all 
law is soiled with “exploiting aims”.  Reisner says, that every “general” law in any society is 
a compromise between different types of class law existing in certain society. The only 
difference according to Reisner is that under capitalism the ruling position had a class law 
of bourgeoisie, and during Soviet period – proletarian law.151   
 
 
 
                                                          
149 KELSEN H. “The communist theory of law”, Frederick A.Praeger Publishing House, New York, 
1955, p. 78 
150  REISNER M.A. “The Theory of Petrazhitsky: Marxism and social ideology”, 1925, cited from 
KELSEN H. “The communist theory of law”, Frederick A.Praeger Publishing House, New York, 1955, 
p.78 
151 NERSESYANTS V.S. “Общая теория государства и права” [General theory of state and law], 
Publishing house INFRA-M, Moscow, 1999, p.166 
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5. Alternative conceptions of law in the Soviet doctrine the 1920-1930s 
5.1. The A.Malitsky’s theory of “octroyed” rights and critics of 
L.Kaganovich  
 
During the 1920s different Soviet scholars elaborated legal concepts which were 
based on interpretation of Marxism. I.Razumovsky was one of a few orthodox Marxists 
who insisted on strictly following the Marxian doctrine, his position was very close to the 
study of Pashukanis with some differences in the approaches. Razumovsky, as well as 
Pashukanis, adopted Marxian statement about socialistic critics of the bourgeois general 
theory of law. Razumovsky associated law with bourgeois law and predicted its withering 
away, since in withering away of law he saw the “death of bourgeois law as ideology” which will 
be replaced by communist stage of the development of the society, when  “social behavior 
will be organized by the conscious system rules based on correlation with material 
conditions of production.” Predicting elimination of law, Razumovsky still insisted on the 
necessity of research and studying of law for correct understanding of historical 
development and for the development of theory of historical materialism in general. He 
said that: “issues of law and its correlation with economic structure of the society, which is 
the foundation point for further theoretical constructions of Marx, this is the main issues 
of Marxian sociology which confirm also necessity of dialectical methodology.”152  
Not all legal concepts of the 1920s were conservatively based and followed from 
the Marxian doctrine. A very creative and unusual interpretation was elaborated by 
A.Malitsky in his work “Soviet Constitution”. Malitsky was adherent to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, and the rights of Soviet citizens he saw as octroyed privilege to them from 
the part of the state in return for fulfilment of obligations. He saw the Soviet Union as a 
lawful state from the feature that activity of all governmental bodies is prescribed by the 
law, he said: “subordination of all governmental bodies to the rule of law is called “legal 
                                                          
152  RAZUMOVSKY I., “Problems of Marxian theory of law”, Publishing house of Communist 
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regime” and the state itself, functioning in the legal regime is called “lawful state”, here we 
can admit that Soviet republic is a lawful state which functions according to its laws.”153 To 
correlate the notion of dictatorship of proletariat with the lawful state, Malitsky explains, 
what he means under the definition of “lawful state”:  
“We should not miss the notion of “lawful state” where all governmental bodies 
function according to the laws of the state, with theory of lawful state, when state itself 
limited with the law for the sake of rights and freedoms of individuals and taking it as an 
orientation in his law-making activity, since the law as something under the state is just a 
protection of interests capitalists: this is individualism of bourgeois law”154 
Formulating his definition of law, Malitsky tends to follow the theory of class law: 
“Law is such system of social relations, which is set up by the ruling class to protect its own 
class interests and guarded by the organized common force of the whole class.  Law as a 
regime […] is expressed in certain rules of behavior […] – legal norms. System of legal 
norms is positive law, which is always the law of ruling class.”155  
Malitsky continues such a legalistic view of law claiming that it is the state that 
creates law, as well as defines the rights, freedoms and obligations of individuals. Following 
this logic, Malitsky made a conclusion, that since the state defines the rights of individuals, 
it is not correct to see individual who sacrifices a part of his rights to the state in turn for 
safety and order. In opposite, it is state that “octroyes” rights and freedoms to the 
individual but with a reservation, that individual should exercise his rights for the interests 
of the whole society and for the sake of development of “industrial forces”. Explaining his 
theory of “octroyed” rights, Malitsky stated:  
“Individuals get their rights not because of the fact of being born humans, but 
from the state, from the ruling class, in interests of society, to keep carrying out their 
obligations which they have as part of the society, as members of the process of 
industrialization and distribution. […] In the Soviet Republic civil rights as well as public 
                                                          
153 MALITSKY A. “Советская Конституция” [Soviet constitution], publishing house of People’s 
Commissariat of Justice of Ukrainian SSR, Kharkov, 1925, pages 27-28 
154 Ibidem, p. 46 
155 Ibidem, p. 5 
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rights should be seen as a way of the citizen carrying out his social obligations, his official 
functions. This means that rights which the individual possess is not his freedom, but his 
social duty. Rights as duty – this is a main difference of view of socialism on the subjective 
rights of the individuals from the bourgeois doctrine of the West. Since citizens are given 
rights by the state, as well as frames of their freedom, the bourgeois statement: 
“Everything, what is not prohibited by the law, is allowed” should be replaced by opposite 
view: “Only those things which are allowed are permitted by the law” since the bearer of 
the rights and source of them is not from individual but the state”.156 
Continuing his theory of dictatorship of the proletariat and “octroyed rights” 
Malitsky states that during socialism the legislative and executive branches of power in the 
activity of governmental bodies will be merged since management of the state reunite with 
the legislative bodies.157  
The theory of Malitsky was criticized by his colleagues; the most harsh criticism was 
expressed by L.Kaganovich, a communist party leader and one of the closest associates of 
J.Stalin. It should be noted that Kaganovich’s interpretation of Marxism was more correct 
and corresponded much more to the Marxian legacy than Malitsky’s scholarship. 
In his article “12 years of constructing of the Soviet state” Kaganovich claimed that many 
scholars still use bourgeois methodology. As an example, he claimed that Malitsky in the 
analysis of Soviet Constitution uses only legal bourgeois methods. Malitsky stated that due 
to the Soviet Constitution, the state itself and government organ function due to the rule of 
law. Kaganovich criticized Malitsky’s approach, citing Lenin who explained the essence of a 
dictatorship which is founded on the unlimited force and not on law: 
“We refuse the notion of legalistic state even for bourgeois state. As Marxists, we 
assume, that bourgeois state covered with the form of law, democracy and formal equality, 
is in its sense the bourgeois dictatorship. Notion of “legalistic state” is invented by 
bourgeois scientists to cover the nature of bourgeois state. […] We should remember 
Lenin’s words who said that dictatorship of proletariat is a force based on power and not 
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law.[…]In the brochure “Proletarian revolution and regenerate Kautsky” Lenin wrote: 
“Revolutionary dictatorship is a power based on violence of working class against 
bourgeoisie  which is not limited with any law. ”158 
Interpreting the dictatorship of the working class as the main force unlimited by 
law, Kaganovich admitted that law still exists. About law and legal order Kaganovich 
wrote: 
“Of course it doesn’t exempt law. We have laws. Our laws determine functions and 
area of activity of certain governmental bodies. But our laws are determined by 
revolutionary necessities at every exact moment.”159 
Lazar Kaganovich also highlighted the necessity to abolish all forms of bourgeois 
law and orient to the dictatorship of working class. His position was very close to the 
works of D.Kursky, and both of them followed the predictions of Marx and Lenin. 
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6. Soviet international law 
6.1 Is it possible to build socialism in one country alone?  
 
Engel’s answer to the question “Will it be possible for this revolution to take place 
in one country alone?” is “no” as follows:  
“By creating the world market, big industry has already brought all the peoples of 
the Earth, and especially the civilized peoples, into such close relation with one another 
that none is independent of what happens to the others. 
[…] the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must 
take place simultaneously in all civilized countries – that is to say, at least in England, 
America, France, and Germany. 
It will develop in each of these countries more or less rapidly, according as one 
country or the other has a more developed industry, greater wealth, a more significant mass 
of productive forces. Hence, it will go slowest and will meet most obstacles in Germany, 
most rapidly and with the fewest difficulties in England.  
[…] It is a universal revolution and will, accordingly, have a universal 
range.”160  
This conception was adopted and further developed in Soviet legal doctrine. A. 
Woods and T. Grant in their work “Lenin and Trotsky—What They Really Stood For”161 cite 
how Stalin summed up Lenin's views on the building of socialism published in his 
Foundations of Leninism162 from February 1924: 
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“The overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of a 
proletarian government in one country does not yet guarantee the complete victory of 
socialism. The main task of socialism - the organization of socialist production - remains 
ahead. Can this task be accomplished; can the final victory of socialism in one country be 
attained, without the joint efforts of the proletariat of several advanced countries? No, this 
is impossible. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient - the 
history of our revolution bears this out. For the final victory of Socialism, for the 
organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of such a 
peasant country as Russia, are insufficient. For this the efforts of the proletarians of several 
advanced countries are necessary…Such, on the whole, are the characteristic features of 
the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution.” 
That view on the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution has been proclaimed 
official and has been repeated in speeches, articles etc. and hasn’t been put into any doubt 
from 1905 till 1926163. This view provided a very honest perspective of the future of the 
Soviet Union – without socialist revolutions in the West any possible peaceful “co-
existence” between socialism with capitalism would be impossible and new imperialist 
world wars would be inevitable. The necessity of revolutions in the West was described as a 
                                                          
163 See for example, Trotsky in 1906 wrote: "without the direct state support of the European proletariat 
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problem of “external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our 
country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration” and “danger of 
restoration of capitalism”.  
With the adoption of the new Constitution of 1936 164  the question about the 
possibility of the existence socialism in one country without the World proletarian 
revolution was put in doubt since the new Constitution of 1936 by the idea of its founder 
represented the full socio-economic and political restructuring of Soviet society and victory 
of socialism. The Constitution in article 1 proclaimed that “The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants”, which fully realized the principle “is that of 
socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”(article 12). 
Article 4 described the economy of USSR as already socialistic:  
“The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and 
instruments of production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist 
system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of 
production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute' the economic 
foundation of the U.S.S.R.” 
It that sense the new Constitution already proclaiming the existence of socialism in 
the USSR raised the question about the possibility of the existence of socialism in one 
country without the support of European proletariat again. The view on that political 
question was formed through the letter of the comrade Ivanov to comrade Stalin published 
in communist newspaper “Pravda” which contained the ideological response in accordance 
with the origins of Marxian theory of proletarian revolution: 
“IVANOV   TO   STALIN 
Dear Comrade Stalin, 
I earnestly request you to explain the following question : In the local districts 
here and even in the Regional Committee of the Young Communist League, a 
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two-fold conception prevails about the final victory of socialism in our 
country, i.e., the first group of contradictions is confused with the second. 
In your works on the destiny of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. you speak of two 
groups of contradictions - internal and external. 
As for the first group of contradictions, we have, of course, solved them - 
within the country Socialism is victorious. 
I would like to have your answer about the second group of contradictions, i.e., 
those between the land of Socialism and capitalism. 
 […] Please, Comrade Stalin, will you explain whether we have the final victory 
of Socialism yet or not. […] 
(Signed) I. Ivanov.  
January 18, 1938. 
 
STALIN TO IVANOV 
[…]Undoubtedly the question of the victory of Socialism in one country, in 
this case our country, has two different sides. 
The first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country 
embraces the problem of the mutual relations between classes in our country. 
This concerns the sphere of internal relations. […] For, during this period, we 
succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration 
with our peasantry and in building, in the main, Socialist society, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist revolution has not yet been 
victorious in other countries.[…] 
The second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country 
embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other 
countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the 
working class of our country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This 
concerns the sphere of external, international relations. 
Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong 
capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of 
military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our 
country? […] 
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Leninism answers these problems in the negative. Leninism teaches that "the 
final victory of Socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration 
of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" […]This is 
what Lenin says on this score : 
"We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is 
inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long 
period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must 
conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic 
and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the 
ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military 
organization." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P. 122.) And further, ”We are 
surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their 
hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth 
from invasion." (Collected Works, Vol. 27. P. 117.) This is said sharply and 
strongly but honestly and truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able 
to speak. 
[…] The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts 
of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole 
of our Soviet people. […] The whole of our people must be kept in a state of 
mobilization and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so 
that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take 
us by surprise . . . […] I would like unpleasant things like capitalist 
encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of 
capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these 
unpleasant things still exist. 
(Signed) J. Stalin.  
February 12, 1938”165 
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Soviet state put itself to the hostile position toward the global community of states 
highlighting the danger of capitalist encirclement. It was one of the instruments of state 
propaganda – mobilizing public energy was much easier in terms of holistic capitalist 
invasion. Moreover, state officials always claimed that the world is divided into two camps 
which constantly fight with each other – one is “imperialist and anti-democratic” led by 
United States, and the “democratic and anti-imperialist” led by USSR.166 The necessity to 
survive in circle of hostile imperialist and anti-democratic forces caused elaboration of the 
concept of “peaceful coexistence”. As Freeman states, that initially that concept was 
elaborated as a “shield for the weak nation” to defend itself, and as he notices, that very 
little remained form this principle in international Soviet politics after World War II when 
Soviet expansion became a doctrine of active strength rather than peaceful coexistence 
with other nations.167   
 
 
6.2. Contradictions in Soviet international law  
 
Bill Bowring, specialist in human right and Russian law, founder of European 
Human Rights Advocacy Center (EHRAC)168, claims that “the Soviet theory and practice 
of international law, if it is the subject of any consideration at all, is usually dismissed as a 
purely historical example of an extreme species of positivism, and of contemporary 
interest. Most often it is ignored. For example, in his essay “What should international lawyers 
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learn from Karl Marx?”169 Martti Koskenniemi does not mention Soviet international law at 
all.”170 
Bill Bowing takes a different position and seeks to argue that Soviet international 
law, notwithstanding of all its contradictions, has created some of the most important 
notions and principles of contemporary international law which are of continuing 
relevance. Namely, the right to self-determination of public international law.171 
Right to self-determination was an important issue for Marxian doctrine, since it 
prescribed the gradual advance of socialism in the world and right to self-determination in 
international law was that legal category which could promote further that process in case 
of communist revolutions. The right to self-determination was a core question in early 
1913 Stalin’s work, which he wrote under Lenin’s instruction, “Marxism and the national 
question.”172 Stalin wrote, that “[…] Russian Marxists cannot dispense with the right of 
nations to self-determination. Thus, the right of self-determination is an essential element 
in the solution of the national question.” He stated that:  
“The only correct solution is regional autonomy, autonomy for such crystallized 
units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc. The advantage of regional 
autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction of territory, but 
it defines population inhabiting a certain territory. Next, it does not divide people 
according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks 
down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for 
division of a different kind, division according to classes. Finally; it makes it possible to 
utilize the natural wealth of the region and to develop its productive forces in the best 
possible way without awaiting the decisions of a common center – functions which are not 
inherent features of cultural-national autonomy.”  
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In December 1913 Lenin himself wrote on right to nations to self-determination in 
“The Cadets and “The right of Nations to Self-Determination”173 which was followed with 
further works on the same issue, where he profoundly explained right of people to self-
determination: 
“The Russian proletariat cannot march at the head of the people towards a 
victorious democratic revolution (which is its immediate task), or fight alongside its 
brothers, the proletarians of Europe, for a socialist revolution, without immediately 
demanding, fully and “rückhaltlos” (unreservedly), for all nations oppressed by tsarism, the 
freedom to secede from Russia. This we demand, not independently of our revolutionary 
struggle for socialism, but because this struggle will remain a hollow phrase if it is not 
linked up with a revolutionary approach to all questions of democracy, including the 
national question. We demand freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, i.e., 
freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we have dreamt of splitting up 
the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we 
want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of nations, only on a truly 
democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is inconceivable without the freedom to 
secede. Just as Marx, in 1869, demanded the separation of Ireland, not for a split between 
Ireland and Britain, but for a subsequent free union between them, not so as to secure 
“justice for Ireland”, but in the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the British 
proletariat, we in the same way consider the refusal of Russian socialists to demand 
freedom of self-determination for nations, in the sense we have indicated above, to be a 
direct betrayal of democracy, internationalism and socialism.”174 
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They weren’t only scientific proclamations; Lenin used the right to self-determination 
as a principle of practice within former Russia Empire after the Revolution of 1917. In 
Decree on peace 1917 stated:  
“If any nation whatsoever is forcibly retained within the borders of a given state, if, 
in spite of its expressed desire — no matter whether expressed in the press, at public 
meetings, in the decisions of parties, or in protests and uprisings against national 
oppression — is not accorded the right to decide the forms of its state existence by a free 
vote, taken after the complete evacuation of the [aggressive] troops of the incorporating or, 
generally, of the stronger nation and without the least pressure being brought to bear, such 
incorporation is annexation, i.e., seizure and violence.  
The government considers it the greatest of crimes against humanity to continue this 
war over the issue of how to divide among the strong and rich nations the weak 
nationalities they have conquered, and solemnly announces its determination immediately 
to sign terms of peace to stop this war on the terms indicated, which are equally just for all 
nationalities without exception.”175 
As B.Bowring claims, citing Russian scholar of international law Igor Blishenko: 
 “[…] in the 1968, the year, that the USSR crushed the “Czech Spring”, Lenin’s 
Decree on peace of 26 October 1917, for the first time extended the principle of the right 
of self-determination to all peoples.[…] On 4 (17) December 1917 the Soviet government 
recognized the right to self-determination of Ukraine. In response to the request of the 
Finnish government, the Soviet of People’s Commissars on 18 (31) December 1917 was 
resolved to go to the Central Executive Committee with a proposal to recognize Finland’s 
independence. […] By a Decree of 29 December 1917 (11 January 1918) the right of the 
people of “Turkish Armenia” to self-determination was recognized. In answer to the 
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request from the government of Soviet Estland, on 7 December 1918 Lenin signed a 
Decree on recognition of the independence of Estonia, Latvia e Lithuania”176 
This gradual conformity with the principle of self-determination was clearly seen not 
only in domestic Bolshevik’s policy, but also in international relations. Soviet Delegation 
was an active participant during the drafting of UN Charter and offered amendments to 
the Article 2(1) which refers to “respect for the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples…”177 Bowring insists, citing A.Cassese, that the initial draft of the 
UN Charter which laid the basis for the future text of the Convention didn’t contain any 
reference to self-determination – the discussion about whether the principles of self-
determination should be included to the Charter or not appeared after the UN Conference 
on International Organization in San Francisco (in 1945) – at the insistence of the USSR. 
The Soviet Delegation “campaigned for establishment of practically unlimited right to self-
determination of colonial and dependent countries and peoples.”178 
The period, when UN Charter was drafted 1945- 1948, European Empires began to 
break up, and the USSR was an active supporter of decolonization. The Marxian 
predictions of world proletarian revolution required the principle of self-determination as a 
necessary condition for the establishment of socialism in the whole world.  As Soviet 
international legal scholar Tunkin claimed that very liberal amendment proposed to the UN 
General Assembly was rejected under the pressure of colonial power that is why the 
principle of self-determination does not included in UDHR, that amendment was 
following: 
“Each people and each nation has the right to national self-determination. A state 
which has responsibility for the administration of self-determining territories, including 
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colonies, must ensure the realization of that right, guided by the principles and goals of the 
United Nations in relation to the peoples of such territories.”179 
As Freeman notices, “national liberalization of course, is an attractive euphemism, 
cloaked as anti-colonialism, for any Communist uprising against an established non-
Socialist regime.[…] real objective was patently to obtain “imprimatur” of international 
community for distorted principle which is designed to facilitate assistance to Communist 
movement throughout the world.”180 That became a key issue which formed a cognitive 
framework of Soviet international world view. As Allison stated, “the universal objective of 
world proletarian revolution, which vindicated and could be advanced by forceful means, 
might be viewed as a basic justice-based challenge to international order”.181 
 
 
6.3. Solipsism and imperialism of Soviet Union in international relations  
 
Another feature of Soviet understanding of international law is unconditional and 
unquestionable primacy of domestic legal order stabilized by the Communist party to 
anything imposed from the outside. As Alwyn Freeman called that as “the most extreme 
form of positivism”: 
“The most extreme form of positivism… The Soviet brand is much more 
restricted, much narrower, and is, in sum. A rejection of a great portion of international 
legal principles… Soviet positivism has been distinguished by the exclusion of customary 
practice as a source of international obligations. It views international law as embracing 
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only those principles to which states have expressly consented through international 
agreement or have otherwise manifested their acquiescence.”182 
That means that Soviet perception required restriction of the sources, and 
“extreme positive”, or even formal approach to international legal issues. As Freeman 
states, “the positivist element provides protection for Soviet interests against anti-Socialist 
principles of international law which might inhibit actions proscribed by existing legal 
norms”, it is a “double-edge approach being defensive and offensive in character”183 
Martti Koskenniemi describing such hermetic absolutism as a position of a state 
toward international obligations cited Hans Kelsen 184 , who held that such a “monist 
position with the primacy of the national legal order […] is both solipsistic and imperialistic 
[…]. Solipsistic in the sense of capable of seeing nothing else than one’s own legal system; 
imperialistic because everything taking place in the world is judged from its perspective.”185   
That monist hermeneutic position was necessary for ideological indoctrination and 
made the interpretation of any outside opinion possible which didn’t correspond to the 
official position of Soviet Union as holistic and anti-democratic, aimed at oppressing the 
proletarian class. A.Vyshinsky claimed that the adoption of UN Declaration of human 
rights is just an instrument to hide the unhuman conditions of life in capitalist countries, he 
also was sure that all amendments which were proposed by Soviet delegation were rejected 
just because they were offered by a communist state. 186  A.Vyshinky on the General 
Assembly highlighted the problems which according to him would make a Universal 
Declaration of human rights extremely formal document which wouldn’t have any real 
impact since it doesn’t prescribe any executive and coercive measure and have only 
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declarative character. Also, Vyshinky claimed that amendments which specify obligations 
of the state towards the realization of proclaimed rights were needed. For instance, 
Vyshinky stood for modification of article 3 of UDHR: “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person.” He believed that it should be reformulated and obligation 
of the state to assure protection of every person from illegal infringements, and assure 
condition that no one will suffer from hunger or from danger of death of depletion. Other 
amendments were offered for an article 23 which contained the obligation of state to pay 
for the medical and social insurance of workers to make it possible for them to use and 
execute their rights for social provision. Otherwise, he said, every guarantee will remain just 
written on paper. That drastic difference between extremely democratic proclamations on 
international assembly with the internal situation in Soviet Union described human rights 
activist Kovalev, he characterized it like a system of legal thinking which is based on: 
 “- Instrumentalist approach which means that human rights and freedoms of 
individuals are important for the realization of higher values such as 
“common wealth, interests of people” 
- Principle of refutation of the autonomy of law and self-sufficiency of its 
principles and institutions; […] 
- Categorical disagreement with the position that absence of legal foundation 
could be an obstacle for limitation or prohibition of “harmful for the society” 
ideologies and social movements; 
- Primacy of “positive law” which are easier interpreted in accordance with 
the interests of the state, rather than from the point of view of civil and 
political rights of individuals. Consequence of such approach became 
complete submission of the idea of law and practice of law-execution to the 
aims of “state expediency””187  
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7. Human rights abuses in the Khrushchev’s era 
7.1. The origin of protests 
 
As a general tendency it could be seen that Marxian theory of socialist law was 
adapted constantly to the realities of the Soviet state and political situation. The luck of 
determined legal base shaped a system in which ideology played an inevitable role in state 
functioning. It served as a tool of political manipulation in almost all spheres – economic, 
social, political, and legal. As Hans Kelsen affirmed:  
“In spite of Marxian postulate of an anti-ideological science, the Soviet theory of 
law has an outspoken ideological character. That means that its presentation of the positive 
law, especially of the law of non-communist states and international law, is not objective in 
a scientific sense but essentially determined by the political interests of the Soviet 
government. In this respect the Soviet theory employs certain conceptual devices which, 
although produced by bourgeois jurisprudence, are denounced as ideological and radically 
rejected by a science of law freely developed in non-communist states.”188  
The state used ideological indoctrination obtained to mobilize public energy by 
political and ideological socialization thus shaping social forms and encouraging 
involvement into the political system. This system helped the Soviet regime to control the 
thoughts as well as actions of the Soviet citizens. The declining of the respect to the 
communist authorities began in Khrushchev’s era when ideological directives showed its 
partiality. 
Khrushchev’s politics of repressions chose concrete aims which gave Soviet 
citizens the orientation of justified behavior. People were able to predict which behavior 
will be acceptable and which will be claimed illegal. Repressions and prosecutions on 
ideological base were still diffused, but the predictability of it created the subjective feeling 
of more freedom. 
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An era of de-Stalinization in the early Khrushchev years should be characterized 
with a slow accumulation of protest which was revealed by declining the communist 
utopianism and respect for the ruling authorities while at the same time being extremely 
loyal to the Marxist-Leninist outlook. In place of mass-terror and repressions of Stalin’s 
years, authorities choose more rationalized means of social control. Khrushchev period 
represents a time of a great political change and social variance, appearance of “dissent” – 
political, religious, nationalist.  
As Ludwikowski R. described the process of declining towards the communist 
ideology and its drastic consequences for the society in general:  
“For a while, ideology served to slow the process of moral corruption in socialist 
societies. The blind belief in Marxist-Leninist dogmas prevented the Soviet people from 
thinking independently. As ideological values began to lose authority, there was a drastic 
decline in public morality and in respect for law. Ideological decay corrupted a generation 
of party members. They came to understand that coercion is useful not to protect 
ideological values but to protect their own privileges. The devaluation of ideology has had 
an equally demoralizing effect on the rest of society. Workers began to realize that a double 
standard of morality means one morality for the party elite and another for nonparty 
people and ordinary party members. This realization became a major detriment to the 
system of public property, the central characteristic of communism. The ordinary citizen 
argues that, if the state doctrine is only a facade, then public property, sanctified by the 
ideology, belongs to no one. Hence the seizure of public property (in fact, no one's 
property) has nothing to do with theft. It is prohibited by law but not stamped by public 
morality. To be more precise, there are two public moralities, one official and the other 
private. The collapse of public morality contributed explicitly to significant problems in the 
Soviet economy: low labor discipline, neglect of equipment, absenteeism, bribery, 
unproductive work, lack of interest in quality output, to name only a few. The society 
created unofficial techniques of social compensation, methods of competition for benefits 
available only in backstage struggles, and means of circumventing the pretended social 
equality. The system created not only a black market and corruption, but also unofficial 
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channels through which many decisions are made and the law is avoided. A "double 
morality," in fact, is linked with the "double life" of the whole society.”189 
In the Soviet Union there was monopoly of information controlled by the 
authorities’ and that accounted for the de facto isolation of the Soviet people and how they 
remained unconscious and naïve about the events in the world and the reality of the USSR. 
Soviet young people were significantly surprised when they saw that even students from 
People’s Democracies such as Poland and East Germany invariably had considerably better 
clothes than they did190. There were however also more substantial facts which caused the 
communist ideology to lose credibility among Soviet citizens.  
In discussing the need for drafting and enacting a new constitution of 1936, P. S. 
Romashkin has stated: 
“The chapter on the basic rights and duties of citizens requires serious elaboration, 
taking into account the successes and achievements of recent  years and especially such 
great prospects for  the  building of communism  as  ensuring the working people of the 
U.S.S.R. in  the next few  years the highest living  standards in the world and creating the  
most favorable  conditions  for the  creative  development of  each member of society.  It 
should stress that the Soviet people, who have already won for themselves  a seven- and 
six-hour working day, are moving towards the shortest working day in  the world ....”191    
So in accordance with the proclamations,  Article 119  of the  Soviet  Constitution 
stated:  "The right to  rest  is  ensured by the reduction  of the working day to  seven hours 
for the  overwhelming majority of the workers."  This statement appears to be a statement 
of achievements.  Actually, a reduction  in  the duration of the working day wasn’t achieved 
in  the Soviet Union and the present proclamation remained without any factual support. A 
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similar situation occurred with the rights of Soviet citizens proclaimed in the chapter on 
fundamental rights of the Constitution of 1936, they are: political rights which included 
freedom of speech and press, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of street processions 
and demonstrations, the freedom to unite in public organizations and societies  of working 
people,  the  electoral  rights, the equality of citizens and the freedom of conscience; socio-
economic rights which include  the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to 
maintenance in old age and in sickness or disability, the right to personal property and the  
right of collective  farm  households  to  have their  holdings. Also, the 1936 Constitution 
guaranteed the right to education; the personal rights which include the inviolability of the 
person from unreasonable arrests, the inviolability of the homes of citizens and the privacy 
of correspondence. As Ted Grant commented on it: 
“Of course in words it was very democratic. The only thing prohibited in Russia 
would have been an attempt to exercise the rights declared in the Constitution and 
enshrined in its clauses. The right to vote for the person of one’s choice, free speech and 
press, freedom of the individual and all other freedoms were established on paper. But they 
went side by side with one of the bloodiest purges, or one-sided civil wars in the history of 
man. Practically the whole of the Bolshevik leadership which carried out the revolution was 
murdered. Hundreds of thousands and even millions of workers and peasants were drafted 
forcibly to Siberia to work as slave labour”.192 
Towe E. distinguishes between three different state groups to which the chapter on 
fundamental rights of Constitution of 1936 was aimed. First, since the Constitution was 
published in Soviet newspapers, it obviously had a purpose to  convince  the people of the  
Soviet Union themselves  that their  rights  were being protected as the citizens of any 
other country. Second group, as distinguished by Towe E., that the Constitution was aimed 
at people outside the Soviet Union. The third group, to which the Constitution was aimed 
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are the future generations for the conditions which should come with the achievement of 
communism.193  
As R.Hornsby stated:  
“For years state propaganda had told of inhuman conditions endured by workers in 
the West, a factor that had ameliorated the many privations endured by the Soviet people 
to some extent, but by the Khrushchev era it was an increasingly obvious lie of major 
proportions.[…] Growing contact with the outside world, therefore, had a two-pronged 
impact in this respect: it showed that people had more goods elsewhere and that the Soviet 
regime had persistently deceived its people.”194 
The beginning of the Khrushchev’s era began with a protest and criticism of 
the authorities that had not been seen for many years, perhaps since the 
establishment of Soviet state and civil war. Among the reasons for the protest were 
also the consequences of Khrushchev’s secret speech. 
 “Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation 
with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to 
his opinion. Whoever opposed these concepts or tried to prove his [own] viewpoint 
and the correctness of his [own] position was doomed to removal from the 
leadership collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was 
especially true during the period following the 17th Party Congress, when many 
prominent Party leaders and rank-and-file Party workers, honest and dedicated to 
the cause of Communism, fell victims to Stalin’s despotism.[…] 
Stalin originated the concept “enemy of the people.” This term automatically 
made it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a 
controversy be proven. It made possible the use of the cruelest repressions, 
violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way 
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disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, 
against those who had bad reputations. The concept “enemy of the people” actually 
eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one’s 
views known on this or that issue, even [issues] of a practical nature. On the whole, 
the only proof of guilt actually used, against all norms of current legal science, was 
the “confession” of the accused himself. As subsequent probing has proven, 
“confessions” were acquired through physical pressures against the accused. This 
led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely 
innocent individuals – [persons] who in the past had defended the Party line – 
became victims. 
We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in their time had 
opposed the Party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their 
physical annihilation. The formula “enemy of the people” was specifically 
introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.”195 
Stalin’s death and further secret speech were the turning points to slow 
liberalization. The most denominated desire among most of the protest movements didn’t 
aim for revolution but for better living standards. Soviet patriotism and belief in the 
communist and revolutionary ideals remained strong among Soviet citizens. For the most 
part, these were not idealistic and proved political criticisms but protests in anger because 
of the hardships of living in the USSR.196 
As could be seen, the major part of the political prisoners Khrushchev’s era, about 
57% were condemned for the anti-Soviet conversations, without any organized anti-Soviet 
activity, but still voicing strong criticism against the Soviet government. 3% were “anti-
soviets” – naive people who didn’t see anything wrong with expressing their dissent 
directly by signing or writing letters or claims to the Soviet officials. 7.7 % were sentenced 
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for being in possession of anti-Soviet literature. And only 31% were sentenced for the 
making and spreading of anti-Soviet leaflets. It was the only group of conscious protests. 197 
Due to the information from archives from the KGB, during the period from 1957-1980 
for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and other anti-Soviet activity 8124 people were 
sentenced in total. The precise statistical data about the indictments for every year is 
presented in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Statistical data about indictment for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda 
(art.70 of Criminal Code of RSFSR) and spreading false information which compromise 
the Soviet social order (art.190 of Criminal Code of RSFSR) during 1956-1987198 
Period Indictments on art.70 of 
Criminal Code of RSFSR 
Indictments on art.190 of 
Criminal Code of RSFSR 
Both articles Average quantity of 
indictments for year 
1956-1960 4676 - 4676 935,2 
1961-1965 1072 - 1072 214,4 
1966-1970 295 384 697 135,8 
1971-1975 276 527 803 160,6 
1976-1980 62 285 347 69,4 
1981-1985 150 390 540 108 
1986-1987 11 17 28 14 
Total 6543 1609 8152 254,8 
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There is very interesting statistical data about the quantity of repressions during 
1956-1960; it shows that for these years the quantity of the indictments was highest. The 
myth about liberal communist and Khrushchev’s “thaw” should be studied. For the 
majority of people Khrushchev’ repressions were faced with the amusement, but still 
during that period the state power made a lot of harsh repressions for political crimes.199  
Statistics for imprisonment for anti-Soviet crimes showed that those who protested 
the most was the social class which was according to the government the most reliable, i.e. 
workers. In 1957 workers were responsible for 50% of all transgressors for political crimes. 
Official employees and peasants during that period showed more social tranquility.200 
During Stalin’s era holding just several books or articles classified as belonging to 
so-called “enemies of the people” were sufficient for harsh condemnation. Under 
Khrushchev legal requirements for inquest were more strict, as recognition of guilt of the 
defendant wasn’t considered the main proof was imprisonment, which caused a lot of 
arbitrariness. Sometimes people were tortured or browbeaten in order to make that 
recognition. Inquest now required obligatory examination of all available proof such as 
witnesses, written and material evidences, expertise etc.  
Khrushchev’s measures were more liberal, partially because it was much more 
efficient not to sentence ideological transgressors to prison for insignificant breaches rather 
than risk creating serious ideological fighters after being repressed or jailed. 201 The Order 
of Supreme Court202 made it possible using so-called “Prophylactic means” for the fights 
with ideological transgressors – governmental organs were authorized to call citizens for 
conversations and threaten them in case of their wrongful behavior. It was more effective – 
the fear of punishment caused more loyal behavior: 
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“Political transgressors (the most dangerous), even if they were kept in prison 
separately, had all chances to pass the “school of revolutionists”, make connections, share 
experience etc. As the result after release from prison, a person, who get there being 
romantic and naïve fighter for justice and “truth socialism”, could become experienced 
underground activist, whose anti-state behavior got additional motivation due to the 
personal offence and living a social outcast.”203 
A very important objective of such prophylactical measures was bolstering the 
image of socialism in world. In 1957 Khrushchev claimed that “in the Soviet Union there 
are no political prisoners, protests against socialism could only be done by those who are 
insane.”204 
 
7.2. The legal basis for the criminal prosecution of dissidents 
 
In October 1960 instead of the old Criminal Code of 1926 by Supreme Council of 
RSFSR, a new Criminal Code of RSFSR was adopted205, which contained more than 40 
articles with components of crime somehow applicable for any anti-Soviet activity of 
dissidence (such as art. 64 “Parricide”, art.70 “Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”, 
art.72 “Organizational activity aimed for commitment serious state crimes or membership 
in anti-Soviet organization”, art.69 “Sabotage”, art. 65 “Espionage” and others).206  
                                                          
203  KOZLOV V. and MIRONENKO S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и 
Брежневе 1953-1972» [Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], 
“Materik” Publishing house, Moscow 2005, p.34 
204 Ibidem, p.35 
205  Criminal Code of RSFSR, adopted by Supreme Council of RSFSR 27.10.1960, published in 
«Ведомости ВС РСФСР» [Vedomosti of Supreme Council of RSFSR], 1960, №40, р.591 
206  Hereinafter are examined the norms of Criminal Code of RSFSR of 1960. Another 14 Soviet 
Republics consisting of USSR adopted their own Criminal Codes. Due to the fact that all the Soviet 
Republics’ Code were adopted based on the Law of USSR from 25.12.1958 «Об утверждении основ 
уголовного законодательства Союза ССР и союзных республик» [About approval of fundamentals 
of criminal legislation of Soviet SSR and soviet republics] published in "Ведомости ВС 
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Article 70 “Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda” of the above mentioned code 
was the most common use for the cases of dissidence. It contemplated sanctions of 
incarceration from a period of 6 months to 7 years or deportation from two to five years 
for the first offence; and from 3 to 10 years of incarceration for reoffenders or people with 
criminal record for specially dangerous crimes. 207  The components of crime were any 
agitation or propaganda made in any form aimed at the disruption or weakening of Soviet 
power or spreading for the above mentioned purposes calumny information discrediting 
soviet state order, or any literature containing the same information.  
For the purposes of declaring the dissidence activists insane article 58 of the 
Criminal Code of RSFSR was adopted that contemplated that “towards people, who 
committed socially dangerous acts in a state of mental insanity which doesn’t permit to 
control or realize the behavior, or towards those who became mentally ill before the 
judicial judgment or during imprisonment, the court could apply the following compulsory 
medical measures: hospitalization in ordinary psychiatric hospitals, hospitalization in 
psychiatric hospitals of special type”208. 
Compulsory hospitalization was a very convenient way for the state to isolate 
dissent activist without a trial. Also, giving a positive diagnosis to mentally ill people, the 
Soviet state discredited the information about human rights violations which dissent 
activists tried to translate to the West.  
In 1961, the Ministry of health confirmed a concordat with the Ministry of Internal 
affairs and General Prosecutor’s Office which adopted the “Instruction for urgent 
                                                                                                                                                                          
СССР"[Vedomosti of Supreme Council of USSR], 1959, N 1, p. 6, the text of all Codes are similar for 
the purposes of identity of socialistic legislation. For the purposes of the present research, examination 
of norms Criminal Code of RSFSR could be seen as examination of Soviet criminal legislation due its 
conformity with other Soviet Republics.  
207 Article 70, Criminal Code of RSFSR, adopted by Supreme Council of RSFSR 27.10.1960, published 
in «Ведомости ВС РСФСР» [Vedomosti of Supreme Сouncil of RSFSR], 1960, №40, р.591 
208 Article 58, Criminal Code of RSFSR, adopted by Supreme Council of RSFSR 27.10.1960, published 
in «Ведомости ВС РСФСР» [Vedomosti of Supreme Сouncil of RSFSR], 1960, №40, р.591 
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hospitalization of mentally ill people who represent social danger” 209 . Due to this 
prescription it was possible to detain and to excoriate the emergency hospitalization of any 
person whose behavior was potentially dangerous to society. Instruction prescribed the 
possibility of detaining the person without their consent or that of their parents, tutors or 
any other representative (Article 1 of the “Instruction for urgent hospitalization of mentally 
ill people who represent social danger”). 
State organs of internal affairs (or “militzia”) were obliged to assist the medical 
employees for emergency hospitalization of mentally ill people representing social danger 
in cases of their resistance, aggressive behavior or attempts to escape, or in cases of 
resistance from hospitalization from the side of parents, tutors or other people. (Article 5 
of the “Instruction for urgent hospitalization of mentally ill people who represent social 
danger”) It was prescribed that during three days after the emergence from hospitalization 
that the patient will be observed by the commission for determination of diagnosis and 
further medical treatment.  
In 1967 the Ministry of healthcare agreed with the Supreme Council, General 
Prosecutor’s Office and Ministry of internal Affairs, adopted a new instruction, “About the 
procedure of forced medical treatment towards mentally ill people committed socially 
dangerous acts”210 . New instruction prescribed strict documentary legalization (medical 
assignment, procedure and terms of the examination by the commission), but contained 
the same reasons and procedure of the detainment for the emergency hospitalization. 
Some of the symptoms incorporated into Soviet diagnostic criteria for mild 
(“sluggish”) schizophrenia and, in part, for moderate (paranoid) schizophrenia are not 
accepted as evidence of psychopathology under international diagnostic criteria211. Specific 
                                                          
209  «Инструкция по неотложной госпитализации психически больных, представляющих 
общественную опасность» [Instruction for emergency hospitalization of mentally ill people 
representing social danger], adopted 10.10.1961 by Ministry of healthcare of USSR by order №4-14-32 
210 “Инструкция о порядке применения принудительного лечения и других мер медицинского 
характера в отношении психически больных, совершивших общественно опасные деяния” 
[Instruction about the procedure of forced medical treatment towards mentally ill people committed 
socially dangerous acts], adopted 14.02.1967 by Ministry of healthcare of USSR 
211 BONNIE Richard J. “Online Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law”, №30 
March 2002, p.136-144, available on: http://www.jaapl.org/ 
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idiosyncratic examples identified in the inter-views included diagnosing individuals 
demonstrating for political causes as having a “delusion of reformism” or “heightened 
sense of self-esteem” to support a diagnosis of schizophrenia. “Sluggish” schizophrenia 
could happen to patients “whose mental disease goes with their social growth, ability to 
study (also in higher education establishments), performance of complicated professions 
such as engineer, architecture etc..” Consequences of “sluggish” schizophrenia were desire 
to resign from the communist party, attempts to reach foreign embassies for asking 
political asylum212, or disagreement with Soviet interpretation of Marxism and “groping 
after truth”213. Any type of behavior which didn’t coincide with soviet legal order was 
interpreted as deviant, and as consequence – inadequate.  
Dissident and Nobel Prize winner for peace Andrey Sakharov writes in his 
memoirs that some people were sent to psychiatric experts after claims to the General 
Prosecutor’s Office or Supreme Council of USSR and for attempts in trying to exercise 
their rights to use official mechanisms of the Soviet state214. This fact was confirmed by 
different sources: «In Moscow… almost 12 people a day are arrested only from the waiting 
chamber of Supreme Council of USSR, also about 2-3 people a day who tried to reach any 
foreign embassy, some from other places or just from the street. The half of the arrested is 
hospitalized by force».215 
The judicial system was seen not as a separate power but as part of common “law-
enforcement machine”, which was connected with common aims with other law-
enforcement authorities, such as Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prosecutor’s Office, and 
State Security Service. The main aim of all of these authorities was fighting crime and the 
role of the court in this chain of “common fight” was to legally finish the process of 
punishment of criminals. That role of the justice was officially proclaimed in Soviet 
                                                          
212  PODRABINEK Alexandr “Punitive medicine”, “Khronica press” publishing house, New York, 
1979, p.78 
213 Ibidem, p.104-105 
214 SAKHAROV A.D. «Воспоминания» [Memoirs], Publishing house “Время” [Time], Moscow, 2006, 
p.323 
215  ALEKSEEVA L., ZUBAREV D., KUZOVKIN G. “Документы Московской Хельсинской 
группы 1976-1982” [Documents of Moscow Helsinki Group 1976-1982], Publishing house of Moscow 
Helsinki Group, Moscow, 2006, Document №8, p.84 
 103  
 
doctrine. The Сhairman of Justice of the Council of People’s Deputies,  Krylenko N.V., 
stated that, “correct and corresponding to the proletariat interests’ functioning of the court 
and judicial system could be guaranteed only if there is systematic and daily managing of it 
on the part of directing authority on every case which takes place.”216  The Judiciary was 
not considered to be independent- on state level it was just “an instrument of the state”217. 
The majority of laws had a serious disadvantage – they didn’t have a mechanism of 
realization of norms and guarantees. Almost all laws of that epoch, especially this 
concerning environmental protection, national education, protection of the historical and 
cultural monuments, human rights and freedoms, had very abstract formulations and 
weren't sanctioned if violated. 
Citizens of the Soviet Union couldn’t use the most important Constitutional rights 
and guarantees because during a significant period there weren’t any adopted laws 
regulating the procedure of realization of the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
freedom of manifestation etc. For this reason a lot of very important state guarantees 
existed only in declaration but without the real instruments for their realization.  
Such a situation lasted since the Stalin’s epoch and even after his death in 1953. 
During 1930-1950 even Labour Code and Provision of the courts weren’t open to public 
access even though they were of great importance for the everyday life of citizens. The 
main part of the legal acts were not designed for public use, they were sent instead through 
the administrative channels in a very detached way.  
Priority of the regulations from the Party and other communist legal acts made the 
codification of official laws more difficult. During the period of the NEP (New Economic 
Policy) a very successful first attempt of codification was made, during only two years 
(1922-1923) seven codes were created: Criminal, Labour Code, Land Code, Criminal 
Procedure Code, Civil Procedure and Code of the laws about Forests and in 1927 
“Systemized collection of the laws of RSFSR” was published.  
                                                          
216 KRYLENKO N.V., «К реформе действующей судебной системы» [To the reform of modern 
judicial system], Daily Soviet Justice, №5, 1922, p.4-5 
217  KRYLENKO N.V., «Судоустройство РСФСР» [Judiciary of RSFSR], Moscow Legal NKU 
Publishing House, 1923, p.458 
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8. Unknown ideological transgressors in the Soviet Union 
8.1. The complexities of research on political crimes  
 
Initially historical researchers were limited to the stories of dissidents and their 
narrow circle of Soviet ideological fighters. That is natural since a lot of sources on dissent 
were published (even in foreign literature about their activity) and files on other ideological 
transgressors were kept in the closed archives during Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s era, 
which were declassified only after 1991. Due to the Decree of the President of Russian 
Federation from 23 June 1992 «О снятии ограничительных грифов с законодательных  
и иных актов, служивших основанием для массовых репрессий и посягательств на 
права человека» [About removal restriction stamps from legislative and other acts, which 
created a foundation for mass repressions and violations of human rights] the major part of 
the documents dedicated to the human rights abuses in Soviet Union became available for 
the research in 1992. That caused a wave of publications of the type of “sensational 
journalism”, more systemized research appeared much later. 
Clearly, in the Soviet period an academic study of dissent wasn’t possible and 
instead there was anti-dissident propaganda 218. After the collapse of USSR in 1991 there 
was a rise of the interest in the dissent and violations of human rights in the USSR, but 
publications were more likely to be sensationalist journalism rather than academic research 
since there was a lack of access to any kind of archived sources (declassification of the 
archives began later).  
Scholarly works of a very high standard, embracing a strong combination of 
archival materials of primary and secondary sources, are produced by the enthusiasts 
working in Memorial 219 . Works written by Russian historians of Memorial such as 
V.Kozlov, A.Pyzhikov, G.Kuzovkin, E.Zubkova, B.Firsov deserved well-known 
                                                          
218 See, for example: YAKOVLEV N.N. «ЦРУ против России» [CIA target: USSR]. Published by 
«Правда» [Pravda], Moscow, 1983 
219 Memorial is a historical society founded in 1989 which main objective was to conserve the memory 
of the victims of the political repressions in the Soviet Union. Nowadays is one of the biggest human 
rights organizations in Russia. 
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recognition for particularly high levels of quality and precise character due to the wide use 
of the archival and documentary sources. In their study they highlight two types of sources 
– “dissent centralized”, which are based solely on the activity of dissent activists, and other 
archival researcher, which provide the whole picture variegated ideological transgressors. 
To the first group of “dissent centralized” researches they attribute an 
“encyclopedia” of dissent life in Soviet Union by Ludmila Alekseeva (born in 1927)  - who 
was a dissent activist and one of the founders of the oldest human rights organization 
Moscow Helsinki Group in 1976. Nowadays L.Alekseeva is a member of Presidential 
Council on development of civil society and human rights. 
The work written in 1987 “Soviet dissent: contemporary movements for national 
religious and human rights”220 gives a detailed overview of different struggles and dissent 
movements that existed within USSR. Another section of sources of the same group are 
the personal memoirs, notably of such Soviet dissents as Andrey Sakharov221, Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Bukovsky222. The memoirs are mostly focused on Brezhnev era 
and contain the less wide-ranging subject rather than academic sources, but being written 
with passion and very personal involvement in the issues on which the dissents protested 
or campaigned – memoirs give a clear inside view and understanding of the events 
occurred.223  
Another group of the sources based on scientific archival research: it could be 
attributed materials from the “Documents of Moscow Helsinki Group for the period of 
                                                          
220  ALEKSEEVA Ludmila “Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and 
Human Rights”, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987 
221 SAKHAROV A.D. «Воспоминания» [Memoirs], Publishing house “Время” [Time], Moscow, 2006 
222 BUKOVSKY V. «И возвращается ветер» [To build a castle: my life as a dissenter], Publishing house 
«Захаров» [Zakharov], Moscow, 2007 
223 An interesting fact that numerous memoirs of dissenters were published in English language in the 
West during 1970s and 1980s and were published for the first time in Russian recently (These include 
V.Bukovsky «И возвращается ветер» [To build a castle: my life as a dissenter], Moscow, 2007, 
Zakharov publishing house, L. Alekseeva and P.Goldberg “Поколение оттепели” [Thaw generation], 
Moscow 2006, Zakharov publishing house and others). 
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1976 – 1982” compiled by D.I.Zubarev, G.V.Kuzovkin224. The book details the evidence 
of the violations of human rights which were addressed to the Moscow Helsinki Group225  
by the Soviet citizens with investigations and confirmation of the violations. Making this 
distinction of sources, Kozlov and Mironenko wrote: 
“In the total disregard we can find the individual anti-governmental statements of 
“ordinary people” during the epoch of Khrushchev. And if liberal and social-democratic 
claims of intellectuals from Moscow and Leningrad [San-Petersburg] were somehow 
distributed to the West, the modern historical scientists couldn’t say anything about attacks 
on Khrushchev from Stalin’s position226 , nationalistic underground movements in Russia 
and Soviet republics, fascist organizations of young activists. Also, the phenomenon of 
increasing national wide-spread hostility to Khrushchev isn’t studied enough during the 
first part of 1960s (the events happened in Novocherkessk in 1962227 are not the only 
evidence, which became a symbol of national dissatisfaction, it doesn’t reflect other forms 
of national protest, including for example terroristic threads addressing to the losing his 
popularity leader)”228 
Protest against state and its power remains largely unknown, and the major part of 
ordinary people’s protest, happened in private life of Soviet citizens is not studied. There is 
a part of “social and cultural reality of Russia” which is totally unknown: 
                                                          
224 “Документы Московской Хельсинской группы за период с 1976 - 1982” [Documents of Moscow 
Helsinki Group for the period of 1976 – 1982] compiled by D.I.Zubarev, G.V.Kuzovkin, Moscow, 
Publishing house of Moscow Helsinki Group, 2006 
225 Moscow Helsinki Group – the oldest human rights organization in Russia, founded on 12 May 1976 
it proclaimed its main purpose to promote the execution the rights and guarantees proclaimed of the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Final Act) signed by the 
Soviet Union in 1975 
226 After the famous Khrushchev’s speech on denouncing Stalin on 20th Congress of CPSU in 1956, was 
seen by many Soviet citizens as heresy. People, brought up with the attitude to Stalin as a father of 
nation, refused agree with the new line of Khrushchev on denouncing the cult of Stalin. It caused mass 
protests, information about which was hidden in the archives of KGB. 
227 On 1-2 June of 1962 in Novocherkessk more than 5000 citizens of the town demonstrated against 
the Khrushchev. Firstly, strike began on local factory and later was supported by other citizens. The 
event are called nowadays “Novocherkessk shooting” since due to the official data during the dispersal 
26 people were killed and more than 80 seriously wounded. Other participants were sentenced with 
further rehabilitation in 1996. 
228  KOZLOV V. and MIRONENKO S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и 
Брежневе 1953-1972» [Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], 
“Materik” Publishing house, Moscow 2005, page 12 
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“At the same time the protests of simple people is almost not studied. Social-
psychological portrait of anti-Soviet activist is unclear and fuzzy, it is diffused in the 
abreaction of “population”, its oppositional behavior, tactics, way of expression, ideological 
orientations and life path almost unknown to the modern historians, as it was unknown to 
the Soviet intelligence of post-Stalin’s era this usually tongue-tied critics of the regime, 
sometimes intentional and goal-seeking, but more often spontaneous and situational. 
Those people didn’t wrote their memoirs and they didn’t create myths about 
themselves, they didn’t emigrate to the West and didn’t write, and actually couldn’t write, 
their stories. They came out from the people and after their sentence for their protest, 
diffused in the masses, or died somewhere obscurely in prisons and colonies.  But they 
were the absolute major part of criminally persecuted people for anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda during 1950-1980s”229 
 
8.2. Indictments and criminal prosecution in the early Khrushchev’s period 
(1953-1960)  
 
As stated above, a lot of dissent and protest behavior remained unknown, since 
protest expressed in a private life by ordinary people – workers, teachers, students, 
remained documented only in judicial decisions and inquest or procurators’ reports. 
Though more interesting is to see that documented facts of protest since they reflect more 
the life of the epoch and character of political mood and attitude to the state and justice in 
the masses. 
Looking through procurators’ reports in the unclassified archives, it could be seen 
that usually protest was expressed by single people, and more interesting they were claimed 
and criticized by society who stood for the political order and protected it. As can clearly 
be seen in the case of a student in the 7th grade of school, Larisa Ogorinskaya. At the 
funeral meeting at her school because of the death of Stalin, the girl said “it serves him 
                                                          
229 Ibidem, p. 17 
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right” for which she was beaten by her classmates. The punishment on behalf of the state 
was even more harsh – 10 years of prison. Such protection of social order was a huge merit 
of ideological education, and as one of the prisoners wrote in his claim, the whole 
atmosphere in the Soviet Union: 
“All my conscious life passed when the First Secretary of Central Committee was 
Stalin. All achievements during peaceful periods and wartime, all works of art, ideological 
education was connected with the name of Stalin. I can admit that it wasn’t only with me. 
When Stalin was dead I saw tears in many people’s eyes. That tears were real, and not for 
effect.”230 
The case of Larisa Ogorinskaya is one of numerous occasions of how soviet 
citizens stood for the ideological inviolability of the state and how regime fought against 
the lightest forms of political disagreement. From the report of the executive Prosecutor 
from the department for specific cases of the Office of General Prosecutor of USSR from 
28 May 1953, case of Ogorinskaya L.M.: 
“Regional Lvovsky Court 31 March 1953 sentenced Ogorinskaya Larisa 
Mikhailovna, born in 1953, non-party member, Jewish, student of 7th grade of 
school, according to the art. 58-10 of part 1of Criminal Code of Ukrainian SSR 
for 10 year of imprisonment and correctional labour works. 
Ogorinskaya L.M. was drawn to criminal responsibility for the fact that being a 
student of 7th grade of school №50 of the town of Lvov, 6 March 1953 during 
the funeral meeting of the students of the school expressed her hostile views 
because of the death of one of the leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet 
Union. 
Supreme Court of Ukrainian SSR due to the cassation appeal revised the case 
and issued the order from 22 April 1953 to leave without amendments in force 
the decision of the Regional Lvovsky Court form 31 March 1953. 
                                                          
230 General Archive of Russian Federation, F. P-8131, OP.36, Case 1173, page 7, cited from Kozlov V. 
and Mironenko S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и Брежневе 1953-1972» 
[Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], “Materik” Publishing house, 
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[…] Ogorinskaya really during the funeral meeting on 6th March 1953 due the 
fact of the death of one of the leaders of Soviet Union expressed hostile views 
which were the following: 
Making a speech at the funeral meeting the student of school №50 told: 
“Comrade Stalin gave us a happy childhood, even if we live in the orphan’s 
home, they provide us clothes and teach us.” And then, he added that “death 
of comrade Stalin is a huge loss for the Soviet people. Comrade Stalin dead 
today at 9.50 AM” 
During that speech, standing among other students in the room, Ogorinskaya 
said: “It serves him right!”[…] 
Testimony of Gukov Vladimir: 
“[…] Student Ogorinskaya said smiling “it serves him right”. Me, Maksimenko, 
Isaev, Gladkih have heard it and we were indignant at this. When she was 
going out from the meeting Gladkih beat her for those words, and when she 
turned to the studying room I beat her as well.” 
During the interrogation on 13 March 1953 Ogorinskaya said: 
“I felt anti-Soviet influence because of the conversations of my parents: my 
stepfather and my mother, who are anti-Soviet by their character. 
My stepfather, he is not my biological father, Ogorenko Mikhail, sometimes 
comes back from work and tells my mother that all the ruling posts aren’t 
given to the Russians and Ukrainians, but Jews are taking the ruling positions. 
He blamed government for this.” […] 
Ogorinskaya refused to tell her confession in court, explaining that she did it 
because everybody was saying that she is guilty. […] 
Due to the above-stated: 
The case is studied in a proper way since all evidence of the anti-Soviet claims 
of Ogorinskaya are proven. 
For the evaluation of the public danger of Ogorinskaya the case should be 
addressed to the head office.” 231 
                                                          
231 General Archive of Russian Federation, F.P-8131.OP31, Case 37877, pages 15-21, cited from Kozlov 
V. and Mironenko S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и Брежневе 1953-1972» 
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Ogorinskaya was released from prison on 17th June 1953 due to the amnesty of 27 
March 1953232. Very often in Russian histories the amnesties were connected to the change 
of political leader, in the case of the amnesty of 1953 in was also the change of the political 
course. After Khrushchev’s speech against of the cult of personality of Stalin, political 
criticism of an ex-leader wasn’t seen any more as a crime. That is why the wave of releases 
from prison affected mainly those who was sentenced for anti-Stalin’s protests (and not 
anti-Soviet in general). 
Another case of the guardianship of the society could be seen in the case of Katrich 
L.I. From the report of the Prosecutor’s assistant on special cases of Lvovskaya Oblast 
from 15 October 1953 on the case of Katrish L.I.: 
“[…] Katrich Lia Isakovna, born in 1918, Jewish nationality, with middle education, 
place of birth is Odessa, unemployed, lived temporarily in the city of Lvov, 12.04.1953 was 
arrested and claimed for criminal responsibility in according to the art.54.10 of part 1 of 
Criminal Code of Ukrainian SSR […] 
Transgression for the criminal responsibility of Lia Isakovna Katrich was the fact 
that during funeral days on 8 and 9 of March 1953, being in the telephone central office in 
the city of Lvov, made anti-Soviet expressions about the death of one of the leaders of 
Soviet Union. 
Anti-Soviet expressions of Katrich L.I. about Communist Party and Soviet leaders 
were proved by the testimonies during the court proceeding […] 
Testimony Shipilov Aleksey Petrovich […] said:  
“8 of March 1953 about 16.30 I was in the central telephone station of the city 
of Lvov where my wife works Shipilova Tatyana Semenovna. I saw as Katrich 
Lia Isakovna came to my wife and seeing a funeral ribbon on her, asked with a 
grin and ironical smile: “Are you in a mourning today?” I was shocked and 
indignant by such behavior of Katrich and asked her: “Doesn’t the mourning 
                                                                                                                                                                          
[Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], “Materik” Publishing house, 
Moscow 2005 
232 Decree of Presidium of Central Committee of CPSU from 27 March 1953 “Об амнистии”[About 
Amnesty] 
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concern you as well?” Katrich didn’t answer and went away. […] Me, being a 
citizen of Soviet Union, and being hurt by our loss, took measures to impede 
Katrich L.I.[…]” 
Testimony Andreeva Vera Vladimirovna said:  
“[...] In the morning on 9 March 1953 about 8.30 Katrich Lia Isakovna came to 
the central telephone station and ordered for a telephone call the town 
Proskutov, after that the employee who took the order from Katrich was 
changed for Shipilova. I heard that Katrich said something bad to Shipilova 
and came to ask about the quarrel. When I came, Katrich said to both of us: “I 
wish you to be in the mourning all your life and in tears for Stalin..”[…] 
Due to that facts and testimonies Court of Lvovskaya Oblast made twice the 
decision for the indictment of Katrich in making anti-Soviet claims about the 
death of the leader of Soviet Union and Communist Party. Katrich Lia 
Isakovna didn’t admit herself to being guilty, she explained it by saying that she 
didn’t have normal relations with testimonies and they said in the court against 
her to harm her. 
Supreme Court of Ukrainian SSR during the proceeding in cassation found 
controversies in the testimony evidences and claim the case as unproved.    
In according with the above-state I make a conclusion that Katrich Lia 
Isakovna was called to criminal account and claimed guilty soundly by the 
decision of the Court of Lvovskaya Oblast according to the articles 54-10 part 
1 Ukrainian SSR.[…]”233  
Another evidence of the fight of the state against ideological transgressors is the 
case of the teacher of history in Chita, who expressed her political views to her students. 
From the report of vice-Prosecutor of the Chita Oblast on special cases from 29 May 1953 
on case Kzakova G.A.: 
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“Kazakova Galina Alfonsovna, born in 1923, place of birth Shimanovskaya, 
Amurskaya Oblast, Russian nationality, citizen of USSR, from the family of 
government official, member of VLKSM [All-Soviet Lenin’s Communist 
Union of Youth], with higher pedagogical education, before arrest worked as a 
teacher of history in the school №4 of the city Chita. 
By the Court of the city of Chita Kazakova admitted guilty the fact that being a 
teacher she made an anti-Soviet propaganda between her students. 
7 March 1953 during the lesson she said calumny against the leaders of 
Communist Party and Soviet government, expression against them anti-Soviet 
speeches. 
20 April 1953  Court of Chitinskaya Oblast sentenced Kazakova to 10 years in 
prison and 3 years of deprivation (limiting) of rights. 
Judicial board on criminal cases of Supreme Court RSFSR on 12 May 1953 left 
the decision in force and complaint of Kazakova without compliance.  
In the letter to the Secretary of Central Committee of Communist Party 
Khrushchev N.S. father of imprisoned Kazakova A.I. claimed the crime of a 
daughter an incident. Him, his daughter and his wife due to their past didn’t 
have any indictments, and he highlights the fact of being the member of 
Communist Party since 1924. […] 
Form the material of the case is evident that the proceeding couldn’t be 
terminated since Kazakova committed a very serious crime. 
Being a teacher, Kazakova made calumniate propaganda between students. So, 
7 March 1953 during the history lesson in the grade 9 “A” Kazakova made an 
expression of calumny against leaders of Soviet Union and Central Committee 
of Communist Party. The same day after the lessons in the pioneer’s room in 
the presence of students Pahomova, Tyrymova, Mikhailovsky, and Shtein, - 
Kazakova spread the calumniate expressions.  
The guilt of Kazakova is proved by her own confession and by testimonies 
Tyrymova E.N., Pahomova G.S., Zhukovskaya A.S., Kotova A.A. and 
Mikhailovskaya N.S. The student of the 9th grade of school in the court’s 
proceeding testified the evidence: 
 “Kazakova G.A. is a teacher of history at our school, and 7 March 1953 on 
the history lesson after the meeting Kazakova answered on the questions of 
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the student and told: that when Lenin was alive, Stalin had imperceptible 
position. 
About diplomats, Kazakova told that they are people, whose words doesn’t 
correspond their actions, making mistake that these are the diplomats of 
capitalist countries. […] 
We asked, why Allilueva [the wife of Stalin] died early? She answered that she 
was poisoned under the special order as enemy of people since she tried to 
compromise Stalin. 
Kazakova told us, that being in exile, Stalin had several wives and children.” 
[…] 
According to the stated above and art. 428 of Code of Criminal Procedure, to 
admit to be correct the decision form 20 April 1953 of the Court of 
Chitimskaya Olblast and reasonable the punishment for Kazakova Galina 
Alfonsovna, and to leave the complaint of Kazakov Alfons Iosifovich without 
compliance.”234 
Anti-Soviet conversations were also a very common crime (about 20% from total 
number of cases for political crimes) for imprisonment. Another interesting feature of the 
reaction of the state on the private forms of protest was that talking against Soviet power 
even in a drunken state was considered as a crime. In case of Basov Boris, such drunken 
conversation about politics resulted in 10 years imprisonment (but with further ahead 
release due to the amnesty). From report of the General Prosecutor’s assistant 235  of 
Krasnoyarsky Kray on special issues from 4th June 1953 on case Basov B.A.236:  
                                                          
234  General Archive of Russian Federation, F.P-8131, Op.31, Case 38002, pages 24-26 cited from 
Kozlov V. and Mironenko S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и Брежневе 1953-
1972» [Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], “Materik” Publishing 
house, Moscow 2005 
235 Due to the ordinance of General Prosecutor of USSR №85 from 1 August 1956 “О порядке 
рассмотрение органами прокуратуры дел о государственных преступлениях” [About the procedure 
of examination by the Office of General Prosecutor of the cases about crimes against state], the state 
officials from Office of General Procurator controlled all the proceedings on crimes against state 
236 Original document from General Archive of Russian Federation, №P-8131, [Оп.31 Д.38248] pages 
5-6 cited from Kozlov V. and Mironenko S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и 
Брежневе 1953-1972» [Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], 
“Materik” Publishing house, Moscow 2005, p.91 
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“By the decision of the Krasnoyarsk’s district Court form 11 April 1953 due 
articles 58-10 part 1 Criminal Code of RSFSR Basov Boris Aleksandrovich, 
born in 1939, literate (educated), not member of the party, without previous 
convictions, before being arrested worked as radiologist in district hospital of 
Krasnoyarsk city, is sentenced to 10 years in prison and 3 years of deprivation 
(limiting) of rights.  
With the decision of Judicial board on criminal cases of Supreme Court of 
RSFSR from 28 April of 1953 the decision of Krasnoyarsk’s district Court 
from 11 April 1953 retained in force. 
Krasnoyark’s district Court acknowledged that Basov is guilty in committing 
the following:  on 5th March 1953 Basov, being not in a sober state, in the 
shop in the presence of other citizens Stepanenko and Muraviev told anti-
Soviet calumny toward one of the leaders of Communist Party and Soviet 
government. 
During indictment, Basov didn’t admit his guilt explaining that he was drunk 
and didn’t remember anything. […] 
During the interrogation in the judicial process, a witness Stepanenko 
indicate: “On 5th March 1953 I met Muraviev at the market and we went 
from there to the shop (larek). Basov entered at the same shop. I didn’t know 
Basov and never met him before. One of the visitors of the shop began 
speaking about state of health of one of the leaders of Communist Party and 
Soviet government 237 , to which Basov answered: “Let him die, there are 
                                                          
237 That is interesting phenomenon, by the Decree of Judicial Board on criminal cases of Supreme Court 
of RSFSR (1959) prescribing “inadmissibility of statement in the text of the judicial decisions authentic 
anti-Soviet expressions.” (Original Document from General Archive of Russian Federation, P-8131, OП 
31, Д.86071а page 11 cited from KOZLOV V. and MIRONENKO S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в 
России при Хрущеве и Брежневе 1953-1972» [Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev 1953-1972], “Materik” Publishing house, Moscow 2005, page 24). Before that decree the rules 
of the fixation of the entry of judgement required writing the anti-Soviet claims of defendant in 
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scores of people to take up his position”. Someone answered: “There are 
scores of people but not as him, millions of people will cry if he dies”. Basov 
answered: “Millions of people won’t cry, they will be happy”.  All visitors 
were indignant at Basov, and me with Muraviev inhibited him” […] 
In his claim, Basov specified, that there were many visitors in the shop that 
day when he was drunk, and not all of them were interrogated. Basov insisted 
that he didn’t make any anti-Soviet claims. 
According to the stated above, due to the absence of foundations for the 
protest, I insist to refuse to Basov Boris Aleksandrovich on judicial revision 
of his case…” 238 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
conjunctive mood – “defendant claims allegedly that there is no democracy in USSR”. Later, it was 
prohibited even call the surname of communist leader who was criticized (as it can see above in the 
document). Firstly, that censorship was required only for public document such as judicial decisions, but 
than, it was also spread to the internal instructions and reports. After 1960-1970 under Brezhnev it was 
prescribed to avoid to specify somehow the dissent expressions, and even in judicial decisions it was 
restricted to the description as “anti-Soviet” claim, “reformist”, “politically  dangerous” (KOZLOV V. 
and MIRONENKO S. «Крамола: инакомыслие в России при Хрущеве и Брежневе 1953-1972» 
[Kramola: Dissent thinking under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 1953-1972], “Materik” Publishing house, 
Moscow 2005, p.25). 
238 By the decision of Judicial board on criminal cases of Supreme Court of USSR from 2 March 1955, 
the sentence of Krasnoyarsky district Court from 11 April 1955 and decision of Judicial board on 
criminal cases of Supreme Court of USSR from 28 April 1953 towards Basov B.A. were altered and 
punishment was diminished to the 5 years of prison. According to the articles 1 and 6 of the Decree 
from 27 March 1953 “On amnesty” B.A.Basov was released from punishment and expunged from the 
conviction.  
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9. Soviet legal thought in the 1950-1960s  
9.1. Redefining of law: S.Kechekyan, A.Stalgevich and L.Yavich 
  
During the 1950s the process of “redefining of law” began. The initial definition 
which was formulated by A.J.Vyshinsky was claimed “narrow normative”, even if in the 
strict scientific sense it wasn’t normative in the meaning of Kelsen – the strict and precise 
following of the norm. Vyshinsky authenticated the law with the legal norm; Vyshisnky’s 
definition was closer to “potestarism” since it confirmed the absolute power of the 
communist party. Vyshinsky himself agreed with that difference in defining the 
“normativism” concerning his definition. His definition was criticized for reduction of the 
meaning of the law to the legal norms: 
“Law is a system of rules of behavior, expressing the will of the ruling class and 
formulated in legislative order, through the customs and rules of common living, 
sanctioned by the state power, and exercising of which are forced by the coercive power of 
the state for the purposes of protection, strengthening and development of the social 
relations which are favorable to the ruling class”.239  
So, beginning from the 1950s new phenomena in legal scholarship appeared, some 
lawyers begin oppose narrow normativism of Vyshinsky alternative concepts. 
S.F.Kechekyan and A.A.Piontkovsky interpreted law as unity of legal norm and legal 
relations, others such as A.K.Stalgevich and J.F.Mikolenko as unity of legal norms, legal 
relations and legal consciousness. So, all alternative theories added additional elements to 
the definition of Vyshisnky. 
As V.S.Nersesyants described this hew branch of Soviet legal scholarship:  
“Correlation of freedom, law and legislation isn’t studied enough in our literature. 
During the 1920-30s due to the analysis of the problems of the essence of law and general 
                                                          
239  VYSHINSKY A.J. “Основные задачи науки советского социалистического права” [Main 
objectives of the Soviet science of socialist law] from “Вопросы теории государства и права” [Issues 
of theory of state and law], State publishing house of legal literature, 1949, p.10 
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definition of law, some aspects of correlation of law and legislation were highlighted. But in 
later years this problematic issue was forgotten by Soviet researchers, the definition of law 
adopted in the 1930s in fact was interpreting law as legislation. Different Soviet and foreign 
scientists criticized this definition numerous times. Even considering all differences of their 
positions, the followers of “wide approach” see the main defect of present definition of 
law which is prevailing in literature, in its “narrow” normative character. For overcoming 
of this defect S.F.Kechekyan and A.A.Piontkovksy offer to include into the notion of law 
also legal relations, J.F.Mikolenko suggests adding to the law apart of legal relations also 
research of legal consciousness, L.S.Yavich offers to study in terms of law subjective law. 
These and other similar suggestions are caused by the interests of further development of 
the socialistic theory of the strengthening of the guarantees of rights and freedoms of 
individuals and widening of the methodological range of legal science.”240 
One of the prominent scholars who opened the discussion towards the wide-
normative approach by uniting norms with legal relations was professor of legal faculty of 
Moscow State University – Stepan Kechekyan. He wrote a profound work on theory of 
state and law “Legal relations in socialistic society”, where he started explaining correlation 
and difference between legal relations and legal norms. 
He stated that, “since law is determined by economics, the law couldn’t be 
established arbitrarily by the state. This is an illusion that law is based only on the will of 
the state”241. Kechekyan used the same approach for legal relations. Taking as the base 
classical Marxian statement about political economy, Kechekyan wrote that “legal relations 
are rooted into the material conditions of the life of society.” 242  Logically from these 
statements Kechekyan highlighted dependence of legal relations from industrial relations, 
but with the necessity not to authenticate them.  
                                                          
240  «Круглый стол «Советского государства и права» [Symposium of “Soviet state and law”], 
Periodical journal “Советское государство и право” [Soviet state and law], Publishing house “Наука” 
[Science], Volume 7, July 1979, p.72 
241 KECHEKYAN S.F. “Правоотношения в социалистическом обществе” [Legal relations in the 
socialistic society], Publishing house of the Academy of Science of USSR, Moscow, 1958, p.8 
242 Ibidem, p.7 
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Insisting on “wide” approach towards the definition of law, Kechekyan stated, that 
law insist of two elements, legal norms and legal relations themselves: 
“Law is the legalized position of ruling class for the expression its will. System of 
social relations which corresponds to the interests of the ruling class and its will is 
expressed in the legal norms. This system of social relations is formed: a) by adopting legal 
norms, b) in the result of exercising of rights and obligations of individuals and 
organizations, which are prescribed by the legal norms. Through this process of influence 
of legal norm on the social life we can observe law itself and the regulating function of 
law.”243 
Explaining his concept, Kechekyan stated close interaction and interdependence of 
norms and legal relations: “Since law is a complicated phenomenon, defining law as a 
system of norms we mean not only some dispositions prescribing obligatory behavior, but 
the dispositions which are functioning, we mean that legal norms shape certain legal 
obligations for citizens and certain permissions for them, and we mean that legal norms are 
embodied in certain legal relations”244 
And from this statement Kechekyan logically makes a declaration about the unity 
of legal norms and legal relations: 
“Legal norms and legal relations form in unity, that is why it won’t be correct to 
divide them metaphysically. Also, attempts to see the norms as something secondary, 
deriving from the social relations, will be groundless, and to see legal relations as something 
independent as make many bourgeois lawyers is inadmissible.”245 
Kechekyan admits that sometimes legal relations could anticipate the adoption of 
adequate legislations if those relations are relatively new for the certain type of the society:  
“Disposition about the unity of law and legal relations formulated above and 
correct for the already shaped and stabilized the system of law, must be seriously mended 
                                                          
243 Ibidem, p. 8 
244 Ibidem, p. 34 
245 Ibidem, p.19-20 
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towards the period of foundation and initial appearance of the law of new type. A new type 
of law couldn’t at once embrace all spheres of social life. Legal relations very often go 
ahead of norms of law. Legal character of those social relations in situation of absence of 
relevant legal norms uses legal consciousness of individuals of ruling class.”246  
But still confirming that legal relations sometimes pass ahead of legal norms, 
Kechekyan criticized the position of other legal scholar A.K.Stalgevich about the priority 
of legal relations under state’s legislation.  
Stalgevich claims that: “Legal relations is one of the form of expressing the 
economic relations and they are mediated by legal norms.”247  
In his article “Some questions on theory of socialistic legal relations” A.K.Stalgevich 
elaborates his statement about priority of legal relation under the state legislation. It was 
based on statement of classical Marxian approach that material conditions of industrial 
production form the basis of the society, and then follows the superstructure which is 
based on material relations. Stalgevich explains:  
"State, exercising its politics expressed in legal norms, through the legal relations 
direct and organize certain frames for holding the desire social order, the governmental 
bodies, social organizations, government official and citizens, and makes an active 
influence on the development of society in the interests of the ruling class. From the 
studying of classics of Marxism-Leninism one can make a conclusion that legal relations are 
relation of the superstrate (it means ideological), which are determined by the material 
relations, which correlate with the legal norms, and that material relations between 
individual who have common rights and obligations are taken to the consideration by the 
state for the creation of relevant legal norms.”248 
                                                          
246 Ibidem, p.7 
247 STALGEVICH A.K. “Некоторые вопросы теории социалистических правоотношений” [Some 
questions about theory of socialistic legal relations], Journal “Советское государство и право” [Soviet 
state and law], Publishing house of Institute of State and Law of Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, 
1951, №3,р.24 
248 Ibidem, p. 25 
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Kechekyan criticized this position of Stalgevich for the lack of a connection 
between socialistic legal relations with legal norms:  
“Legal relations are determined by socialistic basis [material conditions of life of the 
society] and just correspond to the legal norms; - Stalgevich doesn’t see any connection 
between legal relations and norms of socialistic law.”249 
Kechekyan claims that Stalgevich’s main mistake is that his definition of legal 
relations doesn’t reflect their character and relations of the superstructure of society. 
Uniting legal relations with material industrial relations of society, he presents them as 
relations of basis, which is not correct. Since legal relations are always ideological and 
secondary, this means that they always belong to the superstructure.250 Kechekyan says that 
Stalgevich’s concept would be proved if legal relations would go ahead of normative 
legislation, but he sees that foundational statement of Stalgevich as being totally wrong. 
Nonetheless, critics of Stalgevich and other conceptions, Kechekyan admits other 
approaches of “widening” of narrow normativism, when he states that: 
“Law is a complicated phenomenon. It consist in some cases from the legal norms 
and legal obligations determined by that legal norms, in other cases – it consists from legal 
norms and legal rtelations, or sometimes – it consist from legal norms, legal obligations and 
legal relations.”251  
Another legal scholar Yavich L.S. also stood up for the wide normative approach, he 
interpreted law not only as unity of norms and legal relations, and added a third element – 
ideology and legal consciousness.  He insisted on the necessity of the ideological element as 
a part of legal system: 
“It is not correct to the think that turning to the legal consciousness […] is arbitrary. 
During revolutionary periods the foundation of new economic formations in condition 
when the system of new objective law and legislation isn’t formulated yet, legal 
                                                          
249 KECHEKYAN S.F. “Правоотношения в социалистическом обществе” [Legal relations in the 
socialistic society], Publishing house of the Academy of Science of USSR, Moscow, 1958, p. 16-17 
250 Ibidem, p. 18 
251 Ibidem, p. 31-32 
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consciousness and legal act based on it, creating some legal obligations or rights, or creating 
legal relations, could anticipate legal norms with a great benefit for social progress and 
strengthening of new type of legal order, sometimes creating a path for a new 
legislation.”252  
Yavich formulates his definition of law, highlighting the role of legal consciousness:   
“Law is materially determined and formulated in legislation will of ruling class (and all 
people during the socialism), which is expressed directly not only through the state decrees 
and ordinances, but establishing rights for individuals and their legal relations are 
objectively determined and this objective conditions are reflected in legal consciousness. 
Adding the formula of essence of the law to the definition of the law creates the 
philosophical level of definition.”253   
Yavich highlights universality and innovation of his concept and elaborated 
definition of law:  
“For this general definition of law it is significant that it is applicable for any state or 
epoch, without dependence of the development of the juridical form or specialties of 
existing process of law-making, positioning of certain types of sources of law. The double 
dependence of law from the objective condition highlights, that legal order couldn’t be 
separated from the ability of ruling power correctly reflect the needs of industrial 
production, exchange and existence of the society itself (to manage common needs of the 
society and guarantee certain rights for its members). This above formulated definition 
could be the initial starting point for the research on increasing role of the human factor in 
the development of legal relations and analysis of significance of law in developing of 
human personality, in making further guarantees for the ruling class and all people (under 
socialism).”254 
 
                                                          
252 YAVICH L.S., “Общая теория права” [General theory of law], Publishing house of Leningrad State 
University, 1976, Leningrad, p. 57 
253 Ibidem, p. 110 
254   YAVICH L.S., “Общая теория права” [General theory of law], Publishing house of Leningrad 
State University, 1976, Leningrad, p.  110 
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9.2. Symposium on normativism at the Institute of state and law 
 
This gradual development of alternative legal concepts which tried to widen the 
mainstream definition of law lead to the situation that widened the perception of law which 
became prevalent in legal scholarship in 1970-1980s. It was very clearly apparent on the 
debates “About understanding of Soviet law” organized by leading periodical journal 
“Soviet state and law” in 1979.  On these debates the major part of the participants- 
leading scholars and researchers -criticized the previous definition of law of 1938 and stood 
up for alternative conceptions. Also during that symposium the possibility of existence of 
different theories and definitions of law was discussed. 
Professor Institute of State and Law of Russian Academy of Science Piskotin M.I. 
criticized particularly the narrow normative approach caused by the definition of 
Vyshinsky. He stated that current understanding and research on law failed to pay 
sufficient attention to the relationships between citizen and the state. He stated that also 
not enough attention in the literature is paid to the research of correlation of legislation and 
law. That law as a phenomenon is much wider than decrees and ordinances of the 
government. Law includes also customs, legal and political principles which form relations 
in the society, and other factors which legal science doesn’t note if follows the old 
approach of normativism and understanding of law as legal norms.255  
On the symposium, outstanding legal scholar V.A.Tumanov stated the necessity of 
elaboration of alternative definitions of law: 
“There is no scholar among Soviet scientists who would deny the positive character 
of traditional definition of law. In many cases this is a very successful and functioning 
definition, which highlights the peculiarities of law, correctly orient law executive activity 
and very convenient in pedagogical terms. But with all that, it [this definition] has its weak 
points, which is especially seen when this definition is presented as unique and the only one 
                                                          
255  «Круглый стол «Советского государства и права» [Symposium of “Soviet state and law”], 
Periodical journal “Советское государство и право” [Soviet state and law], Publishing house “Наука” 
[Science], Volume 7, July 1979, p.56 
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which is correct. Perhaps, the existence of one and correct definition of law shouldn’t be 
an obstacle for other definitions. It seems, for instance, that the definition of law which 
P.Stuchka elaborated might still be relevant. But a definition of law which is very 
convenient for legal activity won’t satisfy philosopher, sociologist, or specialist on ethics. 
Soviet philosophers very correctly highlight the impossibility to limit themselves to only 
one description. For the practical purposes Soviet science always aimed for standardized 
definition of legal categories, which are used in the legal norms. But this practical method, 
aimed for standardized application of legal norms, shouldn’t suppress activity of legal 
research as social and world outlook science.”256 
He also commented on the debated between narrow and wide normative approach: 
“This is not only a debate about notions and definitions, in reality this is discussion 
about “understanding” of law. We uncover the issue about understanding of law, about 
widening of the horizons of our idea about law and legal performance in socialistic society. 
In mainstream legal literature prevail presentation of law with the legal norm as a central 
element. The situation when from 4 volumes of “Marxian theory of law” two volumes are 
dedicated to legal norms is not acceptable. The process of law-making and creation of legal 
norms and notions isn’t presented at all, and there is not enough attention given to the law 
executive stage – the real legal relations in society. This approach from the legal norm 
caused the situation when even legal principles are seen as consequences of norms, and not 
in opposite – as something which determine the normative content.”257 
Towards wide approach instead of narrow normative one performed almost all 
participants of that symposium. A.M.Vasilyev told: “The concrete notion of law is based 
on the whole sum of the knowledge about it, when law is presented in connection with 
economics, politics, morals, when it is seen in historical perspective and modern patterns, 
analyzed in its own features and from the point of view of the influence on the society […] 
In the concrete notion of law all its parts and demonstrations should be balanced. And this 
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notion should be formulated by a general theory of law”258 At the same time Vasilyev 
highlights possible difficulties of wide approach, associating law with social norms with 
make problematic of withering it away under socialism. The same apprehension expresses 
V.K.Babaev, professor of Superior School of Ministry of Internal affairs, when he claims 
necessity to distinguish law from other elements of superstructure of the society.259 
V.K.Mamutov, professor of Institute of industry and economics of Academy of 
Sciences of USSR states that “it is important to distinguish notions of different branches of 
law and institutes of law or legislation from classification of norms due to legal or technical 
features”, for this reasons, and also strengthening the “wide” normative approach, he 
offers “to elaborate classification of norms without mixture of it with the system of law”.260  
V.S.Nersesyants formulated the sense of “wide” normative approach stating that 
“Law is shaped by society, by the whole system of social relations, and it is not discovered 
by legal norms.”261 
In conclusion to the description of legal research during the 1950-80s, the 
elaboration of wide-approach in Soviet legal studies became a very prominent and positive 
event. Confirmation of necessity of different definitions of law from philosophical, ethic, 
sociological and social points became positive and fruitful for elaboration of different 
thought, which were not framed any more with one mainstream determining concept. The 
critics of the Vyshinsky’s definition of 1938 ruined the monopoly of official understanding 
of law and monolithic unity of legal science.  
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10. Brezhnev’s era: a deadlock or non-Marxian development? 
10.1. Do human rights exist in the Soviet Union? 
 
Soviet leaders used ideology to support the regime in many ways – state 
propaganda told of terrible and inhumane conditions of the workers in the West and 
democracy and wealth of the Soviet people. Soviet citizens had very faulty image through 
the filter of official propaganda about what was happening in the outside world. 
Moreover, the Soviet state did not allow its population access to information. In the 
Soviet Union authorities’ enjoyed a monopoly over information which left Soviet people 
largely isolated, unconscious and increasingly naïve about current and world affairs. Soviet 
young people were significantly surprised when they saw that even students from People’s 
Democracies such as Poland and East Germany invariably had considerably better clothes 
than they did.262  There were, however, far more substantial facts which contributed to the 
loss in faith in communist ideology amongst Soviet citizens. 
The Soviet population was able to grasp the drastic mismatching between the 
proclamations made by the Soviet government and the reality they faced. One of the myths 
for the support of the regime and the positive image of the West was extremely liberal 
legislation and a wide range of legal guarantees for rights and freedoms, which in fact did 
not exist. In addition to the internal legal guarantees, the Soviet Union signed Universal 
Declaration of human rights of 1948, adopting to pledge itself “to achieve, in cooperation 
with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”263 and Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975. In theory Soviet citizens possessed wide range 
of human rights with international criteria of its execution. 
Universal Declaration of Human rights guarantees everyone has the right to leave 
any country, including his own, and to return to his country264 . But Soviet legislation 
contradicted this provision – prescribing as a crime of parricide “escape outside the Soviet 
Union abroad and refusal to return”265. In case of the escape abroad without conscious 
intention to harm the Soviet regime, the act didn’t qualify as a parricide but as “unlawful 
crossing of the state border”266. In fact, Soviet Courts blamed all people who crossed the 
border in creating a threat to state security – almost all male population of Soviet Union 
did military service in the army and Soviet Court acknowledged them to obsess a military 
secrets which couldn’t be passed abroad, if it was a woman who organized an escape 
abroad, Soviet Court recognized her to obsess important military secrets which she got to 
know from her husband or son (or neighbor) who did military service267. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights premises that “everyone lawfully within the territory 
of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence…The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions 
except those which are provided by law…”268. In the Soviet Union the law on emigration 
didn’t exist (or any restrictions for it), so refusal to leave the country was very often made 
in oral form or without legislative motivation269. 
Article 50 of the Soviet Constitution proclaims that:  
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“in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and 
develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the 
press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations”.  
Nevertheless, despite freedom of speech being guaranteed, one of the most 
frequent reasons for political repressions were “anti-soviet conversations” – as it is cited by 
V.Kozlov and S.Mironenko in “Kramola: dissent-activity under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
in 1953-1982” more than 20% of Prosecutor’s indictments were based on art.70 of 
Criminal Code of RSFSR “anti-Soviet propaganda”. It was the most usual accusation over 
all of the Soviet Union period with only some difference through the epochs – in epoch of 
Stalin and Khrushchev people were sentenced even for private conversation, commonly 
even said in a drunken state, in Brezhnev’s era otherwise people were sentenced only for 
public criticism of the regime.270  
Many people accused under art.70 were conscious about criticizing the Soviet 
regime, but there were also numerous cases when accused people weren’t protesting 
against regime – just commenting on politics, international relations or life conditions 
(complaining high prices, impossibility to get accommodation, poor life conditions, deficit 
in the shops). Very often people were emotionally touched by some collision – being fired 
form the work or even divorce and complaining and accusing everything including the 
Soviet regime.271 In such cases victims tried to rehabilitate themselves sending letters to 
Soviet authorities with explanations of their behavior and their biographies stating their 
loyalty to Soviet power. 
Reading the documents about conviction of dissidents for critics of the regime 
might highlight one curious feature – that ideological motives for the convictions played an 
important but not dominant role in sentencing of the dissidents 272 . On sentences of 
conviction are not only for anti-communist statements, but also expressions about 
Marxism which didn’t correspond to the official ideological line were punished, as they 
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were anti-communist. V.Kozlov and S.Mironenko made a conclusion that such repressions 
were organized not for creating the ideological discipline, but mostly for making people 
think “under the prescriptions of Central Committee”.273 
Exercise of political freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution was ensured 
by putting public buildings, streets and squares at the disposal of the working people and 
their organizations, by broad dissemination of information, and by the opportunity to use 
the press, television, and radio. But in fact any demonstration which wasn’t sanctioned by 
the government and didn’t have a purpose to support communism were dissolved and 
their participants arrested for hooliganism.274  
Article 50 of the Constitution of RSFSR guarantees freedom of conscience, that: 
“the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or 
atheistic propaganda”275 .  
Further development of the Constitutional provisions were developed in resolution 
of Congress of People’s Deputies of RSFSR from 1 January of 1929 (with amendments 
from 23.06.1975) “About religious associations”276. Soviet doctrine stated that religious 
confession couldn’t create any obstacle for exercising any other rights or freedoms 277 . 
Further guarantees provided article 142 of Criminal Code of RSFSR which considered a 
violation any on the basis of the confession of religion, such facts as firing from work or 
from University or Institution for conducting a religious worship was considered a crime278.  
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One can find numerous evidences on violations of religious confession – very 
common practice during Soviet period was taking children away from religious families. 
Official Soviet ideology prescribed “communist education” to all young people which 
began in an early age. This principle was embodied in the article 52 of the Soviet Code 
about matrimony and family: “parents should bring up their children according to the 
moral code of the communist”. Article 59 of the same Code stated that:  
“Parental rights could be devastated by the file to the court from Public Prosecutor 
or Governmental or public organization in case if parents make a bad influence on their 
children by their amoral or anti-social behavior”279.  
The above mentioned legislative norms created a legal base for taking children away 
from religious families.280 In such cases the decisions were supported by the principle that 
interests’ of the state and society in general are more important than private interests or 
rights of individuals.281  
Inviolability of the person was guaranteed by the article 54 of The Constitution – 
“no one may be arrested except by a court decision or on the warrant of a procurator.” So, 
article 126 of Criminal Code develops this provision by prescribing criminal responsibility 
for unlawful arrest of the person. The inviolability of the person violated by possibility of 
the KGB to take people for prophylactic “talks” which aimed to “warn” a dissent activists 
about anti-Soviet activity, and numerous secret internal instructions of KGB prescribing 
measures against anti-Soviet activists. 282   The Order of Supreme Soviet of USSR “О 
применении органами государственной безопасности предостережения в качестве 
меры профилактического воздействия” [About implementing of admonition as a means 
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of prophylactic influence] from 25.12.1972 №3707-VIII which laid foundation for such 
preventive measures wasn’t published and circulated as internal instruction of state security 
organs, what violated the Constitutional provisions. 
Private rights and freedoms, such as the privacy of citizens, and of their 
correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications were protected 
by law283. As well as political rights and freedoms, Soviet Constitution contained a large 
range of different political guarantees of development of “socialistic democracy”: which 
included the right to submit proposals to state bodies and public organizations for 
improving their activity, and to criticize shortcomings in their work (article 49 of the 
Constitution of USSR). This  political right to take part in governmental decision making 
process, to make claims for governmental decisions were seen by the Soviet doctrine as an 
inviolable guarantee of the socialistic democracy and whole system of human rights284. 
Nevertheless, the persecution for criticism was legally prohibited; dissent activists were 
subjected to judicial and extrajudicial persecution.  
“[Repressive measures] were personally aimed against people who were involved in 
spread of independent information… This showed a desire of the government to stop the 
delivery of information to the West and cut the channels inside the USSR. Also, such 
activists were organizing the system of help and dotation to the political prisoners and their 
families”285.  
The privacy of the telephone conversations was violated by Special Order of 
Committee of Ministers from 31 august 1972, which prohibits any use of telephone 
communications in purpose which contradict the state’s interest and public order286. In 
practice it meant disconnection of the telephone after several telephone talks with foreign 
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subscribers with translating any information contradicting the official state propaganda. 
Usually the telephone was disconnected for 6 months with further warning not to use it for 
calls abroad, but in many cases it was disconnected forever with handling the telephone 
number over another subscriber.287 
As could be seen, in Brezhnev’s era there were very liberal and progressive 
guarantees of human rights and freedoms in internal legislation as well as signing the 
international human rights declarations. But as described by the famous Russian proverb - 
“severity of Russian laws is compensated with the optionality of its execution”288. One can 
see examples of violations of existing laws for the reasons of public communist interests 
and prevailing of the states’ interests under the private rights and freedoms. 
 
10.2. The dissident movement 
 
The idea of challenging the authorities by taking responsibility for defending the 
state’s laws against violation from the state itself was firstly formulated by dissent activists 
and mathematician Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin. He firmly stated ideas that the legalist 
approach is much more effective and better than violent revolution. Together with other 
dissent-activists in 1965 Volpin organizes in the center of Moscow the “Demonstration of 
glasnost (transparency)”, which was the first public protest in after-war Soviet Union. The 
“Demonstration of glasnost” was organized in support of Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel 
– two poets who were arrested for publishing anti-Soviet pieces, and hold its main demand 
to make the judicial proceeding against them public. Volpin was an author of “Civil 
appeal” which aimed to attract participants:  
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“Several months ago the organs of KGB arrested two citizens: writers A.Siniavski 
and I.Daniel. In this case we have a reasonable doubt about the violation of the law about 
publicity of legal proceedings. It is obvious, that behind “the closed doors” any violations 
of law are possible, and that the breach of the law about glasnost (publicity) (art.3 of the 
Constitution of USSR and art.18 of Criminal Procedure Code of RSFSR) is serious 
violation itself. It is unbelievable, that the art of the writer could harm somehow state 
security.   
In the past, violations of the state caused deaths and arrests to the millions of 
Soviet citizens. Bloody past asks us to be vigilant in the present. It is easier to sacrifice one 
day of rest than to suffer up-stopped tyranny for many years. […]”289  
A.Volpin was arrested on the “Demonstration for glasnost” and took directly to the 
KGB for interrogation.  
Nevertheless the arrest of Volpin, his legal ideas were wide-spread among Russian 
dissent intelligentsia. As Bukovsky put it: “So let us defend our laws from being 
encroached upon by the authorities. We are on the side of the law. They are against it.”290 
Bukovsky liked the idea of public expression of the protest because believed that the law is 
on their side, moreover such way permitted to inform larger quantity of people about 
violations. 
In 1976 the Moscow Helsinki group was founded– nowadays the oldest existing 
human rights organization in Russia. Initially, its main purpose was to monitor the Soviet 
Union’s compliance with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe signed in Helsinki in 1975, embodying A.Esenin-Volpin’s idea about legal 
approach in flight with violations. Ludmila Alekseeva (one of the founders of the 
organization who is the present head of it) recalled the conversation with Volpin:  
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“He would explain to anyone who cared to listen a simple but unfamiliar idea: all 
laws ought to be understood in exactly the way they are written and not as they are 
interpreted by the government and the government ought to fulfil those laws to the 
letter.”291  
For the Soviet reality such affirmations seemed fantastic. As the historian 
N.Berdiaev stated in an earlier era, “the greatest paradox in the destiny of Russian state and 
the revolution is that liberal ideas, ideas of law as well as of social reforming, appeared to 
be utopian in Russia”.292 
It should be noted that dissent activity of intelligentsia who shared legal approach 
was public. Or it was a protest by writing letters in support of the victims of the regime, or 
public demonstrations. Since there were also a popular phenomenon of writing anonymous 
letters and leaflets condemning Soviet regime and its violations.293 
The number of dissent activists wasn’t high at all. V.Bukovsky in his memoirs cited 
different reasons which caused the passivity against state violation – repressions which 
were as a punishment for every type of the expressions of the protest which made one to 
look for family’s interests. Another reason to avoid an expression of protest was the wide-
spread belief that protest could achieve nothing other than to incite trouble and that the 
only way to change the system is from within and that is necessary first to show the 
loyalty.294 
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Part 2  
From Communism to the Western standards of human 
rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The model of democratic reconstruction in post-Soviet countries 
1.1.  The triumph of Western liberalism 
 
Perestroika and the political course of M.Gorbachev in the years before the 
collapse of USSR (1985-1991) showed an inevitable tendency in the weakening of 
communism. The end of the Cold War and communism losing its positions meant that the 
world was bipolar no more. The Western model of capitalism remained absolute since 
there was no more another force to oppose it. This made the claim about the “triumph of 
Western liberalism” as the last remaining global ideology possible: 
“The passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from Soviet Union 
will mean its death as living ideology of world historical significance. For while there may 
be isolated true believers left in places like Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern 
undermines completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history. And the 
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death of this ideology means the growing “Common Marketization” of international 
relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.”295  
The most extreme interpretation was extended by Francis Fukuyama explaining 
that “the triumph idea is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable alternatives to 
Western liberalism.”296 He expressed the view that the conflict between rival ideologies is 
over, that “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government.” Though, this view was criticized broadly, many moderate evaluation of the 
end of global ideological opposition agreed that it was a matter of time before post-
communist countries will construct democracies following the Western model. 297 
Fukuyama, insisting on his triumphalist idea explained: 
 “Marx […] asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that 
could not be resolved within its contest, that between capital and labour, and this 
contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, 
the class issue has been successfully resolved in the West […] the egalitarianism of modern 
America represents the essential achievement of the class society envisioned by Marx.”298  
Still the Western capitalist model is full of its own contradictions and there is no 
perfection that can be found in Western democracies in terms of the respect for human 
rights. Mutua Makao responds to this claim, the fact that human rights are violated in 
liberal democracies just confirms that fact that “human rights and democracy are both 
works in progress”:  
 “The fact that human rights are violated in liberal democracies […] does not 
distinguish the human rights corpus from the ideology of Western liberalism; rather, it 
emphasizes the contradictions and imperfections of liberalism. In other words, the elusive 
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state of perfection in which human rights are fully respected and realized tells us, among 
other things, that both human rights and democracy are works in progress. They are 
projects that are essentially infinite, open-ended, and highly experimental in nature.”299  
And still, could we claim peremptory that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and overthrowing of communist ideology, post-Soviet countries adopted the Western 
model of liberalism and construction of democracy in conditions of the absence of any 
other relevant ideological alternative? Is it correct to claim that after the end of the Cold 
War and bipolar global political opposition, democratic reconstruction of post-communist 
countries proved the “triumph of the Western model”?  
Karl Klare criticized that view about the triumph of Western liberalism as the one 
and only remained global ideology. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War, the Western model of capitalism strengthened its position but still, the 
claim about its absolutism couldn’t be taken without doubts. Klare wrote that it is mistaken 
to claim that “1989 reflects the definitive triumph of liberalism in politics and capitalism in 
economics which presumably may now be packed and transplanted, like McDonald’s 
franchise, to Prague, Budapest and Warsaw.”300  
The first reason for Karl Klare’s criticism of the “triumphalist view” on the 
Western concepts was the existence of that discursive domestic contest which made all 
new democracies different due to the special economic and political condition found in 
each of them: 
 “While it is true that many Eastern Europeans are eager to inaugurate western, 
capitalist types of regime, the new democracies are by no means are limited to look alike. 
Political ideals and economic models emanating from the West profoundly influenced the 
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revolution of 1989. Still, there are grassroots, homegrown affairs, and the erstwhile 
revolutionaries may once again do their own thing in fashioning new institutions.”301 
New democracies in post-communist countries faced such an enormous variety of 
complex problems that it is evidently problematic to claim a mere legal transplant of other 
juridical constructions which copies a foreign legal concept.  
Another reason to contest the triumph of the Western model is that “there is no 
single form of eastern liberal democracy to be exported eastwards.”302 Klare wrote that “it 
might make sense to regard American-style, free-wheeling capitalism and Swedish social 
democracy as exemplars of the “same” system at some very general level of analysis, but 
not for the practical purposes that people care about.”303 
It is problematic just claim that a foreign legal model could be transplanted as a 
“franchise” to post-Soviet countries due to the historical, ideological, economic contest 
since legal transplants always require contextual study. A domestic discursive contest about 
any legal transplant is still inevitable.  
 
 
1.2.  The Western pedigree of the UN Declaration of human rights  
 
 
The claim about the triumph of Western liberalism refers the whole corpus of 
human rights and democratic traditions coming out of the West which diffused globally. 
Mutua W. Makao in his Ideology of human rights argues that rights are the product of 
Western culture since its main promoters have always been Western elements – whether 
they were academic, activists or human rights organizations. Though rights are usually 
presented as non-ideological, this claim was broadly contested. It is hard to deny the 
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influence of political deliberation on the human rights corpus. As Mutua W. Makao wrote, 
human rights are not only a set of normative principles and provisions, they also concern 
routine politics and political choices. He takes the premise that human rights and liberal 
democracy are both Western products, which seems to be different, but in reality is a unity, 
since one is a universalized notion of the other: 
 “…human rights represent the attempt diffusion and further development at the 
international level of the liberal political tradition. These processes have contributed to the 
reexamination and reconstruction of liberalism, and have in some respects refined and 
added to the liberal tradition. It seems to be true historically that for political movements 
and ideologies, from nationalism to free enterprise and beyond, totems and myths are 
necessary to remove them from their earthly moorings. For liberal democracy that totem 
appears today to be the human rights corpus, the moralized expression of a political 
ideology. Although the concept of human right is not unique to European societies, […] 
the specific philosophy on which the current “universal” and “official” human rights 
corpus is based is essentially European.”304  
One of the arguments which Mutua W. Makao uses in support of his claim about 
the European roots of both liberalism and human rights is that the major part of the 
elements, which formulated the corpus of human rights, was European. After the World 
War II, the United Nations promoted the basis for further construction of the international 
human rights. The International Bill of Human Rights, which consists of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
with its two Optional Protocols and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights formulated that the basic platform and human rights core – a fact which 
tends to be admitted.  
As was remarked, the West imposed its philosophy of human rights on the rest of 
the world as result of its leading role in the United Nations. Nonetheless, of the large 
quantity of members of the UN Human rights Commission or the Third Committee of the 
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General Assembly, only a small number of them were amongst the primary drafters. While 
drafting the Universal Declaration, the persons from Human rights commission 
responsible for the preparation of draft were mainly from Western Europe or Europeans 
educated in the West. Virginia Leary, with reference to Verdoodt, lists Renè Cassin of 
France, John P.Humphrey of Canada, Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States, Hernan 
Santa Cruz of Chile, Charles Malik of Lebanon, P.C.Chang of China, and Fernand 
Dehousse of Belgium as the primary drafters of the UN Declaration of Human rights. 
Furthermore, Leary analysis the ideological background of every person from the list: 
 “[…] three of the principle drafters came from the Americas, two from Europe, 
and two from Asia. All, however, had received their education mainly in Western 
Universities. Chang and Malik, the only non-Westerners in the group, were educated at 
Clark College and Columbia University in the United States and the American University 
of Beirut and Harvard University, respectively. Malik had taught at Harvard. Both made 
clear their Western-philosophical orientation in various points in the drafting of the 
declaration. At one point Malik urged inclusion in one of the articles of the declaration of 
the phrase, inspired by the U.S. Declaration of Independence, that each person is 
“endowed by the Creator with unalienable rights.” The proposal was rejected. Chang 
referred on various occasions, with approval to eighteenth century Western philosophical 
theories as a source of declaration.  
The initial draft of the Declaration prepared by John Humphrey drew from 
proposed declarations submitted by a number of Western organizations and individuals, 
particularly from the Western hemisphere. Most of these declarations followed closely the 
French Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen or the U.S. Bill of Rights, 
although the Latin American declarations included references to economic and social 
rights. […] Renè Cassin of France is frequently cited as the author of Declaration. […] it 
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was the first session of the Drafting Committee, led by Cassin, that the declaration received 
its Western character.”305 
Antonio Cassese analyzing the quality of rights, which were included into the text 
of the Declaration, wrote about their Western origin: 
“More space and importance are allotted to civil and political rights than to 
economic, social and cultural rights and no mention at all is made of the rights of peoples 
(the right of self-determination is completely absent). The position taken with regard to 
colonized peoples, partially or completely denied their right to freedom, is purely formal. 
The existence of dependent peoples is not ignored: the preamble states that the Universal 
Declaration is to be observed “both among the peoples of member States and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction”. Moreover, article 2(2) lays down that “no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust or 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation sovereignty. 
However, these remain entirely formal and abstract pronouncements because the 
particular economic, political and social circumstances of dependent countries were not 
taken into account by giving specific instructions to anything about economic inequalities 
between States, or consider the fact that full freedom to their citizens and in any case will 
not be in a position to guarantee certain basic economic and social rights, such as the right 
to work, to education, to suitable housing, etc.”306 
Answering the question about how the West succeeded in imposing its 
“philosophy” of human rights, Cassese highlighted the fact that socialist countries were in 
minority in the UN, and also were unable to formulate and work out a common, clear 
strategy for lobbying their position against the West. While Third World countries were 
associated with Latin American countries with a “Western outlook”, the socialist countries 
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merely failed to stand up to the Western powers due to the luck of authority. This lack of 
authority extended to even influential Western delegates as Eleonore Roosevelt and René 
Cassin. Here, Cassese comes to the conclusion that the view of human rights expressed in 
the Declaration is Western.307 
This pro-Western orientation of the Declaration was largely disputed in 
international society problematizing the mere existence of such an international treaty 
which fails to fully reflect the interests and cultural positions of all UN members. As 
Alston has posited: 
 “It is sometimes suggested that the doctrines of human rights as embodied in the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights may not be relevant to societies with a non-
Western cultural tradition or a socialist ideology. In its extreme form such approach would 
thoroughly undermine the existing system of the international protection of human rights 
and create “free of all” situation in which each dictator and each military junta, as well as 
each democratically elected but embattled government, could design its own bill of rights 
to suit not only local traditions but also its own self-interest”308  
But though, it is evident that the basic content of human right which is was 
formulated in the UN Declaration than transferred to the domestic laws as a standard of 
human rights. Many countries share that common “core” of human rights, which is called 
“universal” and deeply rooted to the Western democratic tradition. 
 
1.3. The ideology of human rights 
 
Despite clear Western roots, the Universal Declaration once it was adopted in 1948 
truly achieved global and universal status. Even though the Declaration did not contain 
fully other approaches to human rights other than a Western approach, it became a corner 
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stone for the global promotion of human rights and standard for drafting domestic laws in 
nation states.  
But not only the UN Declaration of human rights became a promoter of Western 
values due to its drafters being overwhelmingly “Western”. On number of cases Makao 
shows that the founding fathers and major ideological inspiratory activists of the largest 
INGOs – they all were Westerners who had an interest in promoting human rights in their 
domestic discourse.309  
International INGOs became a “prime engine of growth” in the human rights 
movement. The majority of them based in the West and attempt to promote human rights 
globally. For example, the organization Human Rights Watch deals with human rights 
violations in the U.S., but the focus of their activity is the human rights “problems” or 
“abuses” in other countries.310 As Makao explicated: 
 “The boards of the European-based INGOs, the ICJ and AI, tend to differ, 
somewhat, from American INGOs, although they too are dominated by Westerners, 
Western-trained academics, professionals, and policymakers, or non-Westerners whose 
worldview is predominantly West-ern.  Thus, even these Asians and Africans--who, though 
non-White, nevertheless “think White” or “European”-- champion, usually uncritically, the 
universalization of the human rights corpus and liberal democracy. In 1994, for example, 
the seven members of the executive committee of the ICJ included a German, an 
Australian, a Brazilian (a Westerner), and four establishment figures from India, Ghana, Sri 
Lanka, and Jordan.”311 
Another proof supporting the Western origins of human rights is that liberal regime 
which promotes human rights and democratic values is derived from institutions and 
governmental bodies which were developed over centuries in Europe.312 This reason of 
common European history and development of core institutions of democracy and human 
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rights highlighted Koskenniemi. He wrote that this historical heritage of traditions helps to 
interpret and exercise human rights in a certain manner since they are understood 
commonly and were shaped in the common space:   
 “Despite their coherence, and the difficulty to justify them, human rights have 
functioned reasonably well in Western societies because they have been embedded in 
Western ways of life in the same ways as, for example, wearing a tie or shaking hands when 
meeting. That we in the West feel rights important and are able to interpret them broadly 
similar ways in function of our common history, perhaps a result of our imagining our 
societies as moral communities – but certainly not any ability we have of grasping the 
meaning of human “dignity” or “sacredness” in some authentic pre-social sense.”313 
Despite the common roots of the main concepts, every culture contributed to the 
national context of human rights implications. As Schwats put it: 
“Every culture will have its distinct ways of formulating and supporting of human 
rights. Every society can learn from other societies more effective ways to implement 
human rights. While honoring the diversity of cultures, we can also build toward common 
principles that all can support. As agreement is reached on the substance, we may begin to 
trust international law to provide a salutary and acceptable safeguard to ensure that all 
people can count on a minimum standard of human rights.”314  
So, the conclusion which could be made from looking at the origins of democracy 
and liberalism is that both of them are Western due to the origins of its main actors, 
historical aspects of drafting of the most important human rights treaties, common 
contribution of the West in elaboration and the development of democratic institutions. 
However, Western concepts have been diffused globally.  We can’t just agree on a “blind” 
application of human rights since domestic national contest modifies legal concepts 
significantly. But it is clear; we can agree that rights have their common “core” due to the 
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common Western roots. And values and legal structures derive from the Western 
liberalism. This is relevant for the post-communist countries, including Russia. Western 
liberalism and democracy were both modified considerably due to the realities and 
complexities of the post-Soviet period. 
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2. Assessment of the democratic reconstruction  
2.1. What is a democracy?  
 
The disputes about democratic reconstruction and measurement of the liberal 
transformation provoke reflection on what democracy actually is. What are the main 
features of democracy? And which guidance criteria are there which allow us to assess 
whether democratic transformation has been successful or not? 
Under such an argument, the reexamination of democracy requires a rethink about 
its cornerstone characteristics and further observation of those features in post-communist 
societies. 
Samuel Huntington mentions two features of democracy in connection with the 
decision-making process: contestation and participation. The major decision-makers 
(whether individuals or institutions) through periodic elections, for which an honest basis is 
assured. Secondly, there is no restriction on the adult population voting and the candidates 
that are able to compete for the votes.315 
Makao provides a more detailed system of democracy, which adds to Huntington’s 
paradigm of “participation and contestation” with more complex elements such as popular 
sovereignty, checks and balances and the separation of powers, the rule of law and priority 
of human rights: 
(i)  “Political society is based on the concept of popular sovereignty; 
(ii) The government of the state is constitutionally required to be accountable to 
the populace through various processes such as periodic, genuine, multi-party 
elections; 
(iii) Government is limited in its powers through checks and balances and the 
separation of powers, a central tenet of the liberal tradition; 
(iv) The judiciary is independent and safeguards legality and the rule of law; 
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(v) The formal declaration of individual civil and political rights is an indispensable 
facet of the state.”316 
For the purposes of the present research will be used a clear outline of the institutional 
structure of post-communist democracy formulated by Karl Klare, which “consists of four 
basic components: representative political institutions, free markets and human rights 
guarantees, with these all in turn founded upon the autonomous rule of law. […] post-
communist transition will require the development of wholly new codes across the range of 
public and private law fields.”317 
Klare highlights that for this paradigm, the concepts of the “free market” and “human 
rights” are primary since they entail the fundamental principles of a functioning society. 
The idea that the market is “free” or “self-regulating” is an illusion. The transitional period 
from state-planning towards free market prescribes the necessity of a wide range of 
different political decisions to be made in order to define and elaborate the market in legal 
detail. The free market does not have a fixed legal structure, the foundational process of 
specifying it is always a result of political deliberation. Moreover, the idea of a free market 
still foresees the regulating necessity of a state power in order to make socially significant 
choices, such as to distribute power between non-equal social elements – employers and 
employees, creditors and debtors, state and business, as well as to correct market failures. 
As Klare explains:  
 “[…] to have a market at all assumes the existence of a background regime of legal 
rules and entitlements. It assumes, for example, that the coercive power of the state can be 
invoked to protect property and enforce contracts. The state can withdraw from central 
planning but it cannot withdraw from its role in defining market structures and property 
entitlements. The background rules are not socially neutral; they distribute power and 
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frame the possibilities of human fulfillment. The choice of a particular market structure is 
therefore the implementation of a distinct regulatory strategy.”318  
Klare calls it that the struggle is not for the “free” market, but for democratic market 
structures. He wrote that lawyers who elaborate the post-communist legal reconstruction 
should be aware that all influential decisions, legal or economic, must be responsive to 
democratic input. That means “an appeal to recognize the political character of legal 
practices and develop an understanding of our work that links that recognition to 
democratic commitments.”319  
These insights into democracy will be used as a framework for further chapters on 
democratic transitions in post-Soviet Russia. For the purposes of this research, major 
attention will be paid to the political aspect of the legal decisions and their assessment in 
terms of democratic reconstruction. 
 
 
2.2. Human rights as a result of political deliberation  
 
Even under the premise (which is still disputable) that human rights inherited its 
ideological base from Western ideology, could be claimed that all post-communist 
countries have imitated the Western model in their democratic reconstruction? Which role 
does the domestic context play? Is Western liberalism the same in any given country or it is 
modified due to the necessities and special features of any given society? 
The claim about universality of any legal concept was strongly contested by 
international scholars. Debates on universality of rights present constant failure on 
common reliance on the scope, content, language and philosophical basis of universal 
rights.  
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These rights are far from being absolute, and, as Koskenniemi claims:  
 “rights depend on their meaning and force on the presence of institutions, 
histories and cultures, of people thinking in broadly similar ways about matters social and 
political. Freedom of speech is dependent on the systems of political decision-making and 
public information that prevails in society. Freedom of speech is dependent on the systems 
of political decision-making and public information that prevail in society. Freedom of 
contract is limited by the conditions of the actually existing market. Rights protect 
autonomy but autonomy is possible only if society offers collective goods. In a society that 
offers no choices, autonomy is meaningless. The availability of collective goods, however, 
in a pure issue of political value; of struggle and compromise between alternative views 
about what a good society would be like. […] No right is “given”; a right is what one is due 
as a result of political deliberation. However, this is what rights tried to avoid. It was 
precisely because politics seemed to degenerate into a struggle for the advancement of 
particular interests that rights were introduced to protect those in weaker positions. If 
rights are a function of social arrangements, then this point is lost. They become just one 
more policy among others.”320  
Following the premise that no right is “given” and that the amount of guarantees 
and human rights always depends on political deliberation, the democratic system seems 
very fragile. Existence of the above mentioned (see chapter 2.1. The model of democracy) 
features of democracy such as political representation, free markets and human rights 
guarantees doesn’t exhaust the meaning of the democratic society and the rule of law. 
Institutionally, stable democratic institutions and laws do not automatically guarantee their 
correct functioning. Formal institutions determine the foundational choice of the regime, 
but such notions as rule of law require more detailed discernment. They cannot be 
measurement simply by the existence of democracy’s most basic features. A wide range of 
legal structures are compatible with the liberal and democratic systems. But variations 
between legal structures could have huge consequences for power relations in the state and 
life of the society in general. As Karl Klare explained:   
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 “Therefore, the process of articulating the new legal orders will continuously reopen 
foundational questions regarding the character of the democracy under construction. And 
decision-makers go about giving legal content to the foundational ideals of representation, 
markets and rights, they will be permanently and inescapably engaged in making significant 
political choices. 
It follows that the ideal of a neutral and depoliticized (“autonomous”) rule of law is 
misconceived and cannot supply the philosophical underpinning of post-communist 
transition, at least in the way the rule of law ideal has traditionally been understood. 
Because law and politics are inescapably linked, the traditional view of the rule of law is 
inadequate to the problems of democratic legal reconstruction.”321 
This inescapable link between law and politics makes the post-communist 
democratic reconstruction more complex. During the transitional period, lawyers played a 
major role – their decisions established new legislation, institutions, the ways of non-
violent dispute resolution and functional provisions for post-communist society. But their 
choices were never determined beforehand and they took form as a result of social 
deliberation. Different problems and legal aspects were very complicated in the transitional 
society in all spheres, and there was not a model which could merely be transplanted; a lot 
of details need to be worked out to face the needs of a post-communist country. The 
question is how much of the historic project of constructing democracy is oriented to the 
needs of society and in strengthening the rule of law rather than to a random political 
situation or consensus which is far from being an etalon of higher values in the promotion 
of human rights? It is essential to study the political aspect of legal regulation in order to 
avoid a technical approach. This aspect will be analyzed further in order to measure the 
democratic transitions in post-communist Russia.  
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3. Juridical libertarism of V.Nersesyants: from socialism to democracy 
 
The author of original concept of libertarism was Vladik Nersesyants, Soviet and 
later Russian legal scholar. Initially he formulated his theory in the 1970s in his article “Law 
and legislature: defining and correlation” which was refused for publishing in the leading legal 
journal “Soviet state and law” due to criticism about the shallow relation of his theory to the 
acknowledged classical Marxian provisions. However, Nersesyants’ views on the problems 
of redefining law were still included for publication due to his participation in the Soviet 
Academy of Science’s symposium on the Institute of state and law. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Nersesyants elaborated his theory on the basis of the initial premises 
where he detailed the path from socialism to a new democratic legal order. 
The core premise on which the legal conception of libertarism is based is the 
division of law in a strictly positivist sense and legality as a legal order. Nersesyants wrote 
that it is absolutely wrong to agree with the claim that the existence of Soviet socialistic 
legislation necessarily creates Soviet socialistic law. He insisted that legislation (or law in a 
positive sense as written norms and ordinances) existed in the Soviet Union but this in fact 
didn’t create law itself since law in terms of legality prescribes the necessary conditions of 
individual freedom and equality under the law. Nersesyants went on to call Soviet 
socialistic legislation as the “illusion of historical scale, when totalitarian illegal legislation is 
interpreted as “socialistic law”.322  
Nersesyants explained that this misunderstanding and perception of totalitarian 
legislation as law became possible because of the absence of clear specific description of 
what law in a classical sense really meant and implied. Consequently, it became impossible 
to specify the illegal character of some official legal acts and legislation. It created the 
situation when criticism was impossible because any act by the communist party was a priori 
correct and the only possible position of lawyers was “uncritical apologetic positivism”.323 
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Nersesyants explains that due to the distinction of the notions of law in a strictly positivist 
sense and legality libertarism makes it possible to circumnavigate illegal Soviet concepts of 
“socialistic law” and define ways towards the legal democratic order. This is a core premise 
of the distinction of law in a strictly positivist sense and legality. Nersesyants explained it 
accordingly: 
“The distinction of the legality and law in positivist sense [as written from a 
normative base] as a theoretical construction has two main functions: evaluation and 
explanation. The essence of evaluation is in the characteristics of law [as a written norm] as 
legal or illegal prescription. In this process legality acts as a main criterion for the 
evaluation of the legal or illegal character of law, its value and correlation to its main 
functions etc. The importance of such an evaluation consists of its conceptual character: 
since this evaluation is provided not from random, unnecessary or non-binding position, 
but from the point of view of legality – something necessary and unconditional. In other 
words, in its evaluative relation to law, legality is seen as concentrated expression of all its 
requirements, without which law couldn’t be seen as law: law which doesn’t correspond to 
legality is arbitrariness. The evaluative function of the distinction of law and legality is 
strictly correlated with their interpretative function and is based on it. The prescriptions for 
law (“what law must be like?) represent exclusively the consequences of relative 
interpretation of legality (“what is legality?”)”.324 
Nersesyants claimed the necessity of upbringing legal thinking for scholars in a way 
that was independent from state will, seeing in it a fundamental condition for developing 
the term legality as an unconditional source of principles and evaluation of laws: 
“For legal thinking, law is not only arbitrary and subjective governmental order, but 
it is something objective and independent, which possesses its own (independent from the 
will of the state) nature, its essence and specifics, in other words – it has its own principles. 
In other words these principles are the principles of formal equality, which expresses the 
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essence and specifics of law and makes distinction in it from other social phenomena, 
norms and regulations.”325  
Nersesyants analyses what law and legality really mean in order to elaborate an 
objective criteria: 
“Law is the perspective of libertarism is an expression of the sense and principle of 
the freedom of individuals, and following this premise the initial foundation and essential 
feature of any law. So, this [freedom of individuals] is just a necessary minimum for 
existence of law, without this feature law in general, and legality itself, could not exist.”326 
This way libertarism defines the socialistic law as unlawful since it doesn’t have an 
essential foundation for any law that enshrines formal equality and freedom of individuals. 
Nersesyants highlights that fact that criticism provided by the concept of libertarism has as 
its important function a scientific platform. This correspondingly tries to explain and figure 
out the necessary and essential foundations which can be used to construct Russian society 
in order to overcome any unlawful situation that arises out of socialistic law and 
subsequently creates a new legislature. Nersesyants explains the scientific role of 
libertarism: 
“A very important feature of libertarism is that from its perspective it is possible to 
highlight those objective conditions which make the existence of law 
possible. …Libertarism provides a theoretical foundation for the necessary exit from the 
social and historic frames of socialism.”327 
Nersesyats claims that socialism was in its essence a form of totalitarianism which 
denied all forms of legality in a true sense in exchange for dictatorship of proletariat. That, 
he says, excluded the possibility of development of the state in a democratic way, and what 
is more importantly, excluded the existence of concepts which could evaluate dictatorial 
legal orders as illegal: 
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“Totalitarianism in all its variations and expressions is the denial of sovereignty of 
state and exchange of state forms and objective legal norms for other extraordinary, based 
on violation… political structures, institutes and norms. Totalitarianism compensates its 
humane inferiority by vain, predominantly verbal, constructions and forms, which imitate 
state legal order. […] A totalitarian system of real socialism is incompatible with the 
freedom, law in a true sense and legality. So called “withering away of state and law in 
“total communism”, which was foreseen by Marxism-Leninism, was in fact the denial of 
real lawful state institutions and norms (including the principle of the division of state 
powers) and exchange for proletarian-communist dictatorship. Real political power was 
totally in the hands of the communist party, and all other semi-state institutions 
(representative, executive and judicial) were superficial and completely dependent on the 
decisions of the party.”328  
The progeny of Nersesyants’ ideas is Vladimir Chetvernin. In his thesis on 
individual freedom as a foundation for the existence of legality, he explained the 
functioning of the state: 
“Juridical libertarism claims that law and the state are necessary forms of freedom: 
legal norms – are normatively formulated freedom, and state is a powerful organization 
which provides this freedom. The sense of state regulation is to set up such socially 
obligatory norms and order, which will make freedom for every member of society 
possible (freedom for all individuals who admitted to be a subject of law and state in 
certain historical epoch).”329 
Underpinning such ideas of freedom for the individual, the necessity of a definition 
of law which is not dependent on state will were clearly determined by the historical 
circumstances of the transition period from socialism to a democratic legal order. Legal 
scholarship saw the necessities of society in the transitional period and provided the 
answers to the most crucial questions which post-socialist Russia faced. These were the 
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answers about the necessity of educating and upbringing of the democratic and legal order 
in a true sense on values and principles. O. Vlasova reflecting on the essence of 
Nersesyants’s concept, added: 
“Philosophical type of legal thinking oriented on defining the essence of legality as 
criteria for the evaluation of legal character of law and legal quality of ius naturale, has its 
advantages in comparison with strictly positive or natural legal approaches. And, perhaps, it 
is not an accident that the most logical version of philosophical way of legal thinking – 
juridical conception of libertarism – was formed particularly in Russia, where necessity in 
critical evaluation of law making and executive state practice from the part of society is 
extremely high.”330 
Vlasova highlights the fact that libertarism as a concept was formulated with a 
strong orientation towards state and social reality, which determined its philosophical and 
practical character. The philosophical orientation in legal thinking played an important role 
in formulating new principles of legality. 
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4. Transitions of 1993. The Constitutional crisis.  
4.1. The premises of the conflict  
 
 
1990 to 1992 was a period of a serious conflict between the legislative power and 
the President, which had serious consequences for the Russian state. The political situation 
in the early years after the collapse of the USSR was dictated by the constitutional 
formation of the new Russian state. The Soviet Constitution of 1978 did not make 
provisions for the establishment of democratic authorities and it was only with the 
executive powers that democracy was able to be realized. The first years of post-
communist transformations were full of legal and legislative contradictions which provoked 
a serious state conflict. 
 The government was formed directly by the President with all candidates being 
appointed through his direct order. It was through the same executive order of the 
president that the governance of the state was carried out. None of these measures 
complemented the old Soviet Constitution of 1978 which was legally in force at that time, 
because that did not have any norms on the formation of Presidential power. Such 
measures, which could be seen as unconstitutional, were justified as being a critical 
necessity to overcome the old soviet system of governance. The old Constitution of 1978 
did not contemplate the division into legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It stated 
that the main government power was The Congress of People's Deputies, the main Soviet 
authority, which officially consisted of 1068 deputies, most of whom were elected in the 
general election on 4 March 1990 – the first relatively free parliamentary election in Russia 
since 1917. Despite the fact that elections were proclaimed free, 86% of the deputies 
elected were from the Communist Party. Other parties apart from the Communists were 
legally allowed to participate in the elections but due to poor organization, they were 
unable to win any significant powers. The Congress of People’s Deputies assembled 
together 2-3 times a year, and during the periods between the Congresses, all powers were 
at the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR (legislative, executive and control governmental body of 
RSFSR). The Supreme Soviet had as large of a range of the power as the Congress of 
People’s Deputies, and even Government was subordinate to the Supreme Soviet RSFSR. 
The Congress had the ability to pass laws by majority, which then had to be signed by the 
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President (with no right to veto until July 1991). The Congress held the ultimate power in 
the country (that is, power to decide on "any questions within jurisdiction of the Russian 
Federation") and some of the most-important powers including the passage of any 
amendment to the Constitution, approval of the Prime Minister of Russia and the holders 
of the highest public offices, the selection of the members of the committee of 
constitutional supervision. These issues, as well as the appointment of judges of 
Constitutional Court since 1991, declaration of referendums, and impeachment of the 
president, were exclusive powers of Congress, exercised solely by it. 
   While the Presidential institution was gaining more power, it was creating a dual-
power between it and Supreme Soviet RSFSR. It was possible due to the situation of 
doubling the same function’s and the lack of a legislative division. In the beginning, this 
dual power wasn’t striking, especially when President had the support of the majority of 
the People’s deputies. In a sense, the political course was divided, but essentially unified. 
With the further development of the unpopular economic reforms and increasing social 
tensions, the Supreme Soviet and President had serious conflicts. In Moscow and other 
Russian cities, between January and February of 1992, meetings were being organized by 
people who were for the return to the old Soviet system of the governance. Such meetings 
often resulted in violent armed conflicts. The growing violence acted as a catalyst in the 
conflict between legislative and executive powers.  
In December 1992, the VII Congress of People’s Deputies was agreed that 
President was responsible for the decrease in industrial production and in increase in the 
poverty of the people. Another reason for conflict and non-coordination between 
Parliament and President was the question of the adoption of the new Constitution. The 
President was insisting on the adoption of a new Constitution which would proclaim 
RSFSR as a Presidential Republic. Parliament was seeing the situation in the other way, 
pushing for the renovation the old Constitution of 1978 with necessary amendments, but 
making the RSFSR the Soviet Republic with limited credentials to the President. Request of 
the President to make a referendum on this important question was refused by the 
Parliament.  
The president's response was tragic. On 20 March 1993, The President addressed 
the Russian people in a televised speech and stated that the actions of the Congress of 
 157  
 
People’s Deputies were unconstitutional and took the responsibility for the further 
development of the political situation. He proclaimed the necessity of the public state 
referendum and presented the people with the question of who could better lead the 
country: The President or The Congress of People’s Deputies? 
On 26 March 1993, The Congress of the People’s Deputies had an unscheduled 
meeting in response to the Presidents television speech and they considered the possibility 
of attempting a coup d’etat. It tried to divest from authority the President but it didn’t 
succeed. With 2/3 of the votes was taken a decision of staying the current President and 
agreed on making a public referendum with a question to the population of Russian 
Federation about further development of the state.  
Crisis of the powers ended on another compromise. The President refused from 
his television speech and agreed with the Congress about the questions asked on the 
referendum. On the 25 of April 1993, a public referendum had taken place. From the 
beginning of the organization of the referendum there were a lot of debate about its 
political significance and obligatory character of the results because the current legislation 
didn’t give the answer on that question. The current legislation determined that answer if 
the results of the referendum would be obligatory or it will be just interpretation of the will 
of the people. It was the social opinion that the result of the referendum would be 
interpreted by both political parties to be in their own favor since there was no clear 
answer to how the results should be interpreted. There were four questions asked: “Do you 
trust president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin?”, “Do you agree on the social 
politic which carry out President of the Russian Federation and Government of the 
Russian Federation from 1992?”, “Do you think if pre-term elections of the President of 
Russian Federation are necessary?”, and “Do you think elections of People’s Deputies of 
Russian Federation are necessary?”  
The results of the referendum were surprising for all political parties. The Anti-
reformist forces lost this battle. The major part of the people who took part in the 
referendum (58.7%) supported the current President, agreed on social politics which they 
were carrying out (53.0%), and requested pre-term elections of the People’s Deputies 
(67.2%).  
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After the publication of the results of the referendum, R.I.Khasbulatov, The 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Congress of People’s Deputies, proclaimed the 
results as illegitimate because they stated, referencing the old soviet legal norm, that the 
referendum could be legitimate only if the certain decision was voted by more than 50% of 
all registered voters, which was almost impossible. The President on the other hand, 
viewed the referendum as his triumph because he was insisting on the norms which were 
adopted for all other elections: the decision should be considered taken, if for that voted 
more than 50% of the people taking part in the referendum.331 
 
4.2. The bifurcation point in the Russian history 
 
 
The political situation caused strikes and conflicts between allies of The Supreme 
Soviet and allies of President. The country was in a serious risk of a civil war. On the 29th 
of April 1993 in a meeting of Heads of the republics of the Russian Federation, the Heads 
of Kray, Oblast, Moscow, and Saint-Petersburg, (all entities of the Russian Federation), 
President Boris Yeltsin for the first time spoke of the idea of the Constitutional Council as 
a body for elaboration of the text for a new Constitution. The old Constitution of 1978 
didn’t give answers to many of the striking problems of the period on the economic 
reform, and it also created a lot of antagonisms because it consisted of a lot of 
amendments which weren’t corresponding together. According to some experts, the 
political crisis was determined by the legal constitutional reasons because the legislation 
was missing a lot of necessary legal concepts332.  By that time, B.Yeltsin was already the 
Chairman of the Constitutional Commission which has founded in 1990 by the Supreme 
Soviet. But he didn’t want to be guided by its work and began working on preparing the 
text of the new Constitution. One of the reasons for this was that, being dependent on the 
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Congress of People’s Deputies, this Commission prepared the text of the new Constitution 
with state order as Parliament Republic, what didn’t correspond to the expectations of the 
President to make a new Russian State a Presidential Republic. Also, the President was 
making plans to attract a large range of different social groups for working on a new text of 
law – federal state governmental bodies, legislative and executive powers of entities of 
Russian Federation, local governments, political parties, Academy of Sciences, religious 
confessions, which were invited to enter into the new Constitutional Council for the 
discussion.333 Constitutional Council was opened in the Kremlin on the 5th of June 1993. 
By the 12th of July 1993, the Constitutional Council presented its draft of the new 
Constitution. At the same time, the Supreme Soviet published its draft and began sending it 
to the Heads of the entities of the Russian Federation. The conflict between the President 
and Supreme Soviet intensified. It was not only a disagreement on the adoption of the 
Constitution, but also on other issues such as monetary policy, privatization, and economic 
reforms. As commentator described it in August of 1993, “The President issues decrees as 
there is no Supreme Soviet, and Supreme Soviet issues decrees as there is no President” 
(Izvestiya, 13 August 1993)334. 
Political crisis finally led to the armed conflict of the supporters of President and 
Supreme Soviet on the 3-4 of October 1993. The conflict intensified when the President 
asked the Congress of People Deputies to leave the building of the White House, implying 
by this, the termination of its authorities. When the Congress of People’s Deputies refused 
to leave the building, their lines of telephone communication, hot water, and electricity 
were cut off. The Russian Orthodox Church and its Head Patriarch Alexiy II tried to act as 
mediators and to lead to an agreement between the two parties. Representatives of the 
President and of the Congress were to meet at the Saint Daniel Monastery for negotiations. 
Yeltsin accepted the offer, but the Congress’s representatives demanded the electricity be 
put on before they will say their answer, R.Khasbulatov (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
of the Congress of People’s Deputies) and A.Rutskoi (Vice-President) in a provocative 
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manner announced the necessity of the civil opposition to Yeltsin’s “illegal and dictatorial” 
decrees. So, even the Church’s mediation did not help to improve the situation335. 
Neither the public nor the military took any actions to respond to the rebel from 
the Congress. People understood the evident danger of public disorders. Extremist right-
wing communists were the only ones who took to the streets and began to attack the law 
enforcement officers. The police force, were instructed to avoid the provocation, weren’t 
equipped to deal with the rioters. On October 3rd, demonstrators from the side of 
Supreme Soviet stormed the Mayor’s House and tried to storm the Ostankino television 
Center (the main Mass-Media Center), trying to have an opportunity for a television speech 
for the representatives of the Congress of People’s Deputies. There were casualties from 
the both parts. 
The army, which had initially declared its neutrality, by Yeltsin's orders, stormed the 
White House in the early morning hours of October 4 using tanks. Captain Gennady 
Zakharov, who knew the White House’s layout, offered a plan of attack. Ten tanks were to 
open fire on the upper floors of the White House to minimize the human casualties and to 
create panic and confusion among the people inside.  
Special military units Alpha and Vympel were to storm the building after the tank 
shelling, but unit Alpha, wishing to act legally, refused to take part in the storm without an 
order from the Constitutional Court. They refused their orders even after a personal 
meeting with the President, considering the direct order of the President as illegal without 
the consent of the Constitutional Court. But the situation developed unexpectedly - while 
Alpha units were patrolling the area, Alpha’s lieutenant was killed by the sniper’s shot. This 
dramatically changed the mood of Alpha which instantly agreed for the storm. As the news 
of the loss of the member spread through the Alpha, all members reported to the President 
they are ready to storm the White House336. 
By mid-afternoon of 4 October, after the storm and tank shelling, the White House 
was captured by Presidential troops. All leaders of the resistance were arrested (but later in 
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1994 all of them were amnestied by the State Duma of the Russian Federation). 4 October 
is the day when, due to these event, the Soviet power was overthrown after 76 years of the 
government. There was a radical change of the state system: before the adoption of a new 
Constitution the Russian Federation was proclaimed Presidential Republic, after the 
adoption of the Constitution in 1993, it was declared the Presidential-Parliamentary 
Republic.  
Yeltsin won but with a high price. The ten-day conflict became the deadliest single 
event of street fighting in Moscow's history since the revolutions of 1917. According to 
government estimates, 145 people were killed in the two days of violence and estimates 
from non-governmental sources and press suggest the number of deaths as high as 1500337. 
The situation of 3-4 October still remains a contentious topic of political and moral 
debate in the Russian society. Moscovites and Russians throughout the country were 
hoping on a peaceful resolution of the conflict. People were horrified by the merciless of 
the shelling on the White House in the center of Moscow. Photos after shelling of the 
White House and tanks near it were published widely, showing the brute force regardless 
of who had started the confrontation and were not agree for the mediation338. On one 
hand, the critical situation demanded harsh decisive actions, but on the other – human 
victims still remains a very painful part of that period. Thus, a conflict can escalate 
dramatically if it cannot be resolved through rules, procedures, negotiations, or 
compromise. 
The reaction of Western politicians and the Chancellor of Germany Kohl’s 
assessment of the brute force were correct. Kohl himself and all Western leaders rallied 
around Yeltsin, agreeing that under the circumstances there was no other way to get Russia 
out of its intractable political crisis. 
On the 12th of December 1993, the All-Russian referendum was adopted the new 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. The state order was determined as mixed 
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Presidential-Parliamentary Republic. New legislative state body became the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation consisting of two houses – Federal Council and State 
Duma. 
Events that took place in 1993 showed how the first signs of democracy and legal 
state reconstruction in Russia were uncertain. But still it showed that the ideas of 
democracy instead of the old socialistic regime were relatively strong – that was the most 
important aspect which predetermined the further development of the situation. The 
Constitutional crisis of 1993 laid the basis for institutional establishment of democracy in 
post-communist Russia. 
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5. The institutional components of the democracy  
5.1. Judicial reform in Russia of 1991  
 
 
 
In October 1991, the Supreme Council of the People’s Deputies adopted the 
“Conception of judicial reform” presented by President Boris Yeltsin, which marked the 
beginning of democratic transformation of judiciary. It was a period of establishing new 
state order after the collapse of USSR and the formation of an independent judicial 
authority, free from political and ideological influences, independent in its activities from 
the executive and legislative authorities. The importance of judicial reform was obvious for 
all political forces since a new democratic state cannot effectively function without an 
independent and competent law court based on a rule of law. 
The period of formation of the new state order was not simple. Civil institutes were 
not developed and could not make a strong opposition to the political forces. Due to the 
Soviet legacy, the judicial system was seen as part of common “law-enforcement machine”, 
which was connected with common aims with other law-enforcement authorities, such as 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prosecutor’s Office, and State Security Service. The main 
aim of all of these authorities was fighting crime, and the role of the court in this chain of 
“common fight” was to legally finish the process of punishment of the criminals339. That 
role of the justice was officially proclaimed in the Soviet doctrine. The Chairman on Justice 
of the Council of People’s Deputies, Krylenko N.V., stated that, “correct and 
corresponding to the proletariat interests’ functioning of the court and judicial system 
could be guaranteed only if there is systematic and daily managing of it from the part of 
directing authority on every case which happens.”340  The Judiciary was not considered to 
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be independent - on the state level it was just “an instrument of the state”341. In that way, 
any attempt of the court to modify the state accusation or to try to examine the case was 
seen as an obstacle of exercising the justice. But in fact, with the judge being weak in his 
authority, he had no other way than to agree with the recommendations of the state 
prosecutor. One of the aims of the judicial reforming was to set up new approaches to the 
functioning of the judiciary and its principles. 
For the purposes of highlighting the most efficient ways of reforming the judicial 
system, there was a group of leading academics from organized from the Institute of State 
and Law of Academy of USSR and other Research Scientific Institutions. Members of that 
group include such specialists as T.G.Morshyakova, V.M.Kogan, S.B.Bobotov, 
I.B.Mikhailovskaya, S.E.Vitsin, G.F.Hohryakova, O.E. Sokolsky and some others. 
The group was developing reports where the most important and useful legal 
concepts were for the reform of the judicial system for the new post-Soviet Russia. These 
specialists were highlighting weaknesses of the functioning of the judicial system and 
preparing ideas of the most efficient remedies for it, reports had many valuable ideas and 
concepts which were holding together previous experience and necessary perspectives. The 
reports did not have a direct way to the law-making authorities. They were published in 
“Soviet State and law” and “XX century and World” (newspapers) and by this way, it was 
taking attention of the public and authorities. 
But still the concepts of the scientific counsel were adopted by B.A.Zolotuhin – 
who was running the Supreme Council of RSFSR. These ideas were taken to prepare “The 
Conception of judicial reform”, a unique document which fully formed and created a 
judicial system in a state mechanism. “Conception of judicial reform” was the only 
document in post-Soviet Russia adopted in a legislative way which held full detailed plans 
for constructing and maintaining one of the state authorities. It was the common 
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achievement of academics and scientists involved in research and preparing reports and 
law-making authorities of the new Russia342. 
The aim of the Conception was to publicly name the shortcomings which appeared 
in the practice of law-enforcement authorities, determine and formulate the problems 
which are in the system of justice, become sure that the way of separate amendments and 
administrative pressure is not admissible for the overcoming of the critical situations, 
formulate and describe the system of general principles which will be complementing the 
inner nature of the system of the justice and which will become the main indicators during 
forthcoming judicial reform, to offer the concrete legal and organizational measures of the 
progressive reformation of the law-enforcement system in the democratic state, highlight 
the weaknesses of the theoretical support of the judicial reform and found out the needs 
for the working out on the new approaches for the solving of the certain problems. 343  
During elaboration of the concepts of judicial reform two systems were considered 
– American and German one. In the German system, federal courts are higher judicial 
bodies and courts of the “lands” are subordinate. The courts are in a judicial hierarchy and 
all together form one integrated judicial system. The American system has another 
structure: federal courts are authorized to judge cases of federal importance – if case 
interfere with federal Constitution or other federal law, international treaties of US, 
constitutionality of law, disputes between two or more states or cases in which the crime is 
committed on territory of several states. It is the competence of Federal Courts. 
Jurisdiction of Court of the State is connective to legislative of the state. The complexity of 
the American system is that it requires construction of two different systems of the Courts 
– Federal and State, with different jurisdiction and complex interaction between them.344 
                                                          
342    www.ru-90.ru History of the New Russia. Interview with T.G.Morshakova, ex-judge of 
Constitutional Court of Russian Federation (source in Russian), accessed on 14.08.2015 
343   «Концепция судебной реформы» [Conception of the Judicial Reform in RSFSR], Supreme 
Council of RSFSR, 21 October 1991, accessible on 
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=EXP;n=221794 
344 http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jurisdiction.aspx 
Official site of the United States Courts. Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (source in English), accessed 
on 14.08.2015 
 166  
 
Russia is a Constitutional Federation, the state structure established by the 
Constitution and not by the treaty as United Stated. Also, the difficulty of establishing two 
separate systems of the Courts and making them accessible for people, this reasons 
stipulated the choice of the unified judicial system and with hierarchy and federal 
subordination. Unified judicial system was established by the Federal Constitutional law 
“About judicial system in Russian Federation” which was adopted 31 December 1996. All 
courts stabilized by this law are federal. They form the unified integrated system of Federal 
Courts. Only two types of the courts are not federal – Judges of the Peace and 
Constitutional (Ustavniy) Courts of the subjects of Russian Federation. 
 
 
5.2. Judicial system of Russian Federation  
 
 
Conception of the judicial reform became later a frame-law for further Russian 
legislation which formed the existing judicial system: Federal Constitutional Law of 
December 31, 1996 «On the judicial system of the Russian Federation», Federal Law of 
June 26, 1992 «On the Status of the Judges in the Russian Federation», Federal Law «On 
the Justices of the Peace in the Russian Federation» of December 17, 1998. 
In its Article 10 the Constitution establishes that state power in the Russian 
Federation shall be exercised on the base of its division into legislative, executive and 
judicial authority. Bodies of 3 authorities shall be independent. The structure of the judicial 
system of the Russian Federation and the sphere of activities of its various parts are 
determined only by the Constitution and federal constitutional laws (paragraph 3 Article 
118 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). 
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and constitutional courts of the 
republics and other subjects of the Russian Federation are established by the article 125 of 
the Constitution.  The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation decides on 
conformity of the federal laws, normative acts of Russian State bodies and the President of 
the Russian Federation, the Council of the Federation, the State Duma, the Government of 
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the Russian Federation, constitutions of republics, charters and other normative acts of the 
subjects of Russian Federation with the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 125 
of the Constitution). It was a very important legal concept and a great achievement for the 
Russia of that period. During the Soviet period it was impossible to give the legal analysis 
to the laws. Or even doubt if a prescription from government could be unlawful. In 
Constitution of USSR was proclaimed that Supreme Counsel of public deputies (a highest 
law-making authority in USSR) could decide any question and the decision couldn’t be 
challenged or disputed, or appealed. In USSR for many governmental orders there was no 
higher authority for disputes. So, the functions of the Constitutional Court proclaim were 
innovative but necessary for the construction of the new democratic state. It could be 
stated that the history of the development of the Constitutional Court in Russia is an 
evidence of the division of the state powers 3 branches and self-determination of the 
judicial authority itself. Before the existence of the Constitutional Court in the Soviet reality 
there were no legal way to contradict the legislative authority.345  The judicial authority has 
its power when it could have influence and make lawful sentences when law has some 
shortcomings. In the state systems of common law it is a natural function of the courts – 
to create soft law in its decisions. So judges have direct opportunity to influence on the 
laws. In the statutory system of the law, judges cannot create soft law by precedents but 
have other mechanisms of influence on the law making authority and challenging the law 
which are not lawful. The possibility of a control of law-making authority by the judicial 
authority ‘ the one who need to implement the adopted law ‘  is a necessary element for the 
system of “checks and balances”. So, conducting the judicial reform Russian legislative 
systems adopted conceptions unusual for the Russia for that period but necessary for the 
construction of a new democratic state. 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court was held in the situation of historical 
absence of relevant tradition, as the judge of Constitutional Court Tamara Morshakova put 
it: 
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“The development of the Constitutional Court in Russia disproved the diffused 
opinion according to which new legal institutes could be effective only when they appear 
from the relevant historical tradition, when they have certain roots in legal thinking of the 
society and more or less developed legal basis. Established in 1991 the Constitutional 
control did not have this basis. On the contrary, it became a completely foreign institute 
for that system, as much as the system of the division of powers or principles of legality. 
Transformational process at the end of the last century in many countries was 
characterized by the implication of Western practice of democratic development: common 
values of law, including basic human rights guarantees, make it essentially necessary. We 
are talking not about the imitation, but about the use of the effective instruments for the 
protection of the individuals from the arbitrariness of the state power, - this danger 
remains after the Soviet period and could be seen from the Russian experience.”346 
The Constitutional court consists of 19 judges, introduced by the President and 
appointed by the Council of the Federation of the Parliament. The judges must be Russian 
citizens of 40 years old with a degree in law and at least 15 years of experience in legal 
profession. A judge is appointed for 15 years and cannot be reappointed. There are two 
chambers with 9 and 10 judges in each respectively. The chambers consider the majority of 
cases; the most important issues are resolved on the Plenum Session of the Constitutional 
Court. 
Also the “Law of judicial system” established four-level system of the courts of 
general jurisdiction. Three-level system of the military courts is an integral part of it. The 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is the supreme judicial body of this branch.347  
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is the supreme judicial body for all courts of 
general jurisdiction, both civil and military. 
                                                          
346 MORSHAKOVA T.G. “Конституционное правосудие: российское начало” [Constitutional 
judiciary: the Russian beginning] in “Судебное правоприменение в России: о должном и реальном” 
[Judicial implication of laws: about proper and real], Publishing house Valent, Moscow, 2010, p.8 
347   http://www.vsrf.ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=6800 Official homepage 
of the Supreme Court of Russian Federation, accessed on 28.08.2015 
 169  
 
The Supreme Court is at the head of the courts of the general jurisdiction, which 
include civil, criminal and administrative cases. The Supreme Court supervises all 
subordinated courts, including military and specialized courts and gives clarifications on 
issues of judicial practice. It is a cassation instance in relation to the regional courts. The 
Supreme Court acts as a court of the first instance for cases of special public interest. The 
court has the right of legislative initiative, in other words it may introduce a new law to the 
parliament.  
According to Art.128 of the Constitution, judges of the Supreme Court are 
introduced by the president and appointed by the Council of the Federation. A judge of the 
Supreme Court must be a Russian citizen with a law degree and experience in the legal 
profession for 10 years. The organizational structure of the Supreme Court includes the 
head of the court, their deputies, the Plenum, the Presidium, the chambers for civil and 
criminal cases, and the Military Chamber. 
On the second level there are courts of republics, regions, autonomous provinces 
and autonomous districts or federal cities (St. Petersburg and Moscow). These courts act as 
the supervisory body for local courts, examine cases in the order of cassation, by way of 
supervision and upon newly discovered evidence. For certain cases they act as courts of 
first instance. They work in the following composition: presidium of the court, judicial 
panel for civil cases and judicial panel for criminal cases. 
The local courts form the foundation of the system of general jurisdiction: they 
consider the overwhelming majority of civil, criminal cases and cases related to the 
administrative offences. Local courts act as a higher judicial instance for the Justices of 
Peace operating on the territory of the appropriate judicial district. 
Justices of the Peace are judges of the subjects of the Russian Federation and form 
an integral part of the system of courts of general jurisdiction. The reestablishment of the 
institute of Justices of the Peace in Russia in 2000 is an important step in the course of 
development of the judicial and legal reform and provides for more operative and 
accessible judicial protection for the citizens of the country. Judges of the peace have the 
jurisdiction in cases of the first instance of criminal cases with the penalty less than 3 three 
years of prison, divorce and separation of the property, adoption of the child, labour 
disputes, civil disputes where the amount of claim is less than 50 000 rubles (which is 
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around 1600 euros) (Article 3 of the Federal Law 'On the Justices of the Peace in the 
Russian Federation' of December 17, 1998) 
The law entrusts the Justices of the Peace with functions and duties equal for all the 
judges of Russia: to exercise justice observing precisely and strictly the requirements of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized rules, norms and principles of 
the international law and international agreements concluded or joined by the Russian 
Federation. The Justices of the Peace are within the courts of general jurisdiction and 
participate in the work of its bodies. The idea of establishing that kind of jurisdiction was 
to relieve the federal judges and to make the certain types of the cases faster since the 
competence of the Judges of the Peace.  
Three-level system of arbitration courts with the Supreme Arbitration Court of the 
Russian Federation as a supreme judicial body competent to settle commercial disputes and 
other cases considered by arbitration courts, exercise judicial supervision over their 
activities according to the federal law-envisaged procedural forms . It should be noted that 
the name "arbitration court" is misleading as it does not relate to arbitration tribunals but is 
inherited from the Soviet Law. In the USSR any differences between state enterprises could 
be settled by the State Arbitrary, which was a quasi-judicial governmental body. Today the 
term arbitration court" relates to a State court that is competent to hear disputes between 
commercial entities. The system of the arbitration courts comprises: arbitration courts of 
the subjects of the Russian Federation; courts of arbitration districts and the Supreme 
Arbitration Court. The second Level is formed by 10 district courts: Volgo-Vyatsky; East 
Siberian; Far East; West Siberian; Moscow; Volga region; Northwest; North-Caucasian; 
Ural; and Central district. This is made for more guarantees of independence of the justice 
from other state powers.  Because it was considered that in case if court district will be the 
same as the territory of entity (subject) of Russian Federation, it will be easier to unite the 
interests of legislative and executive powers with the judicial authority.  
Another type of specialized courts is the military courts. The main type is the 
military courts of armies, fleets, garrisons and military formations. The middle level of the 
system of military courts consists of military courts of the branches of the Armed Forces, 
military districts, districts of antiaircraft defense, navy and separate armies. 
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For the first time jury trial appeared in Russian in 1864 and lasted till 1917, it was 
revoked legally only in 1922. Jury trial consisted of 12 jury and 3 professional judges. Due 
to the statistics 76% of all criminal cases were examined with jury trial and this made a 
great contribution to the legal education of the people. But this process had also 
controversial effect – some sentences made by jury provoked government to revoke the 
old too harsh laws and review some obsolete legislative basis.  
It was decided to renovate the existence of jury trial since being a very effective 
measure for the increasing of the transparency of the justice, helps to overcome distrust of 
the society to the judicial power and that way to increase the effectiveness of the justice, 
also to improve the quality of the pre-trial investigations. So, the regulations of the jury trial 
in the history of modern Russia were adopted in 1989 in the «Fundamentals of the 
legislation of the USSR and the Soviet Republics about Judiciary», and later adopted in the 
article 123 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and in Federal Constitutional Law 
“On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation” of 1996, categories of the cases which 
could be examined in the proceeding with the jury are in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
It stabilized in a composition of 12 juries and one professional judge. The first jury trial in a 
post-Soviet Russia took place in Saratov in 1993. 
 
 
5.3. Human rights guarantees 
 
 
The establishment of the new state system based on democratic values and the rule 
of law faced complexities connected with the necessity not only to imitate, but to develop 
new legal institutions on the example of foreign experience. Achieving democracy is 
inextricably linked to the high risk that taking decisions could lead directly to a result 
different from the expected one or have a negative effect as an unintended consequence on 
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democracy. Klare wrote: “The initial problem is that many of the most important rights 
concepts are formulated at an exceedingly high level of abstraction. This is because human 
rights concepts tend to be very elastic and open-ended.”348 Reconstructing those human 
rights concepts in the situation of indeterminacy required a lot of effort from the side of 
the lawyers and drafters of the new legal provisions. In post-Soviet Russia the main human 
rights guarantees were formulated in state laws and the Constitution, taking the UN 
Declaration of human rights and International treaties as examples, in order to provide the 
minimum standard of human rights for the citizens of a newly democratic Russia. 
   The new Constitution of the Russian Federation formulated three components of 
democracy – humanitarian (human and civil rights), normative (constitutional legal 
requirements or all sources of law) and institutional (the system of division of powers and 
their correlation).349 
The Russian Constitution proclaims “a democratic federal law-bound State with a 
republican form of government.” (art.1)350 Also, The Russian Federation is a “social state” 
(art.7) and a “secular” one (art.14). In conformity with the art.3, “the bearer of sovereignty 
and the only source of power in the Russian Federation shall be its multinational people.” 
The sovereignty expands on the whole territory of the Russian Federation. And “the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall have supremacy in the whole 
territory of the Russian Federation” (art.4). These basic principles laid foundation for the 
normative formulation of individual human rights and institutional formation for the 
democratic transformation of the society. Those dispositions were qualitatively new for the 
post-Soviet Russia. 
The new Russian democracy was based on the principles of the supreme value of 
the individual rights and freedoms (art.2), division of powers (art.10) and direct application 
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of the Constitutional provisions (art.15).351 Also, equality among the subjects of the Russian 
Federation, state integrity, and “guarantees shall be provided for the integrity of economic 
space, a free flow of goods, services and financial resources, support for competition, and 
the freedom of economic activity” (art.6, 7, 8).  
The new Russian Constitution was adopted in the unique situation of being the 
supreme law in a transitional period, which did not reproduce legal culture or legal 
consciousness of the people, but had another very important role – it had to establish new 
principles of democratic society. Some scholars noticed that feature of law, when law 
represents just a product of people’s consciousness and overall culture of certain society. 
As an example of that phenomenon we can look at any problem which is regulated by 
specific legal provisions. Usually, that adopted legal provision is not the only possible 
solution: with due analysis we can imagine different, alternative solutions. But the reason 
why that exact law was adopted is rooted in deep layers of societal culture and 
expectations, which makes that certain provision the best option among many alternative 
ones due to the complex set of different social trends.352 The Russian Constitution did not 
have that basis in the consciousness of society, and that increased the role of lawyers in 
adopting and elaborating the Constitution to establish the main legal principles. 
An interesting feature of the new Constitution was the formulation on the 
limitation of individual rights. Art.17 of the Constitution set up the guarantees of the 
individual rights which includes not only the Constitution and internal laws but also 
international standards of human rights: “In the Russian Federation recognition and 
guarantees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen according to 
the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and according to the 
present Constitution.” Soviet legal doctrine and practice presumes the priority of the public 
interests upon individual. That meant conflict between the interests of the state and the 
individual person, whereby the interests of the state prevailed since it was proclaimed that 
                                                          
351 NERSESYANTS V. “Преодоление тоталитаризма: путь России к праву” [The overcoming of 
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352 GORDON R. “Law as a Constitutive of Consciousness” in “Critical legal histories”, Stanford Law 
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it is more important to protect the collective rights rather than individual. The new 
democratic regime required the changing of the Soviet paradigm, though the public interest 
is a possible condition for the limitation of individual rights even due to the international 
treaties, that particular Soviet understanding of correlation of public and private was not 
democratic. The limits set up for individual human rights in art.55 of the Constitution 
allowed the limiting ones rights only if they harm or threaten other’s individual rights, and 
were formulated as the following: “The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be 
limited by the federal law only to such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection 
of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and 
lawful interests of other people, for ensuring defense of the country and security of the 
State.” The qualitative change in the understanding of setting up limits to the individual 
rights was that this new provision is based on the premise of the priority of individual 
rights, and public interest could be a condition for limiting, only if it is necessary for the 
protection of the rights, of the individual.353 
Another guarantee for the protection of human rights was the foundation of the 
institute of Ombudsman (High Commissioner for Human Rights), whose duties are aimed 
at monitoring the violations of human rights with the aim of providing the guarantees of 
the protection, informing state bodies about the current situation within the field of human 
rights protection. 
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5.4. The Presidential power 
 
The democratic direction of the post-Soviet state reconstruction provided the 
framework for the institutional formation of the new state order. The principle of the 
division of powers was formulated in art.10 of the Constitution: “The state power in the 
Russian Federation shall be exercised on the basis of its division into legislative, executive 
and judicial power. The bodies of legislative, executive and judicial power shall be 
independent.” Further details about the status of the President of the Russian Federation 
(chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), the Federal Assembly (chapter 5 
of the Constitution), The Government of the Russian Federation (chapter 6) and the 
judicial power (chapter 7) are formulated in certain sections of the Constitution. The 
special feature of the division of powers according to the Russian Constitution is that the 
system of the division of powers is asymmetric and misbalanced – with clear distortion 
towards excessive power of the President.354  
The President, as a guarantor of the Constitution and of the rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen (art.80), has a wide range of the Constitutional rights such as to chair 
meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation, to dissolve the State Duma in 
cases and according to the rules fixed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation (art. 84 
of the Constitution), to suspend acts of the Bodies of executive power of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation (art. 85 of the Constitution). Also, “according to the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation and the federal laws the President of the Russian Federation 
shall determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the State” (art.80 of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation). Since the Constitution provides the main basic 
principles of the state functioning, detailed specification of each state power’s function is 
provided in state laws, but the federal law about the President of the Russian Federation 
has not been adopted yet. That makes a possible a wide-interpretation of the Presidents 
rights in terms of indeterminacy of many Constitutional provisions.   
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As Nersesyants noticed, though the principle of the division of the state powers 
into legislative, executive and judicial, this is clear that the Presidential power is a branch of 
the executive power. But if we see other provisions of the Constitution towards the 
presidents rights it appears to be the forth independent state power, moreover, it appears 
to be superior in comparison to the legislative, executive and judicial.355 So, art.11 of the 
Constitution names the President as an independent state power: “The state power in the 
Russian Federation shall be exercised by the President of the Russian Federation, the 
Federal Assembly (the Council of the Federation and the State Duma), the Government of 
the Russian Federation, and the courts of the Russian Federation.” 
Such phenomena could be explained by historical events – in 1992 when the 
Constitution was drafted, the Constitutional crisis showed that the real power which was 
able to construct the new democratic principles appeared to be the Presidential power. The 
President in a transitional period exercised many duties which were not formulated by the 
law, but were necessary for the complex, post-communist period. The new Constitution 
legalized the rights which already existed de facto. 
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6. The reemergence of civil society  
6.1. The role of civil society in post-communist country   
 
John Gray in his essay “Post-Totalitarianism, Civil society and the Limits of the 
Western Model” agues the widely-held view on the triumph of Western liberalism and 
expectations about the Western model coming into the existence in all the post-communist 
countries. His main argument is that due to the crisis of communist regimes post-Soviet 
countries must have to emerge as civil societies, and need not (and often will not) resemble 
Western liberal democracies. The view is extremely interesting due to the conclusions 
specified above – legal institutions and concepts do not function by themselves. They 
always require historical, political and social context. Is that a degree of reemergence of 
civil society which determine the democratization of post-communist countries? 
What is civil society? The notion of the civil society was a subject of such great 
masters such as Hobbes, Lock, Hegel, Tocqueville, Paine, Gramsci and many others. On of 
the common features of the understanding of the civil society relevant for the present 
research might be highlighted in the following way: “civil society is a historically evolved 
form of society that presupposes the existence of a space in which individuals and their 
associations compete with each other in the pursuit of their values.”356 
Gray’s conclusion about the achievement of the reemergence of the civil society in 
the post-Soviet countries is not a positive one: “Romania and Bulgaria, though in the 
medium term they are likely to become so, are not yet genuinely post-totalitarian, since they 
are ruled by neo-Bolshevik cliques which have not permitted the reemergence or 
reconstruction of the institutions necessary for civil life. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland all appear authentically post-totalitarian, and probably irreversibly so. The most 
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intriguing case is that of the Soviet Union itself. It cannot be affirmed that a civil society 
has emerged, full blown anywhere in the Soviet Union.”357 
Gray argues that it is important to abandon the model of contemporary Western 
democracy and return to the conceptions of civil society, since it would be a proper index 
of the democratic reconstruction in society. The same tendency was described by Paolo 
Grossi, emphasizing the crisis of law and its increasing political character. He insists on the 
necessity of “less state, and more society”, which means that only civil society could 
successfully manage the whole variety of problems and complex issues rather than state 
bodies which are influenced by political interests.358 And as Gray wrote: “Civil society and 
liberal democracy need not and often do not go together, and that the most decisive 
phenomenon in the collapse of communism is not the adoption of democratic governance, 
but rather the emergence of civil life.”359 This is a qualitatively different premise from the 
one which was analyzed above – the measurement of democracy in post-communist 
society due to the assessment of the construction of the institutions and other different 
components of the democracy. Gray offers to measure the democratic transformation 
against the development of civil society.  Further will be provided an insight into the 
institutional foundations of the civil society in Russia. 
 
6.2. Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights  
 
The foundational principles of the civil society are formulated in the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation in the provisions about recognition and equal protection of the 
private, state, municipal and other forms of ownership (art.8). 
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Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights or just “Presidential 
Council for Human Rights” as it sometimes mentioned in the press (hereinafter – Council), 
is a state governmental body which carry out advisory functions for the President in order 
to help to the President to exercise his constitutional obligation being “the guarantor of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and of human rights and freedoms.” (Art. 80, the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation). For this purpose Council informs the President 
on human rights situation in Russia, contributes to the development of the civil society 
institutes, and prepares reports on the topics which are on the Council’s terms of reference. 
Apart of this activity, Council prepares projects for President on a large number of 
different topics connected with the human rights: collaboration with Human rights NGOs, 
development of the institutes of civil society, coordination of the activity of the human 
rights organizations between themselves and state bodies, developments of the 
mechanisms of control of the human rights activities, international collaboration in sphere 
of human rights defense. 
Another duty of the Council is to analyze the claims of people, companies and 
other legal entities on violation of human rights. This list of the functions is not limited – 
Council could make any other activity or work on the questions asked by the President.  
The legal basis of the Council is Executive Order of the President № 120 from 
01.02.2011г. “On Presidential Council for civil society and human rights”. 
Council was founded on 26 September 1993 by the Executive Order of the first 
President of Russia Boris Yeltsin and was called a Human rights Commission.  
From 1993-1995 the Head of the Council was S.A.Kovalev (leading human rights 
activist). From 1996-2002 the Head became V.A.Kartashkin (academics in international 
public law). Later, due to the Executive Decree of the President from 06.11.2004 № 1417 
– Commission on Human rights was transformed into the Council on development for the 
civil society and human rights and its Head from 2002 till 2010 became Ella Aleksandrovna 
Pamfilova.  
In 2010 Mikhail Fedotov has been appointed Chairman of the Presidential Council. 
In 2011 by the initiative of the Council the new Rules of Council on development of the 
civil society and human rights were adopted. The main purpose of the new document was 
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to form the existing Council as a unique state body – collective Council of the President 
and make wider the range of the question which was in the jurisdiction of the Council. Due 
to this scope a lot of new members from representatives of the civil society which are the 
specialists in a lot of spheres new for the Council. These changes were agreed and adopted 
by the President in 2011 and nowadays Council consists of 61 members, which are leading 
Russian lawyers, academics and also representatives of civil society.360 
Work in the Counsel is a kind of “civil duty”, members are not paid or don’t have 
any other privileges from it. All work is made on a good will of the members. It is very 
important because this guarantees independence and liberty from the state power, more 
objective activity of it and makes less possibility for the influence on the members from 
state.  
All documents (reports to the President, recommendations and other) which are 
made by Council itself or any groups of its members are published and could be found on 
the official website of the Council. 
Its functions are realized by informing president on the situation in the sphere of 
human rights on the territory of Russian Federation and abroad. For this purpose experts 
of the Council prepare reports on different topics on the current most relevant issues 
connected to the situation with the human rights. All reports are published and are open to 
public access.  
 Also, a very important function of the Council is to prepare civil expertise of the 
projects, laws, judicial decisions and other legal acts of the state which are connected to the 
situation with the human rights. On the legal basis of that expertise also recommendations 
to the President are prepared if a certain legal act harm some or any aspect of human 
rights. To conduct such expertise Council invite experts (leading professionals in a 
necessary sphere) who make their conclusions on the topic. Such invited experts make 
their work on a good will and not paid as well as other members of the Council.   
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The lawfulness of this function of Presidential Council was doubted by Presidium 
of the Supreme Council of the Judges: they have sent a conversion to the Constitutional 
Court to clear out if expert comments and evaluation of the judicial decisions could be 
made by any state body since this function is exclusively delegated to the Constitutional 
Court. Supreme Council of the judges had apprehensions that activity of the Presidential 
Council on monitoring judicial decisions interferes in the guaranteed of independence of 
the judges and could influence in certain cases on the realization of the justice361. 
These doubts were reflected in a public letter of Chairman of the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation V.D.Zorkin on the question about lawfulness of the 
monitoring and expert’s report about cases with deep public resonance: “that experts’ 
reports should be seen in the contest of the legal nature of the judicial authority and judicial 
independence […] Independence of the judicial power is a fundamental value of any 
democratic state. But this value doesn’t mean isolation and non-transparency of the judicial 
authority. Transparency of the judicial authority as one of the principles chosen for its 
future development362, means not only making bigger access to the information about work 
and activity of the courts, but also possibility of the public reaction on it. Such reaction due 
to the complex structure of the civil society could be expressed from different social 
groups, even from the representatives of the legal entities.”363  He wrote that:  
«The credentials of the judges are directly connected with their responsibility, what 
means their accountability to the society. Judicial authority, having its power delegated to it 
from the society, needs special guarantees for non-intervention to the justice. 
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That is why there are the low possibilities of the control of the judicial authority by 
other state powers, for this reason social control takes a special role. From the other side, 
such public attention is one more guarantee which prevents the wrong administrative 
pressure on the court. Being one of the forms of connection between society and juridical 
power, social reaction on the judicial decisions on the exact cases as well as existing 
practice on certain groups of the cases, cannot be limited from the point of view of the 
analysis of such cases and its evaluation, even made in a public way… Otherwise, it will 
lead to the absolute absence of the dialogue with the society, isolation of the judicial 
authority, coming back to the medieval principal that “King is never wrong”. Especially in 
such important resonance cases where there is the possibility that fundamental human 
rights could be violated – rights on life, right to the private liberty and physical 
inviolability364. History shows to us, that that absence of the connection of the judicial 
authority with the society could cause the situations where a person finds himself lonely in 
the fight with all the power of the state mechanism without any means of influence or 
control on it». 
Due to the opinion of the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, «Society and its 
groups will always have right to discuss judicial sentences. Because increase of the trust to 
the judicial power is one of the most effective condition of its normal functioning, so it 
should be considered that such trust depends on how much the judicial decisions are 
understandable to the public. For the judicial authority evaluation of its work in public 
opinion expressed by the means of discussion, publications, expert evaluation should be an 
important index of the level of the confidence to the judicial authority in the society.»365 
At the end of the letter V.D.Zorkin agrees on the consultative competence of the 
Presidential Council which does not have any obligatory consequences for the court. 
Council makes monitoring only in the frames of civil control on judiciary. And it could 
choose its own opinion on the most resonance cases for the monitoring and bring the 
President’s attention to it. 
                                                          
364   Guaranteed by the art.20, 22 of the Constitution of Russian Federation 
365 Conversion to the Chairman of the Constitutional Courts of the Russian Federation V.D.Zorkin 
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7. Russian approaches to human rights 
 
The Soviet understanding of law had its unique patterns due to the political, 
cultural and social contexts in the reality of the construction of communism. The claim 
about existence of new Soviet law formulated by P. Stuchka explained the phenomenon, 
when Soviet lawyers invented new legal notions or just called different things by the same 
words as used in the universal legal doctrine:  
“Moreover, sometimes on purpose and sometimes unconsciously, the Soviets 
meant different things by the same words as used in the West. For example, the Soviet 
constitution of 1977 established that all 15 Soviet republics were ‘sovereign’ even though 
all competence in foreign relations, and not only that, belonged to Moscow. Although in 
terms of peoples’ rights, the Soviet proclamation of the right of peoples to self-
determination and even ‘sovereignty’ may have been a step forward compared to the 
Tsarist period, this was still not the way the notion of ‘sovereignty’ was understood in the 
West. What the Bolsheviks eventually seem to have meant, was: peoples formerly part of 
the Russian Empire could have their sovereignty and self-determination but only under the 
guidance of Moscow. In any case, only in 1991 did Soviet international law scholars start to 
admit that Soviet republics had not actually been ‘sovereign’ at all. The Soviets also 
understood the political world outright differently, e.g. when the leading Soviet 
international law scholar Grigory Ivanovich Tunkin (1906–93) wrote that socialist 
democracy was a ‘new, higher form of democracy’. Such a thing, if meant seriously, could 
only be argued from the perspective of an utterly different thought world.”366 
However, after the collapse of the USSR in the academic scholarship the interest in 
the research of post-communist Russia declined drastically. It was more prominent to study 
the Soviet law at the time of Cold War rather than the study of post-Soviet Russia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.367 It was noticeable, for instance, from the input of the search 
in leading Western libraries – vast number of various materials on Soviet law and 
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international treaties and relatively few on post-Soviet Russian studies.368 This position was 
developed due to the Fukuyama’s predictions about the “end of the history”. Predominant 
view was that post-Soviet Russian will not continue its trend of “otherness” and that it will 
plainly join the Western liberal tradition. The expectations were that after the ideological 
defeat of the Marxism-Leninism the uniqueness of the Soviet legal thinking will disappear. 
Nonetheless, those expectations did not come true – the predominant view is that Russia 
had kept its tradition in legal thinking and understanding of law.369   
Even in the academic discourse, not only Soviet legal scholars were a kind of 
isolated from the Western scholarship – modern Russia continues being not inserted 
deeply in the context of international legal academic studies. One of the reasons is a certain 
linguistic barrier – many books prove that predominantly Russian legal literature rarely 
quotes Western scholars. And as Mälksoo notices, that “this has been mutual: not only 
have Western authors usually ignored treatises in Russian but knowledge of Western 
sources by Russian authors also tends to be limited and fragmentary.”370 
For period of Soviet government the fundamental ideas of justice, state functioning 
were transformed in communist analogue being alike the universal ones only on the 
surface. Judiciary, for instance, in the Soviet system was seen as one of the “instrument of 
the state” which is necessary to be submitted and managed by the ruling communist party. 
It had lost it primary fundamental principle of independence. It is a very complicated task 
for lawyers to consider how the structure of background rules and Russian “civilizational” 
values will affect the output of the legal transitions and reforms. The state has a necessity 
to take into the account the unique cultural patterns in the endless series of socially 
significant choices. This is the difficulty for the post-Soviet countries to orient themselves 
on their national identity and certain social needs due to the historic context, as Gray put it: 
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: “post-communist countries should avoid both the lawless legality of the communist past 
and the politicized legality of the western present.”371   
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Soviet legal doctrine, being extremely interesting for researchers of the history of 
legal thought as a research object itself, is a deep source of knowledge about the 
peculiarities of modern Russian legal thinking.  
The Italian historiographic legal tradition pays close attention to the historical roots 
of any legal concept as an essential additional source of empirical research, especially in 
terms of the construction of legal systems and the interpretation of legal concepts: 
“The legal consciousness of the nation, the primary source of any kind of law, 
didn’t reveal itself only through customs and laws, but most of all through the science. 
Science had the task to interpret customs and law, disclosing the deepest principles of law 
[…] if the systematic construction of law was the object and the ultimate purpose of the 
legal science; it would have been possible to get this aim only by recognizing the historical 
dimension in which the legal science itself was plunged. The scientific organization of legal 
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discourse meant doing legal history, reconstructing and representing its historic and 
theoretic development.”372  
The main argument of the present research is based on that premise – the historical 
and theoretical development and historical systemic construction of law offers an insight 
into the important tendencies and phenomena of modern legal understanding. Any legal 
research without a historical view would not be able to reflect the important patterns, 
especially if they are not that obvious. Moreover, as Mannoni wrote, theoretic doctrinal 
development still plays a huge role in the formation of modern practice when it gives 
interpretation of legal events directly, and indirectly, when it influences on the understating 
of law and its further implication in practice: 
 “How is it necessary to pursue the research? It is very important foremost to see 
things through the theoretic doctrinal dimension.  Legal doctrine has the capacity to render 
the force of the political regime, to present and explicit it clearly, dividing the essential 
aspects from secondary issues. It offers an illustrative representation which combines 
academic discourse with the most important practical issues. So, the doctrine is a source of 
two factors: the first one is direct, which forms in legal consciousness the phenomena with 
potential for the development. And second one, indirect, when it forms the practice, 
evidently in an inexpressive way, but no less influential. This is an invaluable guide for a 
historic researcher.”373 
A very special case is the Russian one. It could not be denied that Russian modern 
legal thinking still has traces of its Soviet heritage. Legal culture forms several generations 
(or more) of time, and this is that layer of consciousness of the nation which is not rapidly 
transformed, but being the basis of all social events it provides inevitable influence. The 
present research is aimed at gaining insights into Soviet legal science and peculiarities of 
legal thinking, especially into the works of Soviet lawyers, whose writings were not widely 
studied in international legal scholarship due to a lack of translation of their texts from 
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Russian. The conclusion which comes as a result of the present research is that Russian 
understanding of law is special, and it has a peculiar legal culture which is not exactly 
Western in its essence. The adoption of legal concepts of Western liberalism and 
democracy after the collapse of USSR did not lead to mere use of legal transplants. Due to 
an obvious national context, and less obvious but perhaps even more important, a 
historical dimension to the development of legal scholarships, Western concepts were 
significantly transformed. The result, being the biggest difficulty for lawyers, politicians and 
academics, is that essentially different systems often have the same names and operate the 
same notions, meaning qualitatively different things. The universality of human rights is 
widely contested in international legal scholarship, and this fact confirms the necessity of 
looking at national contexts and studying deep layers of legal thinking in order to 
understand the real nature of legal concepts. The present research is focused on filling this 
gap in the academic study of Russian approaches to human rights. Another important aim 
is to highlight that emptiness in historical legal study of Soviet law, which has together with 
academic interest, an important impact on understanding human rights in modern Russia.  
Soviet legal doctrine has its very original dimension. It was officially stated and 
widely proclaimed, that Soviet legal doctrine and the whole political as well as social and 
economic systems are based on Marxian theory of communism. But, in fact, even at first 
sight, which is confirmed through more accurate study, the Soviet formation of communist 
theory contains numerous contradictions despite making claims about following the theory 
literally. Those contradictions were inevitable since complex social problems were not 
premised by the theory outlined by Engels and Marx, and situations often demanded ad-
hoc decisions.   
Marxian theory, and its interpretation by Lenin, distinctly prescribed the gradual 
withering away of law upon the achievement of communism. Marx clearly formulated in 
his theory the absence of any type of law (whether it would be a proletarian law, socialistic 
law etc.) under communism.   
Different theories formulated by Soviet scholars - conception of “proletarian” law 
of  D.Kursky, the “socialistic” concept  of human rights of S. Kechekyan, E. Lukasheva 
and  V. Chikvadze, the claim of P.Stuchka about the formation of the new type of special 
Soviet law - contradicted the provision of Marxian doctrine about the overcoming of law 
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on a global scale. Marxian theory did not contain a theoretical notion of law itself due to 
the social, historical and practical impossibility of its existence in the contest of the Marxian 
concept of proletarian communist socialism. 374 
Though the whole structure of Soviet theory was firmly rooted to Marxism-
Leninism, the doctrine was not purely Marxian. As Scobbie wrote about the extent of 
existing contradictions between Marxian theory and Soviet legal doctrine that “at times it 
seems simply to amount to taking the dogma for a walk.”375 That is why it is interesting to 
study the concepts of alternative lawyers who did not have a mainstream during the Soviet 
rule. Their works were still influenced by the political will and due to their non-mainstream 
position, they were more liberal in elaborating concepts which reflected the immediate 
conditions more precisely rather than adjusted to mainstream doctrine. Arguably, their less 
prominent position gave jurists more freedom to disentangle their conception of law and 
ideology.  
Such as, for example, the theory of “octroyed” rights of A.Malitsky (1874 - 1930), 
according to which the rights and freedoms of an individual were a privilege granted to him 
from the state. Since rights were seen as a kind of “gift” it was logical that privilege from 
the state required exercising some obligations in exchange for it toward the state and public 
interests. It is striking that in this theory rights are seen as a bond with a state and depend 
on its will without even admitting a premise about the human essence of individual rights. 
Though this concept was harshly criticized for contradicting the Marxian theory, it reflects 
two very important features of legal understanding at that time – first, that rights were seen 
as a privilege granted by the state, and this privilege was directly influenced by the state’s 
will. And second, an individual was supposed to follow all prescriptions of the state, since 
public interest was a priority provided by the public necessity of the construction of 
communism.     
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Another alternative representative of legal scholarship is Leon Petrajitsky (1867-
1931). Being an academic of Saint-Petersburg University in 1898-1918, Petrajitsky was a 
representative of Imperial Russian scholarship. Because of that, after the revolution of 
1917 he was constrained to immigrate to Poland in order to protect himself from the new 
communist authorities. His psychological concept of law represents a complex 
philosophical legal theory which concentrates on the individual perception of law and 
consciousness origins of legal understating. This concept was adopted by Mikhail Reisner 
who put it on “Marxian foundations” and with this provided a new paradigm of 
psychology in Soviet legal scholarship. 
Traces of psychologism could be observed also in later concept of libertarism of 
Vladik Nersesyants (1938-2005), who explicated the necessity of the division of legal norms 
and legality in order to reconstruct the true meaning of law. According to Nersesyants 
during the Soviet period, the notion of law was perverted in the national consciousness 
because in the Soviet period every political decision officially formulated was called law. He 
insisted on the necessity of rebirth of the essential core of legality, which is based on high 
principles and human values. Only by the reemergence of that initial meaning of law also in 
national consciousness, according to him, will it be possible to construct democracy in a 
post-communist society.  
The contradictions in legal theory were not only due to the lack of provisions in 
Marxian theory about complex social demands which faced a new, post-revolutionary state, 
but were also  conditioned by the need of constant adaptation of itself to the necessities of 
the Soviet political power.376 Soviet legal scholarship had to face the same complexities as 
political power did, but it had a secondary role and had to always correlate it and justify its 
political choices. As Mannoni wrote:  
“The power, in order to obtain legitimacy should transform itself into the authority, 
and needs to be recognized legally. Of course, the legalizing power is always the political 
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process, which is founded on the consensus, but this consensus is achieved on the basis of 
legal norms.”377  
Soviet politics was extremely aimed on and demanded legal justification. Soviet 
Procurator A.Vyshinsky during the trials in his accusation speeches used highly elaborated 
legal rhetoric mixed with personal insults about the defendant. Of course, legal rhetoric 
was only literal during the political processes but it had the desired effect of superficial 
justice.378 Legality was a political power’s language for justification of any necessity. As 
Harold J. Berman (1918–2007), said about violations in Soviet GULAG:  
“[…] the arbitrariness of the system was expressed above all in its legalism. 
Everything was done in the name of the law—some article of the Code, some regulation of 
the Ministry or of the Chief Administration or of the Director, some rule of the camps that 
had to be obeyed. […] The forms of law were utilized, but in a completely perverse way.”379 
Soviet power widely used legal justification for any of its activities, but sometimes it 
in opposite way did not create legal acts on politically significant issues not to be bond with 
them so this way the legal status of CPSU was not stabilized comprehensively by any 
legislative act.  
Though the role of the Communist Party could hardly be over-emphasized since it 
was a core institution in almost all spheres of Soviet society, it became a “vanguard” and 
orientated the political course as well as public morality for the whole population. In a 
strictly legal sense the CPSU was a social organization, but still the Constitution of the 
USSR of 1977 emphasized the Party’s “leading role” for the whole political system (art.6): 
“The Communist Party of the Soviet Union shall be the guiding and directing force 
of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and of State and social 
organizations. The CPSU shall exist for all people and shall serve the people. 
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Armed with Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Communist Party shall determine the 
general perspective for the development of society and the internal and foreign policy line 
of the USSR, direct the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and impart a planned, 
scientifically well-founded character to its struggle for the triumph of communism. 
All Party organizations shall operate within the framework of the USSR 
Constitution.” 
The guiding role of CPSU as well as directing foreign and internal policy makes its 
status rather disappointing. As Butler emphasized it: 
“Article 100 of the USSR Constitution gives Party organizations the right to 
nominate candidates for deputies of soviets of all levels. […] Enterprises owned by the 
CPSU are taken into account in national economic planning and are exempted from the 
duty to pay income tax on balance-sheet profits. On the other hand, no State legislation 
appears to govern the formation or termination of the CPSU as a juridical entity or define 
its external powers or jurisdiction. […] While the Party undoubtedly enjoys legal 
personality, which has the right to sue and to be sued, or be answerable for liabilities out of 
Party assets.”380  
This is relevant for the main argument of the present research as an example of 
contradictory and peculiar juridical constructions which are conditioned by a special 
historic context and which could be traced in the national legal consciousness in terms of 
understanding modern legal practices. Martin Krygier argues that disrespect to legality in 
Eastern and Central European regimes has its roots in the view of the “law’s role as 
subordinate to social forces and as a mask for ruling class interests”381. This tendency exists 
due to the Marxian doctrine provision about withering away of law in future and as a 
consequence its unimportant function: 
“Many of Marx’s comments on law seek to unmask it and its pretensions, as a limit 
to the power of the powerful it is either illusory and systematically partial – for law is 
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involved in class exploitation and repression – or useful to ruling classes as an ideological 
emollient and mask for their social power, a power which, however, well disguised, is 
fundamental – at least, Engels come to add after Marx’s death, “ultimately”, “in the last 
analysis”. It was necessary, not that law fulfills any mythical essence…but it disappears 
along with the state, and with the civil society which supported them and which they 
supported. 
[…] That [law] might…. Be liberating was only conceded by Marx in comparison 
with the feudal past or with worse versions of the capitalist present, certainly not in 
comparison with the socialist and communist future. So to ask Marxist revolutionaries to 
make space for restraint by the rule of law would be to voice a quaint liberal demand for 
which they were not theoretically – let alone temperamentally – programmed.”382 
As Lauri Mälksoo noted, the Russian international legal scholarship has been “a 
world apart from Western scholarship.”383 This tendency has old roots from the Soviet 
legal scholarship - claims about a new type of special Soviet law or Soviet “socialistic” law, 
did not prescribe the necessity of knowledge of Western legal academic studies. Soviet legal 
scholarship highlighted its self-sufficiency, and used the citation of foreign lawyers with 
only one purpose – to demonstrate the falseness of bourgeois legal concepts. Mälksoo 
notices the same tendency in Russian international legal scholarship, claiming that Russian 
authors tend to have a limited knowledge of Western sources, usually they are fragmentary. 
One of the reasons he gives for this is the language barrier. A lot of representatives of 
Russian legal scholarship do not read or write in languages other than Russian.384 Another 
reason for this phenomenon is the historical tendency in the development of Russian 
scholarship, and image of “self-sufficiency” of Soviet academia which still has its traces in 
self-determination of Russian lawyers and their academic traditions. 
After the collapse of the USSR a very wide-spread opinion was that the Russian 
Federation had no other choice other than to adopt Western values. Fukuyama presented 
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history as a clash of ideologies. According to him, since the end of World War II there was 
a constant rivalry between liberal democracies and totalitarian, usually Marxist, regimes. 
(CIT) After the “defeat” of communist ideology, Russia was constrained to transplant 
Western model of democracy and liberalism in the situation of absence of any other viable 
alternatives. 
Mutua Makao gradually proves that existing systems of human rights could hardly 
be called “universal”. He argues that due to the fact that main actors in providing or 
exercising human rights – the activists of the biggest human rights NGOs – are Western, 
they influence the legal concept of human rights adding it to their own values.385 The UN 
Declaration of human rights has a significantly Western view on human rights.386  
The concept of Western liberalism, which incorporates human rights, is deeply 
rooted in the European tradition due to common history. The main democratic institutions 
found in Europe were formed over long periods in the West and as a result it is more 
natural for Western societies to share a stance on human rights since they share the 
common habits, perceptions and an understanding of them.387 The concept of Western 
liberalism is also rooted in the European tradition. Main democratic institutions were 
gradually developed in the West and became an integral part of the national legal culture 
and consciousness. Many concepts function reasonably well in Europe because the vast 
period of their adjusting formed a strong basis of the common understanding of in the 
consciousness of people. 
And still, could we claim peremptorily that after the dissolution of Soviet Union 
and overthrowing of communist ideology, post-Soviet countries adopted the Western 
model of liberalism and construction of democracy in conditions of the absence of any 
other relevant ideological alternative? The expectations about post-communist countries 
merely joining to the Western liberal tradition could not be admitted. The complex 
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situation and rich historical background makes it impossible in real life to make any claims 
about the pure adoption of legal and political transplants in post-Soviet countries. As Lauri 
Mälksoo put it: “Russia did not, politically or ideologically speaking, became like Poland or 
the Czech Republic. It became a member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe but not 
of the EU and NATO. Quite soon, efforts to ‘Westernize’ Russia were confronted by 
serious backlashes and it became obvious that rather than becoming ‘Western’, Russia was 
choosing its own way, also ideologically.”388 
Another explanation of the special character of Russian legal thinking is that since 
universality of rights is widely contested, this is inevitable, that every country has its own 
way in understanding of law: “the human rights regime has serious and dramatic 
implications for questions of cultural diversity, the sovereignty of states, and ultimately the 
“universality” of human rights.” 389  Moreover, this is true for countries with a Soviet 
background, which has a special impact on any legal construction.  
Also, usually very elastic and indeterminate legal concept requires wide 
interpretation, as well as detail elaboration. The most important and principled human 
rights concepts are formulated with extremely high levels of abstraction.390 This elastic and 
open-ended character of legal concepts requires setting up a lot of special provisions which 
depend on the context and reality of a certain country. Moreover, in post-communist 
societies lawyers and drafters of new laws had an absolutely different legal thought, which 
was developed during Soviet rule. It is rather unrealistic to expect them to be synchronized 
with Western leading conceptualizing jurisdictions.  
This view on the continuity of the Russian tradition is based on the premise that 
“not everything considered Soviet disappeared overnight after 1991.”391 Post-communist 
Russia experienced the come-backs of arguments on different cultural and civilizational 
issues on the features of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This view is opposed by the alternative 
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position – that it is always people and institutions to blame about violations of legality.392 
Nonetheless, the main argument of the present research is based on historiographical 
method, which claims the necessity to reconstruct the bonds between the past and the 
present in order to grasp the essence of the object of the study and the premise that history 
should not be undervalued. 
Besides this, in the research was covered a view which is completely different from 
such Westernized position. John Gray argues that is it profoundly defective to measure the 
democracy reconstruction in post-communist societies due to the accomplishment of 
Western liberal institutions. Post-communist countries in general would rather reach a 
dead-lock if they had been just plainly coping Western democracies. Any 
institutionalization of democratic forms were undertaken upon the gradual process of 
adaptation of foreign experience to the needs and circumstances of the society. As John 
Gray put it in his essay “Post-Totalitarianism, Civil Society and Limits of Western model”: 
“This is not to say that the best prospect for the post-communist societies is in 
merely replicating Western capitalist institutions in their present forms. Although 
acceptance of the core institutions in market capitalism is an inescapable of the core 
institutions of communist societies, the forms these presently assume in the West are a 
historic accident, contingencies in the development of these institutions rather than 
essential, constitutive features of them. The different post-communist societies may 
reconstruct the core institution of private property in various ways, each appropriate to 
their environmental, cultural, and economic circumstances. Further, the degree to which 
they operate a mixed economy will vary significantly – though they are likely, if they are 
prudent, to opt for a state or public sector smaller than that in most Western countries, 
including the United States.”393  
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Such a vision of the development of civil society on the democratic transformations 
in post-communist countries touches deeper layers of social consciousness rather than 
measure the technical approach to the establishment of democratic institutions. The 
category of civil society is strictly bounded to the social legal thought and overall culture of 
a certain community. It could reflect more precisely the real situation regarding democratic 
changes rather than the institutional approach. 
Post-communist legal reconstruction revealed complex risks to achieve democracy 
and the responsibility of lawyers in democratic input. The role of Soviet heritage should 
not be neglected during any meaningful and complex study of the peculiarities of Russian 
understanding and use of law. The current political and legislative situation, reforms aimed 
at establishing new democratic authorities, and the judicial system should be explained 
from a historical perspective in order to have a complex understanding of the processes. 
An examination of the complex historical events in the Soviet Union and its post-
communist democratic reconstruction is necessary to analyze the current Russian 
understanding of law. Historiographical study of legal theory forms the basis for academics 
and political thinkers to establish links between the past and the present situation, in order 
to achieve a deeper understanding of modern events as well as the essence of institutions 
and doctrines. 
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